{
  "id": "R41337",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R41337",
  "active": true,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 366590,
      "date": "2010-08-16",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-06T22:15:37.381410",
      "title": "Independent Evaluators of Federal Programs: Approaches, Devices, and Examples",
      "summary": "Congress and the executive, as well as outside organizations, have long been attentive to the evaluation of federal programs, with frequent interest paid to the independent status of the evaluator. This interest continues into the current era, with numerous illustrations of the multi-faceted approaches adopted and proposed. \nAn evaluation may provide information at any stage of the policy process about how a federal government policy, program, activity, or agency is working. Congress has required evaluations through legislation (or requested these via its committee and Member offices); and the executive branch has pursued evaluations through presidential or agency directives.\nPart of choosing how to carry out an evaluation involves deciding if some kind of \u201cindependence\u201d would be a desirable attribute. Observers often see independence as a means of avoiding or deterring bias and ensuring an objective, impartial assessment. In the context of evaluation, independence may apply to an evaluation or to an evaluator. On one hand, for example, the term may relate to independence of an evaluation from the policy preferences of an individual or group (\u201cindependent evaluation\u201d), perhaps by prohibiting political appointees from revising or evaluating a program. Independence may refer to an entity that conducts evaluations that also is located outside the immediate organization responsible for policy implementation (\u201cindependent evaluator\u201d).\nThere is some diversity of opinion regarding the definition of independence and how it might be ensured. For example, an evaluator\u2019s \u201cexternal\u201d status, outside the organization that is implementing a program, does not necessarily equate with independence. Nor would an evaluator\u2019s \u201cinternal\u201d status, inside the implementing organization, necessarily equate with a lack of independence for an evaluation (e.g., if an expert panel reviewed the internally produced evaluation for bias). There is varying opinion concerning when independence is necessary, or possibly counterproductive, and what value it may bring.\nThe differences of opinion among definitions and perceived need notwithstanding, instances of independent program evaluators appear to be growing in number and variety at the federal level.\nThis report focuses on examples of independent evaluators (IEs): when an evaluation is to be conducted by an entity outside the immediate organization that is responsible for policy implementation, and the entity also is intended to have one or more dimensions of independence. IEs and similar constructs, however, vary across a number of characteristics and attributes: structure, jurisdiction, authority, resources, length of tenure, and specific duties and responsibilities. These differences, in turn, could affect their capabilities, effectiveness, and assistance to others, including their contributions to the oversight of a program or project by Congress and the executive branch. \nAfter an overview of such entities\u2014which encompass new units created specifically for conducting an evaluation as well as existing ones, such as the Government Accountability Office and offices of the inspectors general\u2014this report suggests possible broad characteristics and criteria of independent evaluators or similar units, which could be valuable in oversight or legislative endeavors. The Appendix describes a number of such offices\u2014past, present, and proposed\u2014along with citations to relevant official documents and other materials for each example (public laws, legislative proposals, executive branch directives, and secondary analyses). This report will be updated as conditions warrant.",
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      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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      "topics": []
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  "topics": [
    "National Defense"
  ]
}