Financial Transactions Taxes: In Brief

Financial Transactions Taxes: In Brief

Financial Transactions Taxes: In Brief
Updated February 23, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R42078

Financial Transactions Taxes: In Brief

ince the financial crisis and the ensuing 2008-2009 Great Recession, the idea of imposing a
tax on financial transactions has appeared somewhat frequently in policy debates, most
S recently in response to the GameStop-related market volatility.1 At its most basic level, a
financial transaction tax (FTT) is a tax imposed on the buyer or sel er of a security at the time a
financial transaction occurs. An FTT can be applied across the board to al financial transactions,
or only those involving specific types of securities (for example, stocks, options, and futures, but
not bonds). Similarly, an FTT can be applied to the transactions of al traders, or selectively to
only certain types, such as those made by institutional traders but not individual investors.
While an FTT can come in many different forms, three justifications are commonly offered for
imposing such a tax: (1) it would reduce financial market volatility by reducing speculation, (2) it
would generate a significant amount of revenue, and (3) it would help pay for recent and future
federal assistance to the institutions that are viewed by some as the source of the financial
instability (a.k.a., “Wal Street”). This report briefly discusses the concept of an FTT in a
historical and international context, summarizes recent FTT proposals, examines the tax’s effect
on financial market volatility and speculation, and analyzes the revenue potential.
Opponents of the tax also general y offer a number of objections. First, it is argued that the tax
wil introduce distortions into the marketplace as wel as raise the cost of capital for businesses
seeking to finance investment. Second, if raising revenue is the objective, it is not clear that an
FTT is the best of al available options. Third, if the tax is effective at raising a large amount of
revenue, this would seem to imply that its ability to reduce speculation and high-frequency
trading is low (and vice versa). And fourth, regulators may be better suited to increase
transparency and reduce volatility using the set of tools at their disposal, which may more directly
target improving the function of financial markets if the current financial environment is viewed
to have problems.
Historical and International Overview of FTTs
The general idea of an FTT can be traced back to at least the time of the Great Depression. In
1936, British economist John Maynard Keynes suggested that the United States impose an FTT to
reduce “speculation” in financial markets by raising the cost of short-term trading.2 Along similar
lines, American economist and Nobel Laureate James Tobin, speaking in 1972, advocated for a
worldwide tax on al foreign currency transactions to quel disruptions in the foreign exchange
markets.3 Tobin’s proposal, which became known as the “Tobin tax,” is technical y different from
an FTT because it applies only to foreign currency transactions, but is substantively similar in
objective to an FTT. Thus, the two terms are often used synonymously. Other terms that are used
interchangeably with FTT include securities transactions tax, securities transfer tax, securities
transfer excise tax, stamp duty, and stock transfer tax.
There are historical precedents for an FTT in the United States. At the federal level there was a
stock transfer excise tax (sometimes cal ed a documentary stamp tax) on the issuance and
subsequent transfer of securities from 1914 to 1966. Currently, the Securities and Exchange

1 For more information on the GameStop issue, see CRS Insight IN11591, GameStop-Related Market Volatility: Policy
Issues, by Eva Su.
2 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (New York: Harcourt, 1953), pp.
158-160.
3 James T obin, T he Eliot Janeway Lectures at Princeton, 1972 as published in James T obin, The New Economics, One
Decade older: The Eliot Janeway Lectures on Historical Econom ics in Honor of Joseph Schum peter (Princeton , NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1974).
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Financial Transactions Taxes: In Brief

