{ "id": "R42079", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R42079", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 587156, "date": "2017-03-27", "retrieved": "2020-01-02T14:41:55.856674", "title": "Federal Reserve: Oversight and Disclosure Issues", "summary": "Critics of the Federal Reserve (Fed) have long argued for more oversight, transparency, and disclosure. Criticism intensified following the extensive assistance the Fed provided to financial firms during the financial crisis. Some critics downplay the degree of Fed oversight and disclosure that already takes place. \nFor oversight, the Fed is required to provide a written report to and testify before the committees of jurisdiction semiannually. In addition, these committees periodically hold more focused hearings on Fed topics. Critics have sought a Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the Fed. The Fed\u2019s financial statements are annually audited by private-sector auditors. Contrary to popular belief, GAO has periodically conducted Fed audits since 1978, subject to statutory restrictions, and a GAO audit would not, under current law, release any confidential information identifying institutions that have borrowed from the Fed or the details of other transactions. The Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) resulted in an audit of the Fed\u2019s emergency activities during the financial crisis and an audit of Fed governance. GAO can currently audit Fed activities for waste, fraud, and abuse. Effectively, the remaining statutory restrictions prevent GAO from evaluating the economic merits of Fed policy decisions. H.R. 24 would remove these restrictions and require a GAO audit that would not be subject to remaining statutory restrictions. \nFor disclosure, the Fed has publicly released extensive information on its operations, mostly on a voluntary basis. It is statutorily required to release an annual report and a weekly summary of its balance sheet. In December 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act required the Fed to release individual lending records for emergency facilities created during the financial crisis, revealing borrowers\u2019 identities and loans\u2019 terms. Going forward, individual records for discount window and open market operation transactions have been released with a two-year lag. More recently, congressional attention has shifted to disclosure related to Fed regulation. \nAlthough oversight and disclosure are often lumped together, they are separate issues. Oversight entails independent evaluation of the Fed; disclosure is an issue of what internal information the Fed releases to the public. A potential consequence of greater oversight is that it could undermine the Fed\u2019s political independence. Most economists contend that the Fed\u2019s political independence leads to better policy outcomes and makes policy more effective by enhancing the Fed\u2019s credibility in the eyes of market participants. Chair Yellen believes that the GAO audit provision \u201cwould politicize monetary policy and bring short-term political pressures into the deliberations of the FOMC by putting into place real-time second guessing of policy decisions.\u201d Disclosure helps Congress and the public better understand the Fed\u2019s actions. Up to a point, this makes monetary and regulatory policy more effective, but too much disclosure could make both less effective because they rely on confidential, market-moving information. The challenge for Congress is to strike the right balance between a desire for the Fed to be responsive to Congress and for the Fed\u2019s decisions to be immune from short-term political calculations. A potential drawback to greater disclosure is that publicizing the names of borrowers could potentially stigmatize them in a way that causes runs on those borrowers or causes them to shun access to needed liquidity. Either outcome could result in a less stable financial system. A potential benefit of publicizing borrowers is to safeguard against favoritism or other conflicts of interest.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R42079", "sha1": "cdd91f0dc6ac4465d0f661274c5c0bbf4d1b6110", "filename": "files/20170327_R42079_cdd91f0dc6ac4465d0f661274c5c0bbf4d1b6110.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R42079", "sha1": "87df5b91ee2ee70f2185547e41d19ba0ceefd0e7", "filename": "files/20170327_R42079_87df5b91ee2ee70f2185547e41d19ba0ceefd0e7.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4891, "name": "Federal Reserve & Monetary Policy" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 452844, "date": "2016-05-24", "retrieved": "2016-06-21T21:15:19.002819", "title": "Federal Reserve: Oversight and Disclosure Issues", "summary": "Critics of the Federal Reserve (Fed) have long argued for more oversight, transparency, and disclosure. Criticism intensified following the extensive assistance the Fed provided to financial firms during the financial crisis. Some critics downplay the degree of Fed oversight and disclosure that already takes place. \nFor oversight, the Fed is required to provide a written report to and testify before the committees of jurisdiction semi-annually. In addition, these committees periodically hold more focused hearings on Fed topics. Critics have sought a Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the Fed. The Fed\u2019s financial statements are annually audited by private-sector auditors. Contrary to popular belief, GAO has periodically conducted Fed audits since 1978, subject to statutory restrictions, and a GAO audit would not, under current law, release any confidential information identifying institutions that have borrowed from the Fed or the details of other transactions. The Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) resulted in an audit of the Fed\u2019s emergency activities during the financial crisis and an audit of Fed governance. GAO can currently audit Fed activities for waste, fraud, and abuse. Effectively, the remaining statutory restrictions prevent GAO from evaluating the economic merits of Fed policy decisions. H.R. 3189, passed by the House, would require annual GAO audits that would not be subject to statutory restrictions. H.R. 24, S. 264, and S. 2232 would also require a GAO audit that would not be subject to statutory restrictions. \nFor disclosure, the Fed has publicly released extensive information on its operations, mostly on a voluntary basis. It is statutorily required to release an annual report and a weekly summary of its balance sheet. In December 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act required the Fed to release individual lending records for emergency facilities created during the financial crisis, revealing borrowers\u2019 identities and loans\u2019 terms. Going forward, individual records for discount window and open market operation transactions have been released with a two-year lag. More recently, congressional attention has shifted to disclosure related to Fed regulation. H.R. 3189 would require the Fed to conduct quantitative cost-benefit analysis on its rulemaking and disclose more information related to regulation (including international agreements), and salary and financial information about Fed officials and employees. H.R. 3189 and S. 1484/S. 1910 would require the Fed to compare its monetary policy to a rule and release transcripts of its policy deliberations.