Congressional Court Watcher: Recent Appellate Decisions of Interest to Lawmakers (May 20–May 27, 2024)

Congressional Court Watcher: Recent Appellate Decisions of Interest to Lawmakers (May 20–May 27, 2024)

Legal Sidebari

Congressional Court Watcher: Recent
Appellate Decisions of Interest to Lawmakers
(May 20–May 27, 2024)
May 28, 2024
The federal courts issue hundreds of decisions every week in cases involving diverse legal disputes. This
Sidebar series selects decisions from the past week that may be of particular interest to federal lawmakers,
focusing on orders and decisions of the Supreme Court and precedential decisions of the courts of appeals
for the thirteen federal circuits. Selected cases typically involve the interpretation or validity of federal
statutes and regulations, or constitutional issues relevant to Congress’s lawmaking and oversight
functions.
Some cases identified in this Sidebar, or the legal questions they address, are examined in other CRS
general distribution products. Members of Congress and congressional staff may click here to subscribe to
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attorneys.
Decisions of the Supreme Court
Last week, the Supreme Court issued four decisions in cases for which it heard arguments:
• Arbitration: The Court unanimously held that, under the Federal Arbitration Act, when
parties enter into two contracts—with one contract containing a provision that delegates
to an arbitrator the authority to decide all disputes, including the threshold questions of
arbitrability, and the other contract containing, either explicitly or implicitly, a clause
providing that all contract disputes, including those over arbitrability, will be resolved by
the courts—a court, rather than an arbitrator, must decide which contract provision
governs (Coinbase v. Suski).
• Criminal Law & Procedure: In consolidated cases, the Court resolved a circuit split
over the interplay between the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA). The ACCA increases the mandatory minimum sentence for
federal criminal defendants convicted for the illegal possession of a firearm who have
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certain prior convictions, including state drug convictions defined with reference to the
CSA. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that, in order for a state drug conviction to trigger
the mandatory minimum under the ACCA, sentencing courts must look to the CSA’s
controlled substances list that was in effect at the time of the defendant’s prior state drug
conviction, not the list in effect at the time of the defendant’s conviction for the federal
firearm offense (Brown v. United States; Jackson v. United States).
• Election Law: In a 6-3 decision, the Court reversed a three-judge district court ruling
that held that the legislature’s design of South Carolina’s first congressional district under
the state’s congressional redistricting plan established an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander. Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizes that, while redistricting maps may
be held unconstitutional when a party demonstrates that race played a predominant role in
motivating the legislature’s design (racial gerrymander), race and partisan preference are
correlated, and a finding that a redistricting map was based on partisan preferences
(political gerrymander) is nonjusticiable. The majority held that a party challenging a
map must disentangle race from politics to establish motivation, and courts must start
with a presumption that the legislature acted in good faith in devising a redistricting plan.
The Court held that the three-judge district court impermissibly inferred that the
legislature acted in bad faith based on the racial effects of a political gerrymander in an
area where race and partisan preference were closely correlated (Alexander v. South
Carolina State Conf. of the NAACP).
Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals
• Civil Procedure: The Eleventh Circuit dismissed a petition for lack of jurisdiction,
holding that the statutory deadline for a petitioner to seek review of a denial of survivor’s
benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act was jurisdictional in nature and therefore not
subject to equitable tolling (Sloan v. Drummond Co., Inc.).
• Civil Procedure: The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s issuance of a stay order in
a suit brought under the civil remedy provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), holding that the criteria for the issuance of a stay under
18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(1) was satisfied. Section 1595(b)(1) requires a civil suit under the
TVPRA to be “stayed during the pendency of any criminal action arising out of the same
occurrence in which the claimant is the victim.” The panel understood Section 1591(b)(1)
to require a stay when (1) there was a pending criminal action; (2) the criminal action
arose from the same occurrence as the civil action; and (3) the civil plaintiffs were
victims of an occurrence that was the same in the civil and criminal cases. The panel
declined to read Section 1591(b)(1) to also require that the civil defendant be a named
defendant in the related criminal action (Doe v. Fitzgerald).
• Criminal Law & Procedure: The Fifth Circuit joined the Third and Eleventh Circuits in
holding that Section 404(c) of the First Step Act is not jurisdictional and is instead a
mandatory claims-processing rule. Section 404 of the First Step Act gives federal courts
discretion to reduce the sentence of a defendant convicted of certain offenses. Section
404(c) prohibits successive requests for a sentencing reduction. The court observed that a
statute is jurisdictional only when Congress clearly states that it is and that, in the absence
of any statutory language regarding jurisdiction, there is a presumption that the statute is
a claims-processing rule. Here, the court found that the text of Section 404(c) does not
address jurisdiction at all and thus Section 404(c) is a claims-processing rule (United
States v. Naranjo).

