{
  "id": "R42339",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R42339",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 400733,
      "date": "2012-02-02",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-07T00:16:46.789278",
      "title": "Lebanon and the Uprising in Syria: Issues for Congress",
      "summary": "As Congress exercises oversight and prepares to consider programs for Lebanon in the coming year, some observers have expressed fear that Syrian instability may negatively affect Lebanon. Syria exerts a strong political influence on Lebanon and Syrian business interests remain prominent in the Lebanese economy. Both Lebanon and Syria have diverse societies where ethnic and sectarian groups compete and cooperate as they seek power within the confines of a rigid political system. Primary concerns about the implications of Syrian unrest include:\nNegative effects on the Lebanese economy; \nIncursions by Syrian forces into Lebanese territory; \nThe cross-border transfer of arms to Hezbollah and the Syrian opposition; opportunities for suspected Al Qaeda supporters; and,\nThe migration of Syrian dissidents and refugees to Lebanon seeking safe haven. \nContinued unrest could exacerbate all of these problems, while complicating sectarian relations in Lebanon, reshaping Hezbollah\u2019s strategic position, and contributing to regional instability. Although Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2005, Syria continues to exercise influence through its patronage relationships with members of the pro-Syrian and Hezbollah-affiliated March 8 governing coalition This coalition includes Hezbollah, the Shiite party Amal, the Maronite Christian Free Patriotic Movement, and the Druze-led Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). Its members have mostly supported the Asad regime since unrest in Syria began in early 2011, complicating Lebanese politics and Lebanese-Syrian relations. Despite these complications, many analysts agree that the major political players in Lebanon share a desire to insulate Lebanon from the unrest in Syria and avoid risking domestic conflict by dramatically upsetting the current Lebanese balance of power. However, the fractious nature of Lebanese politics makes discord likely; a small provocation could easily disrupt the tenuous peace. Increased unrest in Syria or dramatic regime change there may incite instability in Lebanon. \nThese factors also may affect the goals and implementation of U.S. programs in Lebanon, which include strengthening Lebanon\u2019s weak democratic institutions, limiting Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon\u2019s political process, and countering transnational threats from Hezbollah and other militant groups through security assistance. Congress may review U.S. priorities and programs and consider the following questions in relation to future U.S. policy in Lebanon:\nWhat are the rationales for key U.S. foreign assistance programs related to Lebanon\u2019s security forces, border control, and efforts to combat terrorism? How might unrest in Syria and potential spillover effects challenge the assumptions and viability of U.S. programs? How might prolonged unrest or civil war in Syria affect relations among Lebanese groups? How might U.S. assistance limit potential negative effects?\nHow are Lebanese political leaders and groups responding to events in Syria? How has the unrest and the potential for regime change affected Hezbollah\u2019s strategic position and outlook? To what extent should U.S. policymakers seek to impose or remove conditions on U.S. assistance to Lebanon in light of events? \nFor more information on Lebanon, please see CRS Report R40054, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations, by Casey L. Addis and contact Christopher Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, at extension 7-0428.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
      "formats": [
        {
          "format": "HTML",
          "encoding": "utf-8",
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R42339",
          "sha1": "9a22ae5ba6102180e834911a8fc4f3c15d34e02f",
          "filename": "files/20120202_R42339_9a22ae5ba6102180e834911a8fc4f3c15d34e02f.html",
          "images": null
        },
        {
          "format": "PDF",
          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R42339",
          "sha1": "378d27d8c7a222de582266b0fb6b46ca5bbd1035",
          "filename": "files/20120202_R42339_378d27d8c7a222de582266b0fb6b46ca5bbd1035.pdf",
          "images": null
        }
      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "Middle Eastern Affairs",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}