Administrative Law Reform Legislation in the 116th Congress

Administrative Law Reform Legislation in the 116th Congress

Legal Sidebari

Administrative Law Reform Legislation in the
116th Congress
July 23, 2020
Congress has broad authority to define and prescribe the powers and responsibilities of federal agencies.
Typically, an agency may carry out its congressionally prescribed responsibilities in a number of ways,
including through issuing binding regulations and adjudicative orders, and through providing nonbinding
oral or written guidance to stakeholders and the public. And Congress may, within constitutional bounds,
alter agencies’ powers and responsibilities as it deems appropriate.
The 116th Congress has considered numerous legislative proposals to alter the administrative rulemaking
process or the way those rules may be reviewed by courts and the legislative branch. Some proposals
would modify the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), including to
require, in certain situations, trial-type, evidentiary hearings on specific types of rules. Others would
increase congressional involvement in agency rulemaking by, for example, requiring legislative approval
of certain rules before they may go into effect. And still other proposals would change the scope of
federal courts’ review of agency legal interpretations by altering or eliminating judicial deference
doctrines. These categories of proposals are discussed in more detail below.
Not every bill in the 116th Congress touching upon administrative law issues is identified in this Sidebar,
particularly those that do not seek to alter the agency-rulemaking process government-wide or modify
judicial oversight of agency legal interpretations. For example, this Sidebar does not address those bills
that would authorize or require White House review of certain actions of independent regulatory agencies;
impose requirements only on specific agencies; primarily affect budgetary and appropriations matters; or,
with the exception of the Congressional Review Act (CRA), amend more specialized or particular
administrative law statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act, Federal Advisory Committee Act,
Regulatory Flexibility Act, or Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. These bills may be discussed in other
CRS products.
Proposals to Amend the APA’s Rulemaking Procedures
Several bills aim to increase transparency and public accountability by altering how agencies promulgate
regulations under the APA. The APA prescribes default procedures that an “agency” must follow when
developing and issuing rules with the force and effect of law. An agency generally must publish a notice
of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and afford members of the public an opportunity to
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submit comments on the proposal. The “agency must consider and respond to significant comments
received during the period for public comment.” And an agency must include in its final rule “a concise
general statement of [its] basis and purpose.” A rule issued under these procedures generally takes effect
no earlier than 30 days thereafter. This process is known as informal or notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Some bills that would amend the APA’s rulemaking provisions are relatively modest in scope and directed
at discrete aspects of the rulemaking process. For example, S. 395, Providing Accountability Through
Transparency Act of 2019, passed by the Senate in June 2019, would amend the APA to require that
agencies include in each notice of proposed rulemaking a citation to a page on regulations.gov containing
a plain-language summary of the proposal in no more than 100 words. (A nearly identical companion bill
was introduced in the House in February 2019.)
Another bill, S. 1419, Early Participation in Regulations Act of 2019, which was reported out of the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) in September 2019, would
amend the APA to require that, with some exceptions, an agency publish an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPRM) 90 days before publishing in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking
for a “major rule.” (The bill employs a similar definition of “major rule” as the CRA.) Agencies would
have to provide at least a 30-day period for public comment on the ANPRM. The APA currently does not
mention ANPRMs, nor does it mandate a minimum comment period for rulemakings.
Other reform proposals in this category focus on broad reform efforts or would impose more extensive
changes to the rulemaking process. S. 1420, Setting Manageable Analysis Requirements in Text Act of
2019, for example, which was reported out of HSGAC in July 2019, would amend the APA to require that
agencies engage in retrospective review of most “major rules” (i.e., examine such rules after they have
been issued) to determine, among other things, whether the rules are achieving their regulatory objectives.
And H.R. 3449, introduced in June 2019, would amend the APA to require that an agency’s notice of
proposed rulemaking for a new rule identify two rules that the agency intends on repealing, unless the
agency is engaging in rulemaking for a new rule that is statutorily required.
S. 3208, introduced in January 2020, is more wide-ranging than the bills discussed above. The latest
iteration of the Regulatory Review Act (RAA), some form of which has been introduced in Congress
since 2011, S. 3208 would amend numerous aspects of the APA’s rulemaking (as well as judicial review)
provisions. For example, S. 3208 would direct agencies to include “all studies, models, scientific
literature, and other information developed or relied upon by the agency” on rulemaking dockets. This
requirement would codify a judicially established doctrine that some jurists and commentators have
criticized for lacking a sufficient basis in the APA. S. 3208 would also authorize parties to petition an
agency to hold trial-type, evidentiary proceedings for proposed “high-impact rules,” which it defines as
rules that the OIRA Administrator determines will likely have an annual economic impact of at least $500
million. While there has been little commentary on the 2020 RAA, commentators debated the propriety of
a number of provisions contained in prior RAAs, including those that, like the current bill, would
authorize or require the use of trial-type proceedings for certain proposed rules that would be akin to (or
directly incorporate) the APA’s formal rulemaking procedures.
Proposals to Increase Congressional Oversight of Rules
Several bills in the 116th Congress would alter the congressional role in the rulemaking process. Congress
can exert a significant amount of control over the substance of agency rulemakings and other actions. As a
general matter, the authority Congress delegates to an agency—including the authority to issue binding
regulations—can be modified at any time by Congress via statute. Likewise, Congress can reverse agency
regulations through the enactment of ordinary legislation. But Congress can oversee or exert control over
agency rulemakings in other ways, too. For example, under the CRA, an agency must submit a rule to
Congress before it may go into effect and Congress can use special, fast-track procedures to consider a

