{
  "id": "R41116",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R41116",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 357386,
      "date": "2010-03-16",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-07T01:53:37.272794",
      "title": "The International Criminal Court (ICC): Jurisdiction, Extradition, and U.S. Policy",
      "summary": "The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first permanent international court with jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for \u201cthe most serious crimes of concern to the international community.\u201d Currently, 110 countries are States Parties to the ICC. Since its inception in 2002, the ICC has received three referrals for investigations by States Parties and one referral from the United Nations Security Council.\nWhile the U.S. executive branch initially supported the idea of creating an international criminal court, the United States ultimately voted against the Statute of the ICC (the \u201cRome Statute\u201d) and informed the United Nations that the United States did not intend to become a State Party to the Rome Statute. The United States\u2019 primary objection to the treaty has been the potential for the ICC to assert jurisdiction over U.S. civilian policymakers and U.S. soldiers charged with \u201cwar crimes.\u201d\nThis concern has been highlighted with recent preliminary investigations by the ICC\u2019s Prosecutor into alleged war crimes in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In 2006, the ICC\u2019s Office of the Prosecutor completed a preliminary investigation into alleged war crimes in Iraq, finding that the information did not establish sufficient grounds for the Prosecutor to launch a formal investigation into the situation. In 2009, the Office of the Prosecutor confirmed that it was conducting another preliminary investigation into possible war crimes committed by NATO soldiers, U.S. soldiers, and both Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents in Afghanistan. That same year, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) sought the ICC\u2019s jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed during the Gaza conflict of December 2008/January 2009, and the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Gaza issued a report recommending that the Security Council refer the situation to the ICC Prosecutor if Israel and the PNA did not undertake appropriate national level investigations and prosecutions. \nThe United States has taken both diplomatic and domestic actions with the potential to affect the ICC\u2019s authority over U.S. citizens. On a diplomatic level, the United States has concluded bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs) with many ICC States Parties to prevent other countries from surrendering U.S. citizens to the ICC without U.S. consent under Article 98 of the Rome Statute. These agreements have generated a vigorous debate over when and whether obligations in international agreements preempt an ICC request to a State Party for the arrest and surrender of a person in its territory. However, the ICC, in which the Rome Statute vests the sole responsibility for interpreting the Statute\u2019s text, has remained silent on the question, neither validating nor refuting the U.S. position that BIAs or any agreement creating similar obligations preempt an ICC request to surrender.\nAlthough remaining opposed to U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute, the Bush Administration in its second term took actions that suggested its support for some ICC activities. The Obama Administration has also taken a more supportive stance toward the ICC and has begun to engage directly with the Court. The Obama Administration is currently reviewing its ICC policy and is expected to announce its conclusions sometime in 2010. Similarly, actions by Congress have eliminated or chosen not to extend provisions affecting U.S. assistance for countries that are ICC States Parties. Although these actions seem to soften Congress\u2019s position on the ICC, the changes might also be interpreted as a decision to reverse sanctions that were perceived as hurting U.S. interests.",
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      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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      "topics": []
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  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}