Commission (SEC) imposes a tax-like fee on certain securities transactions. At the state and local
level, the state of New York, in conjunction with New York City, taxed the transfer of stocks from
1905 to 1981.4 There have been proposals in New York to reinstate the transfer tax since its
repeal.
There are also international precedents for an FTT; at least 40 countries currently or previously
have had FTTs.5 It is beyond the scope of this report to compare and contrast the existing FTTs
around the world; however, it is important to note that there are differences, and in some cases
these differences may impact the effect of the tax.
Proposals
There have been numerous FTT proposals introduced since the financial crisis. The most recent
proposal, H.R. 328, introduced in the 117th Congress, proposes a 10-basis-point tax (0.1%) on
transactions involving stocks, bonds, futures, options swaps, and credit default swaps. The
proposal is a reintroduction of the same proposal contained in H.R. 1516 (and S. 647) introduced
in the 116th Congress. These proposals are similar to H.R. 2306 introduced in the 115th Congress,
which proposed a 3-basis-point tax (0.03%) on transactions involving stocks, bonds, futures,
options swaps, and credit default swaps. H.R. 2306 included an offsetting tax credit for
contributions to qualified tax-favored accounts (retirement accounts, health savings accounts,
education accounts, etc.). A similar 3-basis-point tax was included in H.R. 5745 in the 114th
Congress; H.R. 880, S. 277, and S. 410 in the 113th Congress; and H.R. 3313, H.R. 3638, H.R.
5727, S. 1787, and S. 2252 in the 112th Congress, although not al of these bil s included an
offsetting tax credit for tax-favored accounts.
Proposals introduced in the 114th Congress included S. 1371, S. 1373, and H.R. 1464, which
would have imposed a tax rate that varied depending on the underlying security. Specifical y, the
bil s would have subjected transactions involving stocks and interests in partnerships and trusts to
a 50-basis-point-tax (0.5%), transactions involving bonds and other forms of debt (other than tax-
exempt state and local bonds, and bonds with a maturity of less than 60 days) to a 10-basis-point-
tax (0.10%), and derivative transactions to a half-basis-point-tax (0.005%). The proposals would
have also provided an offsetting tax credit for taxpayers with a modified gross adjusted income of
$50,000 or less ($75,000 if married filing jointly). An identical FTT proposal was included in
H.R. 1579 from the 113th Congress.
FTT proposals were also introduced in the 110th and 111th Congresses, although these earlier
proposals were general y less detailed than more recent ones, and typical y had higher tax rates.
For example, the first FTT proposal (H.R. 7125) made during the financial crisis in the 110th
Congress would have subjected transactions involving securities regulated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to a 25-
basis-point-tax (0.25%) tax. There were a number of proposals in the 111th Congress, as wel ,
which differed in terms of what types of transactions were covered. These include H.R. 1068,

4 For example, details of the tax in New York state are described in Robert Pollin and James Heintz, Confronting the
New York Fiscal Crisis: Raising Revenue Through Taxing Stock Market Transactions, Research Brief 2003-4 (Political
Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, June 2003), p. 2, available at
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/research_brief/RB2003-4.pdf.
5 Daiana Beitler, Raising Revenue: A Review of Financial Transaction Taxes Throughout The World , Health Poverty
Action and Stamp Out Poverty, September 2010, http://www.robinhoodtax.org/sites/default/files/
Raising%2520Revenue%2520web.pdf.
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H.R. 3153, H.R. 4191. In each proposal, however, the maximum tax rate was 25 basis points
(0.25%).
Effect on Financial Market Volatility
An argument that is periodical y invoked in support of an FTT is that the tax would reduce
trading volume, which in turn would reduce volatility in financial markets. It seems likely that a
tax on financial trading would indeed reduce trading volume, as some transactions would become
unprofitable. The reduction in trading, however, could either reduce or increase market volatility.
On the one hand, a reduction in volatility could occur if the tax pushes destabilizing traders out of
the market. On the other hand, volatility could increase if the tax impedes upon the price
discovery function of financial markets. In this case, the tax could lead to greater movement in
asset prices (i.e., volatility) as traders wait for larger fluctuations to offset the higher trading costs
stemming from the FTT. Additional y, it is not clear how effective an FTT would be at preventing
“flash crashes” similar to the ones seen in recent years, especial y ones triggered by a human
error or computer malfunctions.6 It is also not clear how wel an FTT would deter aggressive
trading behavior that could lead securities to temporarily decouple from fundamentals.
A number of empirical studies have examined how FTTs and FTT-like regulations affect financial
market volatility. The majority of the literature has found that transaction taxes either have no
effect on volatility, or that they increase volatility.7 There may be limitations to some of the
research that studied earlier time periods (e.g., the 1980s) since regulatory changes and advances
in technology may have fundamental y changed the way financial markets operate. For example,
some reports suggest that high frequency trading now represents between 40% and 80% of U.S.
trading volume.8 If the amount of high frequency trading has increased substantial y over time,
then older FTT studies may not be applicable to the effect on volatility in today’s financial market
structure. Stil , at least one recent empirical study found that increases in FTT-like fees were
associated with a reduction in volatility, while another posits that the effect on volatility may
depend on how wel developed the market is for a particular asset.9

