{
  "id": "R40606",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R40606",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 363025,
      "date": "2010-06-07",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-07T01:38:14.220972",
      "title": "Trade Remedies and the WTO Rules Negotiations",
      "summary": "At the November 2001 Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Doha, Qatar, member countries launched a new round of trade talks known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Discussions continue, although negotiations at this time seem to be at an impasse.\nOne of the negotiating objectives in the DDA called for \u201cclarifying and improving disciplines\u201d under the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement or ADA) and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Agreement or ASCM). The frequent use of trade remedies by the United States and other developed nations\u2014and increasingly, developing countries\u2014has come under criticism by some WTO members as being protectionist. In a March 2010 report, the chairman of the rules negotiations mentioned that consensus had been reached on many technical issues, but that there was no agreement on the larger \u201cpolitical\u201d issues.\nSome in Congress cite U.S. use of trade remedies as necessary to protect U.S. firms and workers from unfair competition. Some also credit the existence of trade remedies with helping to increase public support for additional trade liberalization measures. These groups would like increased trade enforcement of trade remedies and intellectual property laws. Others in Congress, especially those who represent U.S. importers, manufacturers, and export-oriented businesses, tend to support liberalizing the ADA and ASCM, in ways that could make use of U.S. trade remedy laws less frequent and relief harder to obtain. For example, there is support in Congress for legislation that would require administering authorities to determine whether or not a trade remedy action is in the overall public interest before such a measure can be imposed.\nDDA negotiations involve Congress because any trade agreement made by the United States must be implemented by legislation, thus Congress also has an important oversight role in trade negotiations. For example, preserving \u201cthe ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws\u201d was included as a principal negotiating objective in legislation granting presidential Trade Promotion Authority\u2014the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210).\nIn the WTO talks, the positions of major players in trade remedy talks are well-documented by position papers written by WTO members that are circulated through the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules. Major themes that have emerged include limiting the use of trade remedy actions in favor of \u201cprice undertakings,\u201d reducing the level of duties assessed per action by ending mandatory offsets (also known as \u201czeroing\u201d), or limiting the duration of trade remedy measures through mandatory \u201csunset\u201d reviews. Some members also support placing more restrictions on the ability of officials to grant relief to domestic industries through the use of economic interest tests and other administrative procedures and \u201cspecial and differential treatment\u201d for developing countries. Some countries see revision of the ADA and ASCM and other WTO disciplines on trade remedies as a \u201cmake or break\u201d issue if the Doha Development Agenda is to succeed.\nThis report examines trade remedy issues in DDA in three parts. The first part provides background information and contextual analysis. The second section focuses on how these issues fit into the DDA. A third section provides a more specific overview of major reform proposals that are being considered.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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      "topics": []
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  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Industry and Trade"
  ]
}