{
  "id": "R41817",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R41817",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 447543,
      "date": "2011-05-05",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-07T00:53:57.665343",
      "title": "Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance",
      "summary": "Historically, the U.S. military\u2019s Special Operations Forces (SOF) have had primary responsibility for training, advising, and assisting foreign military forces. Today, although this mission has not been completely relegated to conventional forces, the National Security Strategies of the current and previous administrations direct the U.S. military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) to organize, train, and equip themselves to carry out these activities on a larger scale with conventional (non-SOF) forces. This responsibility in its broad sense of building the capacity of partner states has been termed \u201csecurity force assistance\u201d (SFA). \nSFA ties into several interests of Congress, including security assistance, security cooperation, foreign military financing, foreign military sales, foreign affairs, foreign aid, overseas contingency operations, and legislative authorities associated with training foreign forces (Foreign Assistance Act, P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151). \nOf significant interest to Congress in the near term is the ability of U.S. military forces to train their counterparts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Obama Administration position, endorsed for the most part by Congress, is that developing competent forces in these countries is pivotal to coalition mission success and to protecting U.S. national interests. SFA is part of the U.S. strategic goal of having Iraq and Afghanistan responsible for their own security. Congress has supported the Department of Defense\u2019s agenda for training Afghani forces; however, some Members are skeptical of the new Iraqi government\u2019s commitment to developing its own security forces.\nEach of the military services has undertaken to organize, train, and equip themselves for SFA. However, while SOF have units specifically dedicated to a long-term role in SFA, the conventional forces services do not. Each of the services does have Security Cooperation and Security Assistance organizations that are dedicated to SFA activities, although they do not have SFA in their titles. The services also standardize training for deploying forces to support combatant commanders in their SFA mission. This effort to \u201ctrain the trainers,\u201d although an object of consistent inquiry in congressional hearings, has been endorsed in testimony by combatant commanders.\nAlong with its role in the current Afghanistan and Iraq wars, SFA is directly linked to counterterrorism strategy and is key to engaging underdeveloped and undergoverned nations (often referred to as \u201cweak or fragile states\u201d) in a preventive national security strategy. Regional combatant commanders apply this preventive strategy through authorities provided in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The SFA authorizations in the NDAA are often criticized as being disjointed and cumbersome, creating significant challenges to effective SFA employment. The Departments of Defense and State have presented a proposal for pooled funding to alleviate some of these challenges. The proposed Global Security Contingency Fund would be a shared resource requiring authorization by both departments. This would be similar to the temporary authorization known as \u201c1206 global train and equip\u201d authorization.\nThe training, organizing, and equipping of U.S. forces to conduct SFA competes for scarce fiscal and personnel resources among the services. Some critics of SFA attest that committing to this capability within the services detracts from their ability to conduct traditional combat roles. Others suggest that building the security capacity of weak and failed states is a misguided effort.\nThis report provides the following elements:\nAn overview of the SFA rationale, focused primarily on Department of Defense support for and relations with foreign security forces.\nDescription of the possible employment of U.S. conventional forces and platforms in support of the SFA mission (see \u201cSFA in Current and Previous National Security Strategies\u201d).\nExploration of current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (see \u201cSFA Linkage to Iraq and Afghanistan Strategies\u201d).\nResident training capability in U.S. forces as a tool for geographic combatant commanders.\nIssues Congress may consider (\u201cDo Legislative Authorities Restrict Conducting SFA?\u201d)\nThe report summarizes congressional reaction to SFA proposals and provides a detailed account of the issues raised by SFA concepts and programs.\nA glossary is also provided (see Glossary, page 57).",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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      "topics": []
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  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}