{
  "id": "R42683",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R42683",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 415714,
      "date": "2012-08-23",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-06T23:58:30.938704",
      "title": "Critical Infrastructure Resilience: The Evolution of Policy and Programs and Issues for Congress",
      "summary": "In 2006, the Critical Infrastructure Task Force of the Homeland Security Advisory Council initiated a public policy debate arguing that the government\u2019s critical infrastructure policies were focused too much on protecting assets from terrorist attacks and not focused enough on improving the resilience of assets against a variety of threats. According to the Task Force, such a defensive posture was \u201cbrittle.\u201d Not all possible targets could be protected and adversaries could find ways to defeat defenses, still leaving the nation having to deal with the consequences. The Task Force advocated that greater encouragement for resilience would broaden the range of risk reduction options and should be the overarching policy framework for reducing risks associated with all threats to critical infrastructure. Others in the homeland security community agreed.\nCritical infrastructure are those assets the loss of which would result in great harm to the nation\u2019s security, economy, health and safety, and morale. They include assets necessary to generate and distribute such basic goods and services such as electricity, drinking water, telecommunications, banking and finance, etc. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to a change in environment or conditions. The Task Force argued that government policies encouraged employing greater defenses such as surveillance equipment, guards, etc., around these assets but did less to encourage efforts that would allow assets to continue operating at some level, or quickly return to full operation, if attacked. Such efforts might include increasing redundancies (such as having multiple backup power generation capability) or designing more robust systems for the future (such as using more hardened concrete for stronger fixed facilities). \nIn 2008, as part of its oversight function, the House Committee on Homeland Security held a series of hearings addressing resilience. At those hearings, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) argued that government policies and actions did encourage resilience as well as protection. Even so, subsequent policy documents made greater reference to resilience. At first those references were relatively superficial, but later they became more substantive. Policy has evolved to the point that resilience and protection of critical infrastructure assets are recognized as distinct options to be equally considered when seeking to reduce the risks associated with potential attacks on critical infrastructures.\nAs policy has evolved, programs have also evolved somewhat, to support efforts at improving critical infrastructure resiliency. The Office of Infrastructure Protection within the DHS conducts risk assessments at the asset and regional level that now include a resilience index along with a protection index. The program allows asset owners/operators to compare their level of resilience to other similar assets and allows them to analyze how certain improvements might contribute to better resilience. Also, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate supports some resilience-oriented research and development projects. In addition to projects developing better technologies to aid in response and recovery, the Directorate also supports projects that are developing technologies for structures to withstand blasts or large physical displacements or systems which can self-heal after being damaged.\nThe Federal Emergency Management Agency within DHS provides grants, primarily to state and local governments or public authorities, that largely support resilience by improving the ability to respond to and recover from incidents. Mitigation grants, which allow communities to reduce the potential consequences of an incident before it happens, offer limited support for improving the resilience of critical infrastructures. There is relatively little direct government support or incentives for private sector owners/operators to implement resilience-oriented (or protective-oriented) measures. It is not clear if market incentives are sufficient to drive such investments. Congress may choose to consider the adequacy of private investments in resilience, whether the private market provides sufficient incentives, and options for government action if markets do not.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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      "topics": [
        {
          "source": "IBCList",
          "id": 3473,
          "name": "Emergency and Disaster Preparedness"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Intelligence and National Security"
  ]
}