6 For a discussion of recent flash crashes, see CRS Report R43608, High-Frequency Trading: Background, Concerns,
and Regulatory Developm ents, by Gary Shorter and Rena S. Miller.
7 See, for example, Richard Roll, “Price Volatility, International Market Links, and T heir Implications for Regulatory
Policies,” Journal of Financial Services Research, vol. 3, no. 2/3 (December 1989), pp. 211-246; Steven R. Umlauf,
“T ransaction T axes and the Behavior of the Swedish Stock Market,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 33, no. 2
(April 1993), pp. 227-240; Charles M. Jones and Paul J. Seguin, “ T ransaction Costs and Price Volatility: Evidence
from Commission Deregulation,” The Am erican Econom ic Review, vol. 87, no. 4 (September 1997), pp. 728-737; Karl
Habermeier and Andrei A. Kirilenko, IMF Staff Papers, vol. 50 (2003), pp. 165-180; Harald Hau, “ T he Role of
T ransaction Costs for Financial Volatility: Evidence from the Paris Bourse,” Journal of the European Econom imc
Assoication, vol. 4, no. 4 (June 2006), pp. 862 -890; Shinhua Liu and Shen Shu, “ T ransaction Costs and Price Volatility:
New Evidence from the T okyo Stock Exchange,” Journal of Financial Services Research, vol. 36, no. 1 (August 2009),
pp. 65-83; Markku Lane and T imo Vesala, “ T he Effect of a T ransaction T ax on Exchange Rate Volatility,”
International Journal of Finance & Econom ics, vol. 12, no. 2 (April 2010), pp. 123 -133; and Anna Pomeranets and
Dainiel G. Weaver, Securities Transaction Taxes and Market Quality, Bank of Canada, Working Paper 2011 -26,
February 2013.
8 Cristina McEachern Gibbs, “Breaking it Down: An Overview of High -Frequency T rading,” Advanced T rading,
October 1, 2009, available at http://www.advancedtrading.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=220300267; and Robert
Mackenzie Smith, “Chicago Fed Official Slams CFT C, SEC Over HFT Regulation,” October 2, 2015.
9 T hornton Matheson, “The Effect of a Low-Rate T ransaction T ax on a Highly Liquid Market,” FinanzArchiv: Public
Finance Analysis, vol. 70, no. 4 (December 2014), pp. 487 -510, and Yongheng Deng, Xin Liu, and Shang-Jin Wei,
“One Fundamental and T wo T axes: When Does a T obin T ax Reduce Financial Price Volatility,” NBER Working
Pape,r No. 19974, March 2014.
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Effect on Speculation
An FTT could reduce speculation to the degree that it makes some trading strategies unprofitable.
However, there may also be unintended consequences for businesses that use financial markets to
hedge risk and smooth costs.10 For example, consider an airline that would like to purchase jet
fuel futures contracts in January to protect against the risk of rising summer fuel prices. The party
on the other side of the market may have no real interest in the underlying commodity; rather,
they may wish only to profit off a price movement in the opposite direction. If the counterparty is
considered a speculator subject to an FTT, they may respond by raising their price, and, in turn,
increasing the cost to hedge. The airline would then pass the additional cost on to customers or
shareholders. Alternatively, the airline could fail to hedge and take the risk on itself. Although this
is just one particular example, numerous other lines of business commonly use financial markets
to hedge various risks.
Stil , to the degree that short-term, high frequency trading (HFT) is viewed as speculative,
speculation in this sense would be reduced by the tax. The desirability of this reduction hinges
critical y on the role short-term traders play in destabilizing financial markets. Short-term traders
are an important supplier of liquidity to the market, which, at certain times, performs a stabilizing
role. Additional y, some HFT firms also function as market-makers whose role it is to maintain
liquidity and ensure an orderly market. While several countries provide an exemption for market-
makers, most of the proposals in the United States do not. Subjecting market-makers to an FTT
may infringe upon their ability to carry out their role. At the same time, exempting market-makers
could result in a large number of transactions going untaxed, which could have significant
important revenue implications. Regardless, it does not appear that an FTT could be designed to
tax only destabilizing, speculative behavior.
Financial Crisis
Cal s for imposing an FTT general y began in reaction to the financial crisis that started in 2007.11
It therefore seems reasonable to question whether an FTT would have helped prevent the
financial crisis. On the one hand, as previously discussed, the tax would likely drive some
speculators from the market, which could have a stabilizing effect. On the other hand, the tax may
have had little impact along a number of dimensions that contributed to the crisis. For example, it
appears that an FTT would have done little to address excessive leverage, deteriorating lending
standards, and direct overinvestment in residential housing, al of which are widely thought to
have contributed to the financial crisis. Additional y, it is possible that the presence of an FTT
would have worsened the already dampened interest in buying stocks, which would have impeded
the stock market recovery.
Revenue Potential
One of the arguments made by proponents of an FTT is the potential revenue that it could raise.
The revenue potential of any FTT would depend on its specific design. A tax with too high a rate,
or one applied too narrowly, would likely elicit a behavioral response by traders as they move to

