New FCC Rules Ban Authorizations for Equipment Posing National Security Risks

New FCC Rules Ban Authorizations for Equipment Posing National Security Risks

Legal Sidebari

New FCC Rules Ban Authorizations for
Equipment Posing National Security Risks
January 11, 2023
On November 25, 2022, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released new rules restricting
equipment that poses national security risks from being imported to or sold in the United States. Under
the new rules, the FCC will not issue new authorizations for telecommunications equipment produced by
Huawei Technologies Company (Huawei) and ZTE Corporation (ZTE), the two largest
telecommunications equipment manufacturers in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The FCC also
will not authorize equipment produced by three PRC-based surveillance camera manufacturers—Hytera
Communications (Hytera), Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology (Hikvision), and Dahua Technology
(Dahua)—until the FCC approves these entities’ plans to ensure that their equipment is not marketed or
sold for public safety purposes, government facilities, critical infrastructure, or other national security
purposes. The FCC did not, however, revoke any of its prior authorizations for these companies’
equipment, although it sought comments on whether it should do so in the future.
These new rules are the latest action in the federal government’s broader effort to secure U.S.
communications networks and prohibit the use of equipment that could give a foreign adversary the
ability to exploit those networks. This Sidebar starts by providing a brief background on past steps taken
by the federal government, particularly the FCC, to protect communications networks from national
security risk. The Sidebar then reviews the FCC’s role in authorizing equipment and explains how the
new rules fit into that authorization process. The Sidebar then discusses potential legal challenges to the
new rules and concludes with some considerations for Congress.
Prior Efforts to Protect U.S. Communications Networks
from Foreign Adversaries
As explained in another CRS Report, the federal government has taken several steps in recent years to
secure U.S. communications networks from potential exploitation by foreign adversaries. For example, in
Section 889 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY 2019 NDAA), Congress
restricted Executive Branch agencies from procuring systems that use Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision,
or Dahua equipment or services and from contracting with companies that use their equipment or
services. The Department of Commerce has also set up a process for reviewing, and potentially
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prohibiting, transactions that impact the information and telecommunications technology and services
(ICTS) supply chain and raise national security concerns, as discussed in a CRS In Focus.
The FCC has also acted to address national security risk in communications networks. First, the FCC
prohibited several PRC telecommunications carriers from providing telecommunications services
between the United States and abroad. Under Section 214 of the Communications Act,
telecommunications carriers must obtain an authorization from the FCC before building, operating, or
extending a communications line between the United States and a foreign point. Applications to the FCC
for these international communications lines are reviewed for national security concerns by an inter-
agency Executive Branch committee (Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the
United States Telecommunications Services Sector, formerly known as Team Telecom), who may
recommend to the FCC that the application be denied or may recommend that existing authorizations be
revoked. In recent years, the FCC has revoked or denied international Section 214 authorizations for
several PRC telecommunications companies—including China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom,
and Pacific Networks—based on the executive branch agencies’ assessment that the PRC government
controls these firms and related concerns about government influence on these companies. China Telecom
challenged the FCC’s revocation decision in federal court, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit rejected the challenge in an opinion issued under seal (i.e., unavailable to the public).
The FCC has also sought to remove equipment raising national security concerns from U.S.
telecommunications infrastructure through its Universal Service Fund (USF) restrictions and
reimbursement program. The USF subsidizes voice and broadband internet service in rural and high-cost
areas. As discussed further in a CRS Report, the FCC has restricted telecommunications carriers receiving
USF funds from using equipment or services that appear on a “Covered List” published by the FCC. The
Covered List currently includes equipment and services provided by the PRC-based companies Huawei,
ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, Dahua, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, and Pacific Networks. It
also includes information security products and services provided by the Russian cybersecurity company
Kaspersky Lab. While the FCC first established the USF restrictions on its own initiative, in March 2020
Congress passed the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Secure Networks Act),
which prohibits the use of FCC subsidies for the purchase, lease, or maintenance of equipment or services
appearing on the Covered List. The Secure Networks Act also provides additional direction for the FCC’s
maintenance of the Covered List, and it creates a program to reimburse carriers for the costs of replacing
“covered equipment” in their networks, as detailed in a CRS Insight.
The FCC’s Equipment Authorization Authority
Most recently, the FCC has used its equipment authorization authority to restrict electronic devices raising
national security concerns. The Communications Act authorizes the FCC to adopt regulations, consistent
with the “public interest,” that govern the “interference potential” of devices capable of emitting radio
frequency (RF) energy. Under this authority, the FCC has adopted rules requiring RF devices to be
authorized by the FCC before being imported or marketed in the United States. The FCC has explained
that “[a]lmost all electronic-electrical products” are subject to this authorization requirement.
The authorization process follows two paths, depending on the nature of the device. The first path is
certification, which applies to equipment with the greatest potential to cause harmful interference to radio
services. This category mainly includes “intentional radiators” designed to emit RF energy (such as cell
phones, Bluetooth radio devices, and wireless garage door openers). Under the certification process,
authorization applications are reviewed and approved by a Telecommunications Certification Body, which
evaluates the device’s document and test data to see if it complies with Commission rules. The second
path is the Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) process, which applies to electronic devices that
have no radio transmitters and pose less risk for harmful interference (such as computer peripherals,

