Election 2020 and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Legal Issues in Absentee and All-Mail Voting

Election 2020 and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Legal Issues in Absentee and All-Mail Voting

Legal Sidebari

Election 2020 and the COVID-19 Pandemic:
Legal Issues in Absentee and All-Mail Voting
May 15, 2020
As a result of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, there have been concerns about the
potential impact on the 2020 federal election cycle. Some states have delayed primary elections, and, in
other jurisdictions, officials have moved polling places away from high-risk populations. As the public
health crisis continues, new questions are emerging about the safety and accessibility of voting in the
remaining federal primaries and the November 3 general election. These concerns are coupled with
questions about how to maintain election integrity. As a result, courts across the nation have been
considering challenges to key aspects of state election laws.
Much of the recent election law litigation relating to COVID-19 has challenged aspects of state laws
addressing absentee voting and all-mail voting, also known as vote-by-mail. In this Sidebar, absentee
voting generally refers to state laws that permit eligible voters to request and cast ballots by mail without
physically going to the polls on Election Day. All-mail voting generally refers to state laws that provide
for automatic mailing of ballots to all eligible voters.
This Sidebar outlines the legal landscape for state and federal election laws, examines recent challenges to
state laws in response to the pandemic, and briefly discusses select legislation introduced in the 116th
Congress.
Legal Landscape
Although presidential and congressional elections have national impact, they are primarily administered
according to state laws. The Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides to the states the initial and
principal authority to administer elections within their jurisdictions. As a result of this decentralized
authority, states vary significantly in how they administer the voting process and elections. For example,
states have enacted differing laws addressing whether and to what degree voters can cast ballots prior to
the day of an election, known as early voting. States also have differing laws governing all-mail voting,
deadlines for voter registration, circumstances under which voters can cast absentee ballots, and
procedures for collecting absentee ballots. At the same time, the Elections Clause provides Congress with
the authority to “override” state laws in order to regulate federal elections. Under that authority, Congress
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
LSB10470
CRS Legal Sidebar
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

Congressional Research Service
2
has enacted federal laws, such as the Help America Vote Act and the National Voter Registration Act, that
dictate how states must administer aspects of the election process.
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, all state laws provide some type of absentee
voting, with approximately two-thirds of states permitting qualified voters to vote absentee without
offering an excuse, which is known as “no excuse” absentee voting. Furthermore, in order to avoid
transmission of COVID-19, an increasing number of states have expanded access to absentee voting and
all-mail voting for certain 2020 elections.
As illustrated in the examples below, litigants have recently challenged state voting laws under various
provisions of the U.S. Constitution and key Supreme Court precedent. Challenges have invoked the First
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of association, the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on poll taxes, and the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment’s prohibition on abridging the right to vote based on age. In addition, litigants and courts
have often cited the Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in Purcell v. Gonzalez for the proposition that, in
determining whether to enjoin or modify an election law close to Election Day, courts must consider the
risk of “voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” According to the Court
in Purcell, that risk increases as the election draws closer.
Recent Challenges
Recent election law litigation relating to the COVID-19 pandemic has involved a range of disputes over
state absentee and all-mail voting. Some cases challenged a recent change to a particular voting procedure
that was imposed by a court or an election official as a result of COVID-19. Other cases sought a specific
interpretation of an existing state law in order to respond to COVID-19. Recent court challenges have
concerned various aspects of such voting laws and processes, including expanded all-mail voting
procedures, “no excuse” absentee voting, notary or witness signature requirements, postmark deadlines,
prepaid postage, and third-party collection of ballots (which some refer to as “ballot harvesting”).
While some have argued that states should expand access to absentee and all-mail voting because of
COVID-19, others have maintained that voting practices lack legal safeguards needed to protect against
voter fraud. Court rulings have sought to balance public health interests with election integrity. In
addition, with mixed results, courts have often applied the Supreme Court’s standard in Purcell, which
cautions of the risks in enjoining or modifying an election law as Election Day draws near. The results of
these cases have varied and, in some instances, may be subject to appeal. Additional litigation this
election cycle is expected.
Deadlines for Casting Absentee Ballots
On the day before Wisconsin’s April 7, 2020 presidential primary election, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a
5-4 vote, stayed a federal district court’s preliminary injunction that required the state to count absentee
ballots postmarked after Election Day on April 7. Five days before Election Day, among other things, the
trial court ordered that absentee ballots postmarked after Election Day still be counted so long as they
were received by April 13. According to the trial court, because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the
“huge backlog” of requests for absentee ballots, voters needed additional time to receive such ballots, and
election officials needed additional time to count the “avalanche of absentee ballots” in a safe manner. As
a result, the trial court reasoned that the extension was needed to alleviate an unconstitutional burden on
Wisconsin citizens’ right to vote. Appealing to the Supreme Court, the appellants argued that by
permitting the counting of absentee ballots postmarked after Election Day, instead of permitting only the
counting of ballots postmarked by Election Day, the trial court effectively created more than one voting