\nAlthough oversight and disclosure are often lumped together, they are separate issues. Oversight entails independent evaluation of the Fed; disclosure is an issue of what internal information the Fed releases to the public. A potential consequence of greater oversight is that it could undermine the Fed\u2019s political independence. Most economists contend that the Fed\u2019s political independence leads to better policy outcomes and makes policy more effective by enhancing the Fed\u2019s credibility in the eyes of market participants. Chair Yellen believes that the GAO audit provision in H.R. 3189 \u201cwould politicize monetary policy and bring short-term political pressures into the deliberations of the FOMC by putting into place real-time second guessing of policy decisions.\u201d Disclosure helps Congress and the public better understand the Fed\u2019s actions. Up to a point, this makes monetary and regulatory policy more effective, but too much disclosure could make both less effective because they rely on confidential information. The challenge for Congress is to strike the right balance between a desire for the Fed to be responsive to Congress and for the Fed\u2019s decisions to be immune from short-term political calculations. A potential drawback to greater disclosure is that publicizing the names of borrowers could potentially stigmatize them in a way that causes runs on those borrowers or causes them to shun access to needed liquidity. Either outcome could result in a less stable financial system. A potential benefit of publicizing borrowers is to safeguard against favoritism or other conflicts of interest.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R42079", "sha1": "3ad6c58db8cf699c076ed045d56b79449ab4f9d1", "filename": "files/20160524_R42079_3ad6c58db8cf699c076ed045d56b79449ab4f9d1.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R42079", "sha1": "cc299bae0bce9f634c6c1c0a2a2ee2f84298cd29", "filename": "files/20160524_R42079_cc299bae0bce9f634c6c1c0a2a2ee2f84298cd29.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 237, "name": "Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 448700, "date": "2016-01-13", "retrieved": "2016-04-06T17:30:38.188662", "title": "Federal Reserve: Oversight and Disclosure Issues", "summary": "Critics of the Federal Reserve (Fed) have long argued for more oversight, transparency, and disclosure. Criticism intensified following the extensive assistance the Fed provided to financial firms during the financial crisis. Some critics downplay the degree of Fed oversight and disclosure that already takes place. \nFor oversight, the Fed is required to provide a written report to and testify before the committees of jurisdiction semi-annually. In addition, these committees periodically hold more focused hearings on Fed topics. Critics have sought a Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the Fed. The Fed\u2019s financial statements are annually audited by private-sector auditors. Contrary to popular belief, GAO has periodically conducted Fed audits since 1978, subject to statutory restrictions, and a GAO audit would not, under current law, release any confidential information identifying institutions that have borrowed from the Fed or the details of other transactions. The Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) resulted in an audit of the Fed\u2019s emergency activities during the financial crisis and an audit of Fed governance. GAO can currently audit Fed activities for waste, fraud, and abuse. Effectively, the remaining statutory restrictions prevent GAO from evaluating the economic merits of Fed policy decisions. H.R. 3189, passed by the House, would require annual GAO audits that would not be subject to statutory restrictions. H.R. 24, S. 264, and S. 2232 would also require a GAO audit that would not be subject to statutory restrictions. On January 12, 2016, the Senate voted not to invoke cloture on S. 2232.\nFor disclosure, the Fed has publicly released extensive information on its operations, mostly on a voluntary basis. It is statutorily required to release an annual report and a weekly summary of its balance sheet. In December 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act required the Fed to release individual lending records for emergency facilities created during the financial crisis, revealing borrowers\u2019 identities and loans\u2019 terms. Going forward, individual records for discount window and open market operation transactions have been released with a two-year lag. More recently, congressional attention has shifted to disclosure related to Fed regulation. H.R. 3189 would require the Fed to conduct quantitative cost-benefit analysis on its rulemaking and disclose more information related to regulation (including international agreements), and salary and financial information about Fed officials and employees. H.R. 3189 and S. 1484/S. 1910 would require the Fed to compare its monetary policy to a rule and release transcripts of its policy deliberations.\nAlthough oversight and disclosure are often lumped together, they are separate issues. Oversight entails independent evaluation of the Fed; disclosure is an issue of what internal information the Fed releases to the public. A potential consequence of greater oversight is that it could undermine the Fed\u2019s political independence. Most economists contend that the Fed\u2019s political independence leads to better policy outcomes and makes policy more effective by enhancing the Fed\u2019s credibility in the eyes of market participants. Chair Yellen believes that the GAO audit provision in H.R. 3189 \u201cwould politicize monetary policy and bring short-term political pressures into the deliberations of the FOMC by putting into place real-time second guessing of policy decisions.