Federal Criminal Law: January 6, 2021, Unrest at the Capitol

Federal Criminal Law: January 6, 2021, Unrest at the Capitol

Legal Sidebari

Federal Criminal Law: January 6, 2021, Unrest
at the Capitol
January 12, 2021
On January 6, 2021, a crowd gathered on the U.S. Capitol grounds, breached police barriers, entered the
Capitol building, occupied portions of the building for an extended period of time, and clashed with law
enforcement, resulting in at least five deaths, dozens of injuries, and damage to federal property. Multiple
participants in the unrest al egedly carried firearms and used flag poles and other objects as weapons, and
explosive devices were discovered on or near the Capitol complex. Members of Congress and the Vice
President, who were in the process of fulfil ing their constitutional duty of counting the 2020 presidential
election electoral votes, were forced to evacuate in response to the unrest. In its wake, observers have
speculated about the nature and scope of criminal charges that might be brought against a number of the
individuals involved. Indeed, the first charges have already been filed in federal and D.C. Superior Court.
That said, investigations are ongoing and additional charges are expected. An array of federal, District,
and state criminal statutes could have been violated during the unrest, although identifying every
potential y applicable statute would be difficult given the breadth and diversity of the activity and the
resultant complexity of the investigations.
For example, some authorities have signaled civil disorder and explosives statutes, as wel as the Anti-
Riot Act, which are discussed in a prior Legal Sidebar, could be applicable. In addition, another CRS
product analyzes the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a federal cybercrime statute that could be relevant
assuming initial reports are correct that some individuals involved in the unrest at the Capitol accessed
government computers or email accounts. Additional products discuss issues related to domestic
terrorism, incitement and threats, and some potential y relevant constitutional limitations under the First
Amendment, al of which are beyond the scope of this Sidebar. So too are the laws of the District of
Columbia, under which numerous charges have already been announced.
This Sidebar focuses, instead, on three specific categories of federal criminal statutes that may have been
violated by some of the participants in the unrest at the Capitol: (1) crimes involving federal property; (2)
crimes against persons; and (3) crimes against government authority. (Additional y, though not discussed
further in this Sidebar, inchoate crimes like attempt or conspiracy to commit the substantive crimes
described below or other crimes, as wel as accomplice liability, may be relevant).
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
LSB10564
CRS Legal Sidebar

Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

Congressional Research Service
2
Crimes Involving Federal Property
Unlawful Activities on Capitol Grounds and in Capitol Buildings: 40 U.S.C. § 5104
40 U.S.C. § 5104, the federal law perhaps most applicable to the unrest at the Capitol on January 6, 2021,
and that appears to have been used most often in the charges filed so far, prohibits a variety of conduct
and activities on Capitol Grounds or in Capitol Buildings. The Capitol Grounds are specifical y defined
by separate statute to include certain streets, roadways, and other areas surrounding the Capitol itself, and
Capitol Buildings are defined to include the U.S. Capitol building and also House and Senate office
buildings, among other things. A non-comprehensive list of conduct proscribed by Section 5104 includes:
 occupation of Capitol Grounds roads in a manner that obstructs or hinders their proper
use;
 injury of Capitol Grounds statues, seats, wal s, fountains, or other erections or
architectural features, or any tree, shrub, plant, or turf;
 knowingly, with force and violence, entering or remaining on the floor of either House of
Congress;
 wil fully and knowingly remaining unauthorized on the floor of either House of Congress
or any adjacent cloakroom or lobby;
 wil fully and knowingly entering or remaining in either House’s gal ery in violation of
rules or authorization for admission;
 wil fully and knowingly entering or remaining in any room in any Capitol Building set
aside or designated for use of Congress or the Library of Congress with intent to disrupt
the orderly conduct of official business;
 wil fully and knowingly uttering loud, threatening, or abusive language, or engaging in
disorderly or disruptive conduct, anywhere on the Capitol Grounds or in Capitol
Buildings, with intent to impede, disrupt, or disturb the orderly conduct of Congress;
 wil fully and knowingly obstructing or impeding passage through or within the Capitol
Grounds or Buildings;
 wil fully and knowingly engaging in an act of physical violence (defined as an act
involving assault, other infliction or threat of infliction of death or bodily harm to an
individual, or damage or destruction of real or personal property) on Capitol Grounds or
in Capitol Buildings;
 wil fully and knowingly parading, demonstrating, or picketing in any Capitol Buildings;
 except as authorized by Capitol Police Board regulations, carrying or having readily
accessible a firearm, a dangerous weapon (including a dagger or knife with a blade over
three inches), an explosive, or an incendiary device, or using or discharging any of the
preceding items. (A separate statute, 18 U.S.C. § 930, also prohibits, with exceptions,
knowing possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon in a “federal facility,” the
definition of which would appear to include the Capitol Buildings because they are
“owned or leased by the federal government” and have federal employees regularly
present for the purpose of performing official duties).
As described in news reports, on January 6, 2021, a large number of people forced their way into Capitol
buildings and offices, damaging or destroying property, disrupting the conduct of official business, in
some cases resorting to physical violence, and in several instances carrying weapons or explosive devices.
As noted above, multiple charges have already been filed under Section 5104 as a result of some of this
activity, often referencing the provisions regarding violent entry and disorderly conduct and, at least in