10 T here is no uniform definition of “speculation.” See Lynn A Stout, “Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and
Private Ordering in T he Market for OT C Derivatives,” Duke Law Journal, vol. 48, no. 701 (1999), p. 735, and
footnotes within, for a discussion of the difficulty in identifying speculation and defining it.
11 See, CRS Insight IN11591, GameStop-Related Market Volatility: Policy Issues, by Eva Su.
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Financial Transactions Taxes: In Brief

avoid the tax by either fleeing the market or using financial engineering to create “synthetic”
securities that generate the same economic return, but that are not subject to the tax.12
Additional y, if the tax is effective at raising a large amount of revenue, this would seem to imply
that its ability to reduce speculation and high frequency trading is low (and vice versa). At this
point, it is difficult to predict exactly how traders’ behavior wil change in response to a tax. Stil ,
the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated in 2020 that a proposal similar to the one
included in H.R. 328 in the 117th Congress (and H.R. 1516/S. 647 from the 116th Congress) would
generate $751.9 bil ion in revenue over 10 years.13 The proposal included in both of those bil s
would impose a 10-basis-point tax (0.1%) on transactions involving stocks, bonds, futures,
options swaps, and credit default swaps.
Estimates by others vary depending on the design of the tax and modeling assumptions.
Researchers at the Tax Policy Center (TPC) estimated the revenue-maximizing rate for a
hypothetical FTT to be between 0.34% and 0.48% depending on how broadly the tax was applied.
At these rates, an FTT could generate between $316.4 bil ion and $822.7 bil ion (2017 dollars)
over 10 years.14 At rates higher than that, the behavioral responses of traders would lead to fal ing
revenues, according to their model. Others have estimated revenue effects in excess of $200
bil ion annual y, depending on the design.15 These estimates appear high when compared to the
JCT and TPC estimates and the experience of other countries. However, researchers general y
tend to acknowledge a fair amount of uncertainty about the actual revenue-raising potential of an
FTT.
Regulatory Alternatives
Depending on the goal of policymakers, an alternative or complementary approach to taxing
financial transactions would involve regulatory changes.16 For example, most of the recent FTT
proposals would probably only indirectly address the use of particular trading strategies such as
front-running or stock-trading platforms such as “dark pools” that are believed by some to tilt the
market in the favor of certain traders, often at the expense of other traders by reducing the profits
in the industry. Financial regulators could possibly better address concerns over some of these
financial market practices with regulations. The introduction of “circuit breakers” has helped to
prevent unusual y large and sudden movements in stocks, although various observers speak of the
persistence of so-cal ed “mini” flash crashes, which are significant and precipitous drops in the
prices of individual securities that do not reach the level of the 2010 flash crash.17 Additional y,
the Dodd-Frank Act introduced more emphasis on clearing houses and margin requirements to
reduce counter-party credit risk, which was prominent during the financial crisis. And the SEC is