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joint resolution of disapproval of an agency rule, which, if enacted, would prevent the rule from taking or
continuing to have effect. An agency is prohibited from reissuing a rejected rule “in substantially the same
form” or issuing “a new rule that is substantially the same” unless “specifically authorized” to do so by a
subsequently enacted law.
Several bills would increase congressional oversight of agency rulemakings, including through changes to
the CRA. For example, H.R. 3972 and S. 92 are the latest iterations of the Regulations from the Executive
in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, which would amend the CRA in critical respects. The bills’ most
significant changes to the CRA concern their treatment of “major rules.” Under the current version of the
CRA, any rule—major or not—will not take effect if a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted. But
under the REINS Act, a major rule would not take effect unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted.
This would be a significant change to the current CRA process. If enacted, the REINS Act could
potentially incentivize agencies to craft regulations, particularly “major” ones, in accordance with known
congressional preferences, as congressional inaction would be sufficient to block a major rule. A joint
resolution of disapproval would still be available to block all other, “nonmajor” rules. (Another proposal,
H.R. 903, Sunset Act of 2019, would require enactment of a joint resolution of approval before any
covered rule can become effective. H.R. 903 does not distinguish between major and nonmajor rules.)
Some bills would similarly create specific oversight mechanisms by which Congress could channel its
authority over agency rules. H.R. 903, for example, would provide that rules would become ineffective 10
years after congressional approval (or 10 years after their extension by a joint resolution of approval).
And H.R. 3617, the latest version of the Article I Restoration Act introduced in recent Congresses, would
provide that covered agency rules become ineffective after three years “unless specifically reauthorized
by an Act of Congress.” H.R. 3617 would allow agencies to seek congressional reauthorization within a
specified period of time. By conditioning the long-term existence of covered rules on congressional
approval, the bill could lead agencies to give considerable attention to the continued need for certain
regulatory initiatives and programs, as well as congressional support for such rules.
Another proposal, H.R. 395, Preventing Overreach Within the Executive Rulemaking System (POWERS)
Act of 2019, would require that agencies refrain from issuing a final rule for at least 60 days from the date
they publish a notice of proposed rulemaking for the rule, and directs agencies to respond to comments
submitted by certain congressional committees during that time period.
Proposals to Alter the Scope of Judicial Review of Agency Legal
Interpretations
Some Members introduced bills that would alter deference standards federal courts employ when
reviewing certain agency legal interpretations. Federal courts are authorized to review the legality of
federal agency actions in a variety of contexts, and the Supreme Court has established several doctrines
that guide judicial review in these cases. One of the most well-known of these doctrines is the Chevron
doctrine—named after the Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. Chevron generally instructs courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statute it administers. The related Auer or Seminole Rock doctrine, named after the Court’s
opinions in Auer v. Robbins and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., generally instructs courts to defer
to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous regulation (as opposed to statute). If neither
Chevron nor Auer deference applies, the High Court’s 1944 decision Skidmore v. Swift & Co. instructs
lower courts to still give an agency’s legal interpretation some level of deference consistent with “the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”
In recent years, many commentators, lower federal court judges, and even some Justices of the Supreme
Court have criticized the Chevron and Auer doctrines on a variety of constitutional and statutory bases.

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Some Members of Congress who share similar views frequently have introduced legislation to overturn
the deference doctrines by requiring courts to review agency action “de novo”—i.e., “anew, . . . as if no
decision [below] previously had been rendered.” H.R. 1927 and S. 909, the newest iterations of the oft-
introduced Separations of Powers Restoration Act (SOPRA), would amend the APA’s judicial review
provisions by directing reviewing courts to “decide de novo relevant questions of law, including the
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, and rules made by agencies.” Both bills further
state that the de novo standard would apply to actions reviewed under any statute—not just the APA. The
bills would seem to significantly constrain or perhaps even prohibit courts from according Chevron and
Auer deference to agency statutory and regulatory interpretations, respectively, although some
commentators question the effectiveness of such an approach.
SOPRA is not the only attempt by Members of the 116th Congress to limit the breadth of judicial
deference to agency legal interpretations. The RAA (discussed above) would amend the APA to provide
that courts should give weight to agency interpretations of their own rules according to “the thoroughness
evident in the consideration of the rule by the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, and the
consistency of the interpretation with earlier and later pronouncements.’’ This provision would seemingly
replace Auer with Skidmore deference, or something akin to it, in judicial review of agency regulatory
interpretations. But the proposed amendment does not mirror completely the deferential standard set forth
in Skidmore, omitting reference to the Court’s broader observation that deference may be given to an
agency’s interpretation based on “all those factors which give it power to persuade.” This difference may
call into question whether the RAA is intended to limit judicial review of agency regulatory
interpretations only to consideration of the thoroughness, validity, and consistency factors, and not any of
the other factors identified by courts applying Skidmore.
Conclusion
Like the 115th Congress, the 116th Congress has for its consideration many proposals to reform the
administrative state, both through modest amendments to procedural requirements and more wide-ranging
or substantive changes to the regulatory process and judicial review of agency action. Assuming Congress
does not pursue any major legislative efforts in this area prior to the beginning of the 117th Congress next
January, many of the same bills or variations thereof may be introduced in the next Congress. Whether the
Members of the next Congress will share a similar desire for reform as shown by some Members of the
116th Congress remains to be seen and may hinge on a variety of factors, including how the division of
power is shared between the House of Representatives, Senate, and President, and whether new
regulatory or other policies pursued by the executive branch prompt questions from Congress about
whether administrative agencies are appropriately carrying out their congressionally prescribed powers
and responsibilities.

Author Information

Daniel J. Sheffner

Legislative Attorney

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