Kisor v. Wilkie: Supreme Court Upholds the Auer Doctrine but Clarifies Its Limitations

Kisor v. Wilkie: Supreme Court Upholds the Auer Doctrine but Clarifies Its Limitations

Legal Sidebari

Kisor v. Wilkie: Supreme Court Upholds the
Auer Doctrine but Clarifies Its Limitations
July 3, 2019
On June 26, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Kisor v. Wilkie, declining the petitioner’s request to
overturn one of the most significant and contentious doctrines in administrative law. That doctrine,
commonly called the Auer or Seminole Rock doctrine, generally instructs courts to defer to agencies’
reasonable construction of ambiguous regulatory language. While the Court in Kisor declined to dispatch
this deferential rule, it emphasized limitations to the doctrine’s scope and application that may bear
consequences for future courts’ review of agency action and, perhaps, the manner in which agencies go
about the decision-making process. This Sidebar provides an overview of the Kisor decision.
The Supreme Court has established several doctrines to guide judicial review of agency action. Perhaps
the most well known is the Chevron doctrine, which generally instructs courts to defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute it administers. Auer deference takes its name from the
Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Auer v. Robbins, but has roots in the Court’s 1945 decision in Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co. (and, according to some Members of the Court, may have even earlier
antecedents). Subject to limitations, Auer generally instructs courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation
of ambiguous regulatory language “unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”
While Chevron deference applies to agency interpretations of statutes, and generally then only when those
interpretations are in agency statements that have the force of law (e.g., regulations promulgated
following notice-and-comment), Auer deference has been applied to a range of non-binding agency
memoranda and other materials that construe ambiguous regulatory language.
As discussed in an earlier Sidebar, even prior to the Kisor decision, the Supreme Court recognized
circumstances when Auer deference was not appropriate. For example, deference is not owed when an
agency interprets a regulation that simply restates the terms of the statute being administered. Nor is Auer
deference warranted when the agency’s interpretation is not a product of its “fair and considered
judgment.”
The Kisor case arose after the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) denied the petitioner’s request for
retroactive disability compensation benefits because the agency determined that records petitioner
submitted were not “relevant” as required by the governing regulation. On appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court held that the term “relevant” was ambiguous and, applying Auer
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deference to the VA’s interpretation, affirmed the VA’s decision. The Supreme Court granted the
petitioner’s request for review to consider whether to overturn Auer.
While the Supreme Court unanimously agreed to vacate the Federal Circuit’s decision and remand the
case for further proceedings, the Justices fractured on whether to overrule Auer, with a bare majority
voting to uphold it. Writing on behalf of five Members of the Court, Justice Kagan—joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor—grounded the decision to uphold Auer on
stare decisis principles. Those principles typically lead the Court to follow rules set forth in prior
decisions unless there is a “special justification” or “strong grounds” for overruling that precedent. Justice
Kagan concluded that the petitioner had not put forth sufficient justifications to abandon Auer deference
in light of the extensive body of precedent, going back at least to Seminole Rock, which supported
continued use of a doctrine that “pervades the whole corpus of administrative law.” The Kisor majority
also expressed concern that abandonment of Auer deference could result in litigants revisiting any of the
myriad cases that applied the doctrine. And, the Court continued, “particularly ‘special justifications,’”
which had not been offered by the petitioner, were necessary to overturn a doctrine such as Auer that
Congress has left undisturbed for so long, despite the Court’s repeated assertions that the doctrine rests on
a presumption “that Congress intended for courts to defer to agencies when they interpret their own
ambiguous rules.”
Although the Court did not overrule Auer, it took “the opportunity to restate, and somewhat expand on”
the doctrine’s limitations. In so doing, the Court formulated a multi-step process for determining whether
Auer deference should be afforded to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation. First, a reviewing “court
must exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction” before concluding that the regulation at issue “is
genuinely ambiguous.” Second, even if ambiguity exists, Auer will not apply unless the court determines
that the regulatory interpretation is “reasonable”; that is, the interpretation is “within the zone of
ambiguity” that the court uncovered through its exhaustion of the tools of construction. And third, even if
a court determines the regulation is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, it must still
independently assess “whether the character and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to
controlling weight.” Though the Court cautioned that this examination cannot be reduced “to any
exhaustive test,” the Court indicated Auer deference shall not extend to interpretations that (1) are not the
official or authoritative position of the agency; (2) do not somehow implicate the agency’s “substantive
expertise,” or (3) do not represent the agency’s “fair and considered judgment.”
Two portions of Justice Kagan’s opinion that defended Auer on grounds other than stare decisis did not
gain the support of a majority of the Court. Joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, Justice
Kagan argued that Auer deference follows from “a presumption that Congress would generally want
[agencies] to play the primary role in resolving regulatory ambiguities.” A presumption that Congress
intended agencies themselves, rather than the courts, to take the leading role in clarifying the meaning of
ambiguous regulatory language is justified on several grounds, including agencies’ significant substantive
expertise; the political accountability of agencies, which is based on their subordination to the President;
and the view that the agency responsible for issuing a regulation is often best situated to determine the
meaning of the regulations it promulgates. The four Justices also took issue with the petitioner’s statutory,
policy, and constitutional arguments for overruling Auer.
Justice Gorsuch concurred in the Court’s judgment to vacate and send the case back to the court of
appeals, but, joined in full by Justice Thomas and in substantial part by Justices Alito and Kavanaugh,
disagreed with the majority’s refusal to overrule Auer. Justice Gorsuch maintained that Auer deference
forces judges “to subordinate their own views about what the law means to those of a political actor.” He
argued instead that judges should employ the Skidmore doctrine when attempting to discern the meaning
of an agency regulation. Under Skidmore, courts independently interpret the text of a regulation, but may
accord non-binding weight to an administrative interpretation, consistent with “the thoroughness evident

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in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”
Chief Justice Roberts, who provided the crucial fifth vote to uphold Auer, authored a partial concurrence
contending that the “distance” between the controlling portion of Justice Kagan’s opinion and the position
put forth by Justice Gorsuch “is not as great as it may initially appear.” Chief Justice Roberts noted that
the requirements announced by the Kisor majority for according binding status on an agency’s regulatory
interpretation—that an interpretation must, among other things, be based on the agency’s “authoritative,
expertise-based, and fair and considered judgment”—is not so different from those factors that Justice
Gorsuch believes may persuade a court to follow an interpretation—e.g, that the interpretation is based on
the agency’s thorough consideration of the question, supported by valid reasoning, and not in conflict
with prior and later interpretations. Perhaps anticipating a future legal challenge to the continuing
viability of the Chevron doctrine, the Chief Justice also wrote that the Auer and Chevron doctrines are
analytically distinct. The Court’s refusal to overrule Auer, the Chief Justice contended, has no bearing on
issues associated with Chevron. The Chief Justice did not elaborate on the reasons he believed the
doctrines are distinct. But the High Court has recognized that Chevron is based on a presumption that
Congress sometimes intends agencies to fill gaps in ambiguous statutes they administer. Some