12 A synthetic security is a financial instrument composed of two or more different assets and that is designed to
replicate the return of another asset.
13 T he JCT provided the estimates for Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2021 to 2030,
December 2020, pp. 86, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56783.
14 Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, and Sarah Gault, et al., Financial Transaction Taxes: An Overview, T ax
Policy Center, January 2016, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000587-
financial-transaction-taxes.pdf.
15 Robert Pollin, James Heintz, and T homas Herndon, “T he revenue potential of a financial transaction tax for US
financial markets,” International Review of Applied Econom ics, vol. 32, no. 6 (2018), pp. 772-806.
16 For more on the regulatory aspect, see CRS Report R43608, High-Frequency Trading: Background, Concerns, and
Regulatory Developm ents, by Gary Shorter and Rena S. Miller; and CRS Report R43739, Dark Pools in Equity
Trading: Policy Concerns and Recent Developm ents, by Gary Shorter and Rena S. Miller.
17 See, for example, Ivy Schmerken, “Mini-Flash Crashes Continue T o Fly Under T he Radar,” Wall Street &
Technology, November 19, 2012.
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continuing to review particular aspects of the market’s structure, such as tick-sizes, exchange-
access fees, maker-taker rebates, and order routing transparency, while also increasing its capacity
to better monitor markets in real time. For non-tax related policy options related specifical y to
the recent events surrounding the stock of GameStop, see CRS Insight IN11591, GameStop-
Related Market Volatility: Policy Issues, by Eva Su.
Considerations
If the objective of policymakers is to reduce financial market volatility, then it is not clear that an
FTT would be the most effective tool. Existing empirical research suggests that an FTT could
increase volatility, although al of the existing research may not be directly applicable to today’s
environment. Thus, improving financial market operations may be achieved more effectively via
some other mechanism such as reforming the regulatory environment within which derivatives
and high-frequency traders operate, for example. If policymakers do proceed with an FTT as a
means for reducing volatility, one option would be to begin with a low tax rate and increase it
only if additional research or data supports such a move. Another option would be to consider
imposing a tax on submitted bids instead of completed transactions. As it stands, most proposals
would not affect high-frequency traders who submit large orders that are then frequently canceled
in an attempt to move the price of a stock.
If the objective of policymakers is to raise tax revenue, a carefully designed FTT appears to be an
option. Although opponents of the tax may argue that it introduces distortions into the
marketplace, the same can be said about other taxes. Distortions would be minimized if the set of
taxable securities were as broad as possible. A lower rate could then be applied to achieve a given
amount of revenue. An important question yet to be fully answered is whether an FTT is the best
of al available options that can reasonably raise a given amount of new revenue.

Author Information

Mark P. Keightley

Specialist in Economics

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