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• Environmental Law: The Ninth Circuit held that, under 36 C.F.R. § 220.6, the U.S.
Forest Service (Forest Service) could not approve a mineral exploration project by
invoking two categorical exclusions (CE) to comply with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) when neither exclusion alone could cover the entire proposed project.
NEPA imposes procedural requirements on federal agencies when they take on a major
federal action that could impact the environment. To comply with NEPA, among other
things, an agency may invoke a CE, which agencies may establish for categories of
actions that typically do not have a significant impact on the environment. When an
action meets the criteria for a CE, no further action under NEPA (i.e., environmental
assessment or environmental impact statement) is required. The Forest Service formally
approved the mineral exploration project by combining two CEs: one for the mineral
operations that are less than one year and the other for the habitat rehabilitation. The
Ninth Circuit held that Section 220.6 unambiguously prohibits combining CEs to approve
a proposed action when a single CE cannot cover it alone. The Ninth Circuit vacated the
agency’s decision and remanded the case for the district court to enter summary judgment
for the environmental groups (Friends of the Inyo v. U.S. Forest Serv.).
• Health: The D.C. Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that the 340B Drug Discount
Program statute (340B statute) (42 U.S.C. § 256b) does not prohibit drug manufacturers
from imposing conditions on offers to sell drugs at reduced prices to covered entities that
contract with retail pharmacies to distribute those drugs to patients. The court observed
that the 340B statute does not mention contract pharmacies or drug distribution methods,
and that the Secretary of Health and Human Services lacks rulemaking authority under
the statute. The court held that the drug manufacturers’ conditions on offers did not
violate the 340B statute because the statute is silent about delivery conditions and, based
on general principles of contract law and the plain meaning of the statute, the statutory
silence “preserves—rather than abrogates—” the manufacturer’s right to impose “at least
some” delivery conditions (Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Johnson).
• Immigration: The Ninth Circuit held that 8 C.F.R. § 235.7, which governs the Secure
Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) program, provides
meaningful requirements and standards to allow courts to judicially review whether
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) abuses its discretion when making decisions
relating to SENTRI. SENTRI is a program that allows a person to travel between the
United States and Mexico and avoid a full inspection at the border. CBP revoked the
plaintiff’s SENTRI membership several times without explanation. When the plaintiff
sued CBP, claiming that the latest revocation was an abuse of discretion in violation of
the Administrative and Procedure Act (APA), the district court dismissed the case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that CBP’s administration of SENTRI is committed
solely to agency discretion. The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the district court’s order, held
that the court had jurisdiction to review the plaintiff’s claims because, although CBP has
broad discretion to revoke SENTRI memberships, the exercise of that discretion can be
reviewed under the APA. The court further held, among other things, that 8 C.F.R.
§ 235.7 imposes mandatory duties on CBP to consider SENTRI ineligibility and provides
the court with meaningful standards to review an APA claim. The Ninth Circuit remanded
the case to district court to consider the plaintiff’s claims on the merits (Jajati v. U.S.
Customs & Border Prot.).
• Immigration: The Eleventh Circuit held that a petitioner’s 2009 Florida conviction for
lewd and lascivious battery was not an aggravated felony under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which includes “sexual abuse of a minor” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(A). Section 1101(a)(43)(A) does not define “sexual abuse of a minor.” The