Congressional Research Service
3
one case, carrying a firearm and ammunition. Violations of most of the provisions of Section 5104 are
punishable by fines and up to six months in prison. The provision regarding firearms, dangerous weapons,
explosives, and incendiary devices, however, carries a higher maximum punishment of up to five years in
prison.
Vandalism of Government Property: 18 U.S.C. § 1361
18 U.S.C. § 1361 prohibits wil ful injury of federal property. Ordinarily, violations of the statute are
subject to fines and a maximum prison term of one year. However, if the damage to federal property
exceeds $1,000, the statute authorizes increased fines and up to ten years of imprisonment.
Theft of Government Property: 18 U.S.C. § 641
18 U.S.C. § 641 makes it a crime to steal “any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United
States or of any department or agency thereof.” If the property stolen is worth less than $1,000, the statute
authorizes fines and a maximum prison term of one year. Offenses involving property of greater value
may be punished by fines and up to ten years of imprisonment. Depending on the circumstances,
additional federal robbery statutes—prohibiting theft of government property from another person by
assault, violence, or putting that person in fear—could also be relevant to conduct that occurred during the
unrest at the Capitol. The DOJ has, as of the date of this Sidebar, charged at least one individual under §
641 in connection with the unrest, al eging that he took official materials from the Office of the Speaker
of the House of Representatives.
Restricted Buildings or Grounds: 18 U.S.C. § 1752
18 U.S.C. § 1752 prohibits certain conduct at “restricted building or grounds,” which are defined to
include, among others, locations where a “person protected by the Secret Service,” such as the Vice
President, “is or wil be temporarily visiting.” Conduct prohibited at restricted buildings or grounds
includes: (1) knowingly entering or remaining without lawful authority; (2) knowingly engaging in
disruptive conduct, or impeding ingress or egress, “with intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of
Government Business or official functions;” and (3) knowingly engaging in “any act of physical violence
against any person or property.” Violations of § 1752 may be punished by fines and up to one year of
imprisonment, but a maximum sentence of up to ten years is authorized if the offense involved a deadly
or dangerous weapon or firearm, or resulted in significant bodily injury. DOJ has charged several
individuals under § 1752 in connection with the unrest at the Capitol.
Crimes Against Persons
Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Federal Officers or Employees: 18 U.S.C. § 111
Among other things, 18 U.S.C. § 111 prohibits forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding,
intimidating, or interfering with “any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any
branch of the United States Government (including any member of the uniformed services)” while
“engaged in or on account of” the person’s “performance of official duties.” Acts under the statute that
qualify as only “simple assault” are punishable by up to one year in prison, while acts that “involve
physical contact with the victim of that assault or the intent to commit another felony” are punishable by
imprisonment for up to eight years. Final y, use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or infliction of bodily
injury enhances the applicable penalty to up to twenty years in prison.
On its face, the statute appears to cover not only forcible assault—i.e., “an attempt or threat to injure”—
but broader categories of conduct such as forcibly opposing or impeding a federal officer. However, as