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microwave ovens, and LED lightbulbs). Under the SDoC process, the responsible manufacturer or
importer only needs to make a self-determination that the equipment complies with the FCC’s technical
standards and must make testing information available to the FCC upon request. Some devices are exempt
from the certification and SDoC processes because their potential for causing harmful interference is so
low, such as devices with very low power consumption or that generate very low frequencies.
New Equipment Authorization Rules
On November 25, 2022, the FCC released a Report and Order (R&O) in which it adopted new equipment
authorization rules (EA Rules) prohibiting authorizations for equipment on the Covered List (Covered
Equipment). While these rules are the culmination of a rulemaking proceeding begun in June 2021, they
also implement the Secure Equipment Act of 2021. The Secure Equipment Act took effect in November
2022 and directs the FCC to adopt rules that “clarify” that the Commission will “no longer review or
approve” authorizations for equipment on the Covered List.
The EA Rules require all applicants using the certification process to attest that the application is not for
Covered Equipment. They also prohibit companies named on the Covered List from using the SDoC
process or from relying on an exemption for their equipment, even if that equipment is not Covered
Equipment. The FCC explained that this requirement will secure its oversight over these companies and
prevent evasion of the prohibition on Covered Equipment. While the FCC did not revoke prior
authorizations for Covered Equipment, it did assert its authority to do so and asked for comments on
whether and how it should do so. It also asked for comments on whether and how it should withhold
authorization for component parts (i.e., pieces of equipment that are used within a finished product)
manufactured by entities named on the Covered List.
As the R&O explains, Covered Equipment currently includes “telecommunications equipment” and
“video surveillance equipment” produced by Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, and Dahua. According to
the R&O, “telecommunications equipment” broadly encompasses any equipment that can be used in a
broadband network, including consumer electronic devices that exchange data over the internet. “Video
surveillance equipment” encompasses any device that enables users to originate and receive high-quality
video service over broadband internet, such as surveillance cameras, body cameras, and data storage
devices for video surveillance. Any telecommunications or video surveillance equipment produced by
Huawei or ZTE is Covered Equipment; by contrast, equipment produced by Hytera, Hikvision, and
Dahua is only considered Covered Equipment if it is used for a prohibited purpose (such as security of
government facilities, surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes). Still,
the FCC announced that it would not approve any telecommunications or video surveillance equipment
made by these three companies unless they first submit a plan for the FCC’s approval outlining how they
will ensure the equipment is not marketed or sold for a prohibited purpose.
Potential Legal Challenges
Interested parties impacted by the EA Rules will have 30 days from the R&O’s publication in the Federal
Register (FR) to file a legal challenge in a federal appellate court. As the R&O has not yet been published
in the FR (publication is delayed due to the need for Office of Management and Budget review under the
Paperwork Reduction Act), it remains to be seen whether it will be litigated.
Should the EA Rules be challenged in court, the litigation might focus on arguments that the rules exceed
the FCC’s statutory authority. For instance, during the rulemaking, Hikvision maintained that the FCC did
not have statutory authority to ban video surveillance equipment because it is “peripheral” customer
premises equipment rather than essential to communications networks. Hikvision argued that banning this