Congressional Research Service
3
deadline. Appellants argued that the “orderly administration” of an election requires imposition of a single
deadline for counting ballots.
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s ruling. According to the High
Court, the narrow question presented in this case was whether absentee ballots needed to be postmarked
by Election Day in order to be counted, “as state law would necessarily require,” or if they could be
postmarked after Election Day, so long as they were received by April 13. (Although Wisconsin law does
not expressly specify that an absentee ballot be postmarked by Election Day, it requires receipt by
Election Day.) According to the Court, a six-day extension of the date by which voters may cast ballots
significantly altered “the nature of the election.” Central to the Court’s decision was that the trial court
unilaterally extended the postmark deadline, even though the plaintiffs had not requested that extension
from the trial court. Furthermore, relying on the Purcell precedent, the Court held that the district court
violated the principle that courts should not “ordinarily” alter the rules of an election shortly before
Election Day. The Court stressed that it was not expressing an opinion on the “wisdom” of Wisconsin
holding the election in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic or if other changes to voting procedures
were appropriate.
Written by Justice Ginsburg, the dissent maintained that the concerns articulated by the Court were minor
in comparison to the large numbers of voters who might be disenfranchised by the Court’s ruling.
According to the dissent, the Court’s “eleventh hour” ruling presented voters with the problematic choice
of either voting in person, risking exposure to COVID-19, or losing their right to vote because they did
not receive an absentee ballot in time to comply with the April 7 postmark deadline.
Expanded All-Mail Voting
In a case challenging the Nevada Secretary of State’s decision to institute an all-mail election (with one
physical polling place) for the June 9, 2020, congressional primary, a federal district court denied a
motion for injunctive relief on April 30. Among other things, the challengers argued that an all-mail
election violates the right to vote by not including voter fraud protections, which dilutes legally cast votes,
and by not complying with the Purcell standard. Rejecting the challengers’ argument that all-mail voting
dilutes votes, the court determined that Nevada’s interests in protecting voter health and the franchise
outweighed the burdens on the challengers, which the court characterized as merely “an imposition upon
their preference for in-person voting.” The court also observed that the plan for an all-mail election did
maintain election safeguards against fraud by, for example, requiring identification for first-time voters
and imposing penalties against fraudulent votes. In response to the contention that the Secretary’s
decision to institute all-mail voting shortly before Election Day violates the Purcell standard, the court
determined that Purcell applies only to courts when they enter orders affecting election procedures, not to
state and local election administrators prescribing voting regulations.
“No Excuse” Absentee Voting
On April 17, 2020, a Texas state court temporarily enjoined Travis County, TX, from rejecting
applications for absentee ballots from voters claiming the “disability category of eligibility as a result of
COVID-19” for the July 14, 2020, congressional primary runoff election. (Texas law provides that certain
elections require a majority vote, necessitating a runoff election between candidates who receive the
highest and second-highest number of votes in the main election.) Under Texas voting law, all eligible
voters over age 65 may vote absentee by mail upon request. The law also provides a “disability category
of eligibility,” which allows younger voters to obtain such ballots “if the voter has a sickness or physical
condition that prevents the voter from appearing at the polling place on election day without a likelihood
… of injuring the voter’s health.” Determining that voters “are reasonable to conclude that voting in
person while the virus that causes COVID-19 is still in general circulation presents a likelihood of