Congressional Research Service
4
described above, the least severe statutory penalties apply to conduct that “constitute[s] only simple
assault,” while conduct that “involve[s] physical contact with the victim of that assault or the intent to
commit another felony” carries a heightened penalty. Based on this language, some courts have concluded
that any violation of the statute must “necessarily involve[]—at a minimum—simple assault,” meaning an
attempt or threat to injure that does not involve actual physical contact, a weapon, bodily injury, or intent
to commit certain felonies. Thus, under this view, merely refusing to obey commands or “tens[ing] up” in
response to an officer’s use of physical force, for instance, would not qualify as an offense under Section
111 even if technical y considered resistance or opposition. However, other courts have disagreed that a
violation of Section 111 necessarily requires an assault, asserting that such a reading “makes a great deal
of what § 111 does say entirely meaningless.” Under this latter view, resistance could be a violation of the
statute even if not coupled with an attempt or threat to injure.
Regardless of the statutory term at issue, the conduct proscribed by Section 111 must be forcible, which
does not require physical contact but, in one formulation, requires at least some “display of physical
aggression toward the officer.” Section 111 also requires that a person intend to engage in the proscribed
conduct but does not require knowledge that the person subjected to the conduct is a federal officer or
employee. Final y, the requirement that a protected federal officer or employee at least be “engaged in . . .
performance of official duties” cal s for a fact-specific analysis, and the officer or employee does not
necessarily have to be “on duty” to meet the standard so long as he or she is carrying out a federal
function.
The January 6, 2021, unrest at the Capitol reportedly involved clashes between participants and
responding federal law enforcement officers, resulting in injuries and, in one case, death. Assuming
forcible, intentional conduct beyond passive resistance on the part of some of the participants in the
unrest, some of this conduct could be charged under Section 111 and, if coupled with physical contact,
injury, or use of a weapon, could lead to federal felony convictions. (A separate statute, 18 U.S.C. § 351,
proscribes assaults on Members of Congress, among other things, but there do not appear to be reports at
this time of conduct that might qualify under this provision).
Unlawful Killing
Federal prosecutors are reportedly considering federal statutes prohibiting murder in connection with the
unrest at the capitol. Although murder is ordinarily a matter of state law, federal statutes prohibit murder
and related conduct where there is a federal jurisdictional nexus. In this vein, one potential y relevant
statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1111, which prohibits the “unlawful kil ing of a human being” when committed in
the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States, such as various federal buildings and lands. Of
possible relevance to the unrest at the Capitol, Section 1111 prohibits “felony murder,” kil ings that occur
from the actual or attempted perpetration of a variety of other offenses, including robbery (discussed
below). To establish felony murder, the government need not establish intent to kil on the part of the
defendant—instead, his mental state may be established by “commission of the specified [underlying]
felony.” Section 1111 also prohibits “[a]ny other murder” committed in special territorial jurisdiction, but
that prohibition is subject to more stringent intent requirements.
In addition, depending on the circumstances, other statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 1114 could be relevant.
Section 1114 imposes a range of criminal penalties—depending on the circumstances and defendant’s
state of mind—for the kil ing of federal officers or employees (murder or manslaughter) “in any branch of
the United States Government.” As with assault of federal officers under Section 111, the statute may also
protect state and local officers acting in cooperation with, and under the control of, federal officers, and
sometimes even private citizens when they are assisting federal employees in their official duties.