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type of equipment would be “so unprecedented” that, under the major questions doctrine, the FCC needs
explicit authorization from Congress to do so.
Litigants might also challenge the rules on constitutional grounds. Commenters proffered various
constitutional arguments during the rulemaking, including that the rules violate the Equal Protection
Clause, are an unconstitutional taking of property, and violate separation of powers. The argument most
commonly made, however, is that the restrictions are an unconstitutional “bill of attainder” (i.e.,
legislative punishment). Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a law is an unconstitutional bill of
attainder if it (1) specifically targets individuals or groups and (2) inflicts punishment without a trial.
Objecting companies may have particular difficulty establishing that the restrictions inflict punishment. In
Huawei’s challenge to the 2019 NDAA, a federal district court held that the statute’s restriction did not
amount to punishment because the law reasonably furthered non-punitive goals, such as protecting
national security and informational security. The D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion in its 2018
decision in Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. DHS, which dealt with the 2017 NDAA’s prohibition on government
agencies using “hardware, software, or services” developed by the Russian cybersecurity company
Kaspersky Lab. For more discussion of these cases, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10274, Huawei v. United
States: The Bill of Attainder Clause and Huawei’s Lawsuit Against the United States, coordinated by
Joanna R. Lampe.
Considerations for Congress
Over the past several years, Congress has played an active role overseeing the FCC’s approach to
securing the nation’s communications networks, in particular by passing the Secure Networks Act and the
Secure Equipment Act. Congress could continue to shape the FCC’s efforts in this space and might
address some of the outstanding issues around equipment authorizations.
For instance, the FCC is considering whether to revoke prior authorizations for Covered Equipment, but
has not yet done so. If Congress believes that revoking prior authorizations is undesirable because, for
instance, it might limit consumer options for affordable electronic equipment or impact the supply chain,
it could prohibit the FCC from taking this step. Alternatively, Congress could require the FCC to revoke
prior authorizations for Covered Equipment if it believes doing so is necessary for network or national
security.
Should Congress require revocation, one consideration is that revoking prior authorizations might
implicate the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause. Under the Due Process Clause, the government
may not deprive any person of their property without notice of the government action and a meaningful
opportunity to contest it. Government benefits or licenses may be considered property interests under the
Due Process Clause if they give the recipient a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to the uninterrupted
enjoyment of the benefit. While courts have not said whether companies have a constitutionally protected
property interest in FCC equipment authorizations, legislation that empowers the FCC to revoke
authorizations without notice and an opportunity to respond could raise due process challenges. Affected
companies might also argue that revoking prior authorizations without compensation violates the
Constitution’s Takings Clause. The Takings Clause prohibits the government from “tak[ing] property for
public use, without just compensation.” It is unlikely that the equipment authorizations themselves would
be property under the Takings Clause, as courts have generally been skeptical of arguments that
government licenses are property for Takings Clause purposes. Affected companies may argue, however,
that a revocation is a “regulatory taking” if it results in serious financial loss in a way that frustrates their
reasonable investment-backed expectations. Congress may seek to shift the burden for future
authorizations by establishing a timeframe in which an authorization or transfer sunsets, similar to the
way broadcast licenses are granted for a defined duration, rather than allowing a grant of the authorization
in perpetuity, thereby potentially limiting future revocation actions.

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Congress might also address whether the FCC should deny authorizations for equipment with component
parts produced by entities on the Covered List. The FCC said that component parts produced by these
entities could pose an unacceptable national security risk, and the agency is exploring how to address this
issue. Some commentators, such as the Internet & Television Association (NCTA), have argued that the
FCC’s equipment authorization authority is limited to finished products and that extending the prohibition
to component parts would burden small companies with limited ability to identify the manufacturer of
every component in a given piece of equipment. Congress might weigh in, for instance, by passing
legislation clarifying whether and how the FCC should approach component parts in the authorization
process.

Author Information

Chris D. Linebaugh

Legislative Attorney

Disclaimer
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to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
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