\u201d Disclosure helps Congress and the public better understand the Fed\u2019s actions. Up to a point, this makes monetary and regulatory policy more effective, but too much disclosure could make both less effective because they rely on confidential information. The challenge for Congress is to strike the right balance between a desire for the Fed to be responsive to Congress and for the Fed\u2019s decisions to be immune from short-term political calculations. A potential drawback to greater disclosure is that publicizing the names of borrowers could potentially stigmatize them in a way that causes runs on those borrowers or causes them to shun access to needed liquidity. Either outcome could result in a less stable financial system. A potential benefit of publicizing borrowers is to safeguard against favoritism or other conflicts of interest.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R42079", "sha1": "8ea72a289101939cc12dcdc8bd26a2874ea6a171", "filename": "files/20160113_R42079_8ea72a289101939cc12dcdc8bd26a2874ea6a171.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R42079", "sha1": "63eae6d91c58a4ad54762f2f9782640bd42b2093", "filename": "files/20160113_R42079_63eae6d91c58a4ad54762f2f9782640bd42b2093.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 237, "name": "Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc824711/", "id": "R42079_2016Jan04", "date": "2016-01-04", "retrieved": "2016-04-04T14:48:17", "title": "Federal Reserve: Oversight and Disclosure Issues", "summary": "This report provides an overview of existing Federal Reserve (Fed) oversight and disclosure practices. It also considers the potential impact of greater oversight and disclosure on the Fed's independence and its ability to achieve its macroeconomic and financial stability goals.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20160104_R42079_99bfe36bf92ab7a0bd9e27ea935650dfcc8e509a.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20160104_R42079_99bfe36bf92ab7a0bd9e27ea935650dfcc8e509a.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Economic policy", "name": "Economic policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Monetary policy", "name": "Monetary policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Central banks and banking", "name": "Central banks and banking" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc795899/", "id": "R42079_2015Dec01", "date": "2015-12-01", "retrieved": "2016-01-13T14:26:20", "title": "Federal Reserve: Oversight and Disclosure Issues", "summary": "This report provides an overview of existing Fed oversight and disclosure practices. It also considers the potential impact of greater oversight and disclosure on the Fed's independence and its ability to achieve its macroeconomic and financial stability goals.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20151201_R42079_778a77284bc3ea5e4c9c8655e46e410e700cb0d4.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20151201_R42079_778a77284bc3ea5e4c9c8655e46e410e700cb0d4.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Finance", "name": "Finance" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Monetary policy", "name": "Monetary policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Federal reserve system", "name": "Federal reserve system" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Central banks and banking", "name": "Central banks and banking" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc462263/", "id": "R42079_2014Sep19", "date": "2014-09-19", "retrieved": "2014-12-05T09:57:41", "title": "Federal Reserve: Oversight and Disclosure Issues", "summary": "This report provides an overview of existing Fed oversight and disclosure practices. The report also considers the potential impact of greater oversight and disclosure on the Fed's independence and its ability to achieve its macroeconomic and financial stability goals.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20140919_R42079_8f70250d0b3b49109f6c56c31d760e1caedd15cf.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20140919_R42079_8f70250d0b3b49109f6c56c31d760e1caedd15cf.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Economic policy", "name": "Economic policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Monetary policy", "name": "Monetary policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Central banks and banking", "name": "Central banks and banking" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc462859/", "id": "R42079_2014Jul25", "date": "2014-07-25", "retrieved": "2014-12-05T09:57:41", "title": "Federal Reserve: Oversight and Disclosure Issues", "summary": "The report discusses recently-enacted legislation and legislation introduced in the 113th Congress related to the Federal Reserve (Fed). It also provides information about the potential impact of greater oversight and disclosure on the Fed's independence and its ability to achieve its macroeconomic and financial stability goals.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20140725_R42079_58050872a15cf0abe49f824161da26d8e3cf1409.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20140725_R42079_58050872a15cf0abe49f824161da26d8e3cf1409.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Federal reserve system", "name": "Federal reserve system" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Economic policy", "name": "Economic policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Banks and banking", "name": "Banks and banking" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc287890/", "id": "R42079_2014Apr15", "date": "2014-04-15", "retrieved": "2014-06-05T20:55:02", "title": "Federal Reserve: Oversight and Disclosure Issues", "summary": "The report discusses recently-enacted legislation and legislation introduced in the 113th Congress related to the Federal Reserve (Fed). It also provides information about the potential impact of greater oversight and disclosure on the Fed's independence and its ability to achieve its macroeconomic and financial stability goals.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20140415_R42079_6b3979f1fae71cec1b493b4fde522cbb25f89355.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20140415_R42079_6b3979f1fae71cec1b493b4fde522cbb25f89355.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Federal reserve system", "name": "Federal reserve system" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Economic policy", "name": "Economic policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Banks and banking", "name": "Banks and banking" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Economic Policy" ] }