Congressional Research Service
5
Crimes against Government Authority
Though the federal charges filed thus far appear largely to have been limited to crimes in the foregoing
categories, some observers have noted that if the motive for at least some of the unrest at the Capitol was
to undermine the functioning of the U.S. government, crimes such as treason, insurrection, seditious
conspiracy, and advocating overthrow of the government could be relevant.
Treason: 18 U.S.C. § 2381
Due to limited case law, the exact contours of the federal crime of treason are unclear, as is its potential
applicability to the events of January 6, 2021. Treason has been described as the “most serious offense”
that may be committed against the government. It is the only crime defined in the Constitution itself,
which specifies that treason “consist[s] only” of “levying War against” the United States or “adhering to
their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.” That definition is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2381, which
imposes fines and a minimum sentence of five years of imprisonment for treason, and also authorizes the
death penalty. Treason prosecutions are rare—particularly since the 1950s. That said, there are a number
of significant limits on the application of the treason statute. First, the Constitution itself permits
conviction for treason only where there is a “[c]onfession in open [c]ourt,” or “testimony of two
[w]itnesses to the same overt [a]ct”—an action committed in furtherance of the treason. Second, the
Supreme Court has held that treason requires proof that the defendant “intend[ed] to betray his country.”
Third, treason may only be committed by those who owe al egiance to the United States—such as citizens
or some temporary residents—and who breach that al egiance. Furthermore, the concept of “levying war”
is a “meticulously exclusive” phrase, which the Supreme Court has held applies only to conduct involving
“an actual assemblage of men for the purpose of executing a treasonable design.” It is unclear from the
limited case law exactly what conduct would count within that definition, and the Supreme Court has
cautioned that the “crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases.” Conduct
that fal s outside the narrow definition of treason may stil be subject to prosecution under other laws
concerning crimes against the government—such as seditious conspiracy discussed below.
Insurrection: 18 U.S.C. § 2383
Federal prosecutors are reportedly considering whether a federal statute prohibiting insurrection could
apply to the unrest at the Capitol. That statute authorizes fines and up to ten years of imprisonment for
anyone who “incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebel ion or insurrection against the authority
of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto.” The statute also bars anyone
convicted of violating that provision from “holding any office under the United States.” The exact scope
of the insurrection statute is unclear, in part because it does not define “rebel ion” or “insurrection.” In
addition, there is little interpretive case law, because prosecutions under the insurrection statute are rare.
Seditious Conspiracy: 18 U.S.C. § 2384
18 U.S.C. § 2384 provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United
States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent,
hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess
any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
In a 2020 memo to U.S. Attorneys (hereinafter the “Rosen Memo”), Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey A.
Rosen noted that the statute “does not require proof of a plot to overthrow the U.S. Government, despite
what the name might suggest.” Rather, the statute applies to any conspiracy—i.e., an agreement with the

Congressional Research Service
6
requisite intent—with the object of using force to (1) overthrow, put down, or destroy the U.S.
government, (2) oppose the authority of the United States, (3) prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of
any law of the United States, or (4) seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to its
authority, among other things. Though recent case law interpreting these phrases is limited, some
authority suggests that at least some of the al eged conduct connected to the January 6, 2021, unrest at the
Capitol might come within the purview of the statute. For instance, the Rosen Memo specifical y noted
that charges under Section 2384 could be “potential y available” “where a group has conspired to take a
federal courthouse or other federal property by force,” presumably under the statutory prong proscribing
forcibly seizing, taking, or possessing any property of the United States contrary to its authority.
Additional y, in an early twentieth century case, one federal court of appeals indicated that the prong
addressing prevention, hindrance, or delay of the execution of federal law prohibits a conspiracy to use
force “against some person who has authority to execute and who is immediately engaged in executing a
law of the United States,” using forcible interference with a government printing office as a possible
example. Thus, though the January 6, 2021, unrest at the Capitol disrupted the legislative, rather than
executive, branch of the U.S. government, it might be argued that because Congress is charged by law—
indeed, by the Constitution—with the electoral vote counting in which it was engaged, some forcible
actions taken at the Capitol could have been intended to prevent or hinder execution of that law.
More broadly, the seditious conspiracy statute has been used in recent decades in circumstances involving
plots to bomb government buildings, and as noted above, reports indicate that law enforcement
discovered explosive devices in multiple locations near the Capitol on January 6, 2021. That said, one
fairly recent district court case did identify some apparent limits to the seditious conspiracy statute’s
“oppose by force” prong, recognizing that it implies “force against the government as a government.” In
other words, there must be agreement to forcibly “resist some positive assertion of authority by the
government. A mere violation of law is not enough; there must be an attempt to prevent the actual
exercise of authority.” As such, whether charges would be warranted under the seditious conspiracy
statute in connection with particular conduct at the Capitol on January 6, 2021, could ultimately depend
not only on whether the conduct related to an agreement between two or more persons to take forcible
action against government property, but also on whether (depending on the statutory prong at issue) the
object of the agreement was actual y in opposition to a positive assertion of government authority.
(Another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2385, separately proscribes knowingly or wil fully advocating, abetting,
advising or teaching “the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying” the
federal or a state or local government “by force or violence” or by assassination, as wel as organization
of or affiliation with groups that do the same and distribution of related printed matter. Depending on the
circumstances, some conduct to which Section 2384 is relevant might also be considered under Section
2385, though the First Amendment implications of that statute place it beyond the scope of this Sidebar.)
Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2384 are punishable by fines or up to twenty years in prison, or both.

Author Information

Michael A. Foster
Peter G. Berris
Legislative Attorney
Legislative Attorney

Congressional Research Service
7
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

LSB10564 · VERSION 1 · NEW