Congressional Research Service
4
injuring their health,” the court construed the statute to permit absentee voting for voters claiming the
“disability category of eligibility as a result of COVID-19.” The State of Texas has appealed, and, in light
of a letter from the state attorney general maintaining a contrary interpretation of the statute, the
challengers have sought emergency relief from the court to enforce the temporary injunction.
Litigants have filed additional suits arguing that the Texas law permitting voters over age 65 to vote
absentee by mail is unconstitutional under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which prohibits abridging the
right to vote based on age. The challengers argue that the law unconstitutionally prohibits those under
65—a majority of Texas’s voters—from voting by mail because of their age in violation of the text of the
amendment. They maintain that because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the law leads to younger voters
having to choose between voting on the one hand and risking their health and increasing the spread of the
virus on the other. Likewise, a suit challenging an Indiana “no excuse” absentee voting law includes a
claim of age discrimination under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.
Prepaid Postage for Absentee Ballots
On April 30, 2020, a federal district court denied a motion for injunctive relief that would have required
Georgia to provide return postage for absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots in the June 9
presidential and congressional primary election. The challengers argued that, by requiring voters to pay
postage for mailing absentee ballots, the Georgia Secretary of State unconstitutionally imposed a poll tax
in violation of the Twenty-Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and an unjustifiable burden on the right to
vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing Purcell, among other cases, the court
determined that time constraints precluded issuing the relief sought. That is, since absentee ballots had
already been mailed to hundreds of thousands of voters, the court concluded that requiring the state to add
postage instructions to absentee ballot envelopes or mailing postage to voters would “run[] the risk that
voters awaiting new instructions do not timely submit their ballots.” However, the court confirmed that
the challengers and similar voting rights groups could distribute stamps to voters for the purpose of
mailing absentee ballot applications and ballots.
As for future elections—including Georgia’s August 2020 runoff and November 2020 general—the court
reserved judgment about whether injunctive relief was appropriate. In this vein, the court announced that
“it would benefit the public for the Parties to immediately discuss means to reach the goal of eliminating
barriers to voting posed by the COVID-19 pandemic,” specifically recommending that the parties discuss
whether adding an instruction about postage to the revised voter instructions could be a solution. As
examples, the court suggested that the state might opt to instruct a voter unable to obtain postage to
contact the local board of elections for alternative ballot delivery methods. The court also proposed that
the state consider whether a law allowing in-person delivery of ballots by family members could be
construed to permit ballot delivery for voters at high risk for COVID-19 because of underlying conditions
or age.
Considerations for Congress
While states have the initial and principal authority to administer elections within their jurisdictions,
Congress has enacted specific overriding federal laws in some areas. Similarly, in response to varying
state laws and court rulings relating to COVID-19, and within the bounds of the Constitution, Congress
may choose to enact legislation addressing absentee voting and all-mail voting procedures in federal
elections. For example, introduced in the 116th Congress, S. 26 and H.R. 92 would require states to allow
postage-paid, all-mail voting in federal elections and prohibit them from imposing additional conditions,
except for a deadline for returning the ballot. S. 3440 and H.R. 6202 would require states to develop
contingency plans for voting in federal elections if a significant number of voters or poll workers are
quarantined because of COVID-19. The bills state that the contingency plans would need to permit

Congressional Research Service
5
registered voters to submit online requests for absentee ballots and to vote-by-mail and extend vote-by-
mail deadlines if postal service is disrupted because of COVID-19. On the other hand, Congress may
wish to defer to state laws and election officials, as interpreted by the courts, regarding federal election
voting procedures in the era of COVID-19. CRS discusses additional policy options in this In Focus.

Author Information

L. Paige Whitaker

Legislative Attorney

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

LSB10470 · VERSION 1 · NEW