{
  "id": "R42868",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R42868",
  "active": true,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 430052,
      "date": "2012-12-14",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-06T21:33:38.113508",
      "title": "Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 C.F.R. 37, A New Rule to Protect Radioactive Material: Background, Summary, Views from the Field",
      "summary": "This report analyzes 10 C.F.R. 37, a forthcoming rule promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Physical Protection of Byproduct Material. Byproduct material includes specified types of radioactive material other than uranium or plutonium. The rule regulates byproduct material of types and in quantities that could be used to make a dirty bomb.\nCongress may find this analysis of interest for several reasons: Congress attaches great importance to protecting the United States against terrorist threats; the rule will affect the many industrial, research, and medical activities nationwide that use radioactive materials, thereby affecting many constituents and raising cost-benefit issues; and there is wide concern about regulation and radiation more generally.\nNRC may regulate through orders or rules. Both have the effect of law. If prompt action is required, NRC may issue orders to its licensees. After 9/11, NRC issued orders to enhance radioactive material security. Orders went to licensees of irradiators having a large amount of radioactive material (2003), manufacturers and distributors of radioactive material (2004), licensees transporting radioactive materials in quantities of concern (2005), and others.\nNRC prefers, however, to regulate through rules. The rulemaking process is transparent, as it solicits public comments and revises draft rules to reflect them, a process that may take years, whereas NRC may issue orders with little or no public involvement. An order applies only to licensees receiving it, while a rule applies to all current and future licensees. Accordingly, NRC began a rulemaking process to consolidate the security orders into a rule. It solicited public comments in the June 15, 2010, Federal Register.\n10 C.F.R. 37 incorporates many provisions of the orders. Its main areas are:\nBackground investigations and access control programs, setting trustworthiness and reliability (T&R) requirements for persons granted unescorted access to radioactive material in quantities of concern.\nPhysical protection requirements during use, requiring licensees to establish a written security program, coordinate with local law enforcement, and be able to monitor, detect, and assess theft of radioactive material.\nPhysical protection in transit, requiring transporters of radioactive material to follow certain procedures.\nTo assess impacts of the rule, CRS interviewed 14 radiation professionals, including state regulators, university radiation safety officers, manufacturers and distributors of radioactive material, and a transportation specialist. They noted such impacts as:\nT&R adjudication: Some interviewees felt requirements were burdensome; others could meet requirements easily. Some felt human resources staff lacked expertise needed to adjudicate T&R; others were confident in staff capability.\nCooperation with local law enforcement: Some interviewees felt that cooperation was excellent. Some found it improved greatly once the threat had been explained. Others found poor cooperation. Still others noted that multiple emergencies or the size of an officers patrol area could delay response.\nTransportation security: NRC relinquishes parts of its regulatory authority to certain states. One interviewee felt the Department of Transportation, not NRC and states, should regulate transport of radioactive materials to establish uniform national requirements: when transportation requirements are set by many [state] regulators and by federal interstate commerce rules as well, compliance with transportation regulations can become very complicated.\nThe analysis raises several general points:\nThe orders imposed many requirements on licensees. Since the rule incorporates many of these requirements, it imposes less additional regulatory burden than would have been the case if the orders had not been issued first.\nSince the rule requires many actions regardless of facility size, it would appear to impose a proportionately larger burden on small licensees.\nThe rule implements a layered defense. The ability of one layer to offset weaknesses in others should improve security but cannot guarantee it.\nFurther stepssuch as requiring licensees to install more monitoring equipment or mandating more stringent requirements for adjudicating personnel reliabilitymight increase security beyond what the rule provides. Whether their costs are worth potential benefits is a matter for political judgment.",
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      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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  "topics": [
    "Energy Policy",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}