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Eleventh Circuit determined that, in the statutory rape context, the generic federal offense
of “sexual abuse of a minor” requires that a perpetrator be at least one year older than the
victim. Florida’s offense of lewd and lascivious battery, which considered a statutory rape
offense, does not require a minimum age for the perpetrator or an age differential
between the perpetrator and the victim. Therefore, under the categorical approach to
determine whether a state conviction constitutes an aggravated felony (which requires a
court to determine whether the state offense fits within the generic federal offense), the
court found that petitioner’s Florida conviction of lewd and lascivious battery was not a
“sexual abuse of a minor” aggravated felony because the state offense is broader than the
generic federal offense (Leger v. U.S. Att’y Gen.).
• Intellectual Property: Sitting en banc, a divided Federal Circuit overturned the Rosen-
Durling test it had previously articulated to determine whether design patents were
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Under the Rosen-Durling test, obviousness could be
shown only by (1) a primary reference that was “basically the same” as the claimed
design and (2) any secondary references that were “so related” to the primary reference
that certain features in one would suggest application of those features to the other. In
light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, including KSR International Company v. Teleflex
Incorporated, the en banc majority held the Rosen-Durling test was overly rigid. The
court held that obviousness of design patents should instead be analyzed under the same
factors the Supreme Court articulated to assess utility patents in Graham v. John Deere
Co. of Kansas City (LKQ Corp. v. GM Glob. Tech. Operations LLC).
• Intellectual Property: A divided panel of the Federal Circuit held that under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285, a party in patent litigation cannot recover attorney fees incurred in a parallel inter
partes review (IPR) proceeding, nor can they seek to hold opposing counsel jointly and
severally liable for fees. Section 285 allows a court to award attorney fees to the
prevailing party in exceptional patent cases. The court reasoned that when a party
voluntarily pursues a challenge to the patent’s validity through IPR—a separate
administrative proceeding—there is no basis to recover attorney fees incurred in the IPR
proceeding. Here, the appellants voluntarily initiated and participated in IPR proceedings,
instead of arguing invalidity before the district court. As to the liability of opposing
counsel, although Section 285 is silent on who is liable for attorney fees, the court found
that other statutes expressly identify counsel as liable. The court determined that the
inclusion of “exceptional” in the statute does not mean Congress intended to extend
liability for attorney fees to counsel. The court therefore held that liability for attorney
fees under Section 285 does not extend to counsel (Dragon Intell. Prop. LLC v. DISH
Network LLC).
• Securities: The Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a company’s
claims under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act as moot. Section 13(d)
requires a group that is acquiring beneficial ownership of more than 5% of an issuer’s
equity securities to report the members of the group to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). An issuer can seek injunctive relief when there is a violation of
Section 13(d). Here, after the complaint was filed, the defendants amended their
submissions to the SEC by appending a copy of the complaint and stating that the
allegations therein were without merit (i.e., that they did not act as a group). The Second
Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that these amendments submitted to the
SEC rendered the complaint moot, reasoning that the amendments satisfied the
informative purpose of Section 13(d) and that the company thus failed to establish a risk
of irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief (Nano Dimension Ltd. v. Murchinson
Ltd.).

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• Trade: The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade and held that the
Department of Commerce’s (Commerce’s) imposition of a countervailing duty on
imported Spanish table olives was justified under 19 U.S.C. § 1677-2. Commerce has
authority to impose a countervailing duty on a finished agricultural product with
subsidized raw ingredients if the demand for the latter stage product is “substantially
dependent,” or has an important and real effect, on the demand for the prior stage
product. The Federal Circuit determined that the statutory term “substantially dependent”
is nonspecific and shows that Congress intended to delegate to Commerce the
determination of whether a particular set of facts meets this standard under Section 1677-
2. Here, Commerce determined that the meaning of “substantially dependent” did not
amount to a numerical minimum and instead focused on the nature of the raw product
and the market for the prior stage product to find that the demand for raw olives was
“substantially dependent” on the demand for table olives. The court held that
Commerce’s factual findings satisfied the statutory requirements of Section 1677-2 and
were supported by substantial evidence (Asociacion de Exportadores e Industriales de
Aceitunas de Mesa v. United States).

Author Information

Michael John Garcia
Alejandra Aramayo
Deputy Assistant Director/ALD
Legislative Attorney

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