{ "id": "R41976", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R41976", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 390304, "date": "2011-08-30", "retrieved": "2016-04-07T00:34:56.616250", "title": "Intent Standard for Induced Patent Infringement: Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. ", "summary": "While Section 271(a) of the Patent Act (35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(a)) creates liability for someone who directly infringes a patent (by the unauthorized use of a patented invention), Section 271(b) of the act provides indirect infringement liability for someone who \u201cactively induces\u201d another party to engage in infringing activities. \u201cInducement\u201d is a theory of indirect patent infringement, in which a party causes, encourages, influences, or aids and abets another\u2019s direct infringement of a patent. In Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., the question was the legal standard for the mental state necessary for a defendant to be liable for actively inducing infringement under Section 271(b). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had ruled that a plaintiff may hold a defendant liable for induced patent infringement by showing that the defendant had a \u201cdeliberate indifference of a known risk\u201d that the induced acts may violate an existing patent. \nOn May 31, 2011, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit\u2019s \u201cdeliberate indifference\u201d standard. By a vote of 8-1, the Court ruled that induced infringement under Section 271(b) requires actual knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement. However, in a somewhat surprising step, the Court declared that this statutory knowledge requirement could be satisfied by proof of the accused inducer\u2019s \u201cwillful blindness\u201d (that is, the defendant subjectively believes there is a high probability that a patent exists and takes deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact). This is the first time that the Supreme Court has applied \u201cwillful blindness,\u201d a criminal law doctrine, to a civil patent infringement case. It is also the first time that the Court has held that proof of willful blindness can substitute for actual knowledge, thus establishing a standard not only for patent infringement cases brought under Section 271(b), but also potentially for all federal criminal cases involving knowledge.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R41976", "sha1": "0af85d7efb402d8cb290d15db2f74997cc4fc1a7", "filename": "files/20110830_R41976_0af85d7efb402d8cb290d15db2f74997cc4fc1a7.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R41976", "sha1": "fb2e1d179934612c60ad089a8942ef0d8d628816", "filename": "files/20110830_R41976_fb2e1d179934612c60ad089a8942ef0d8d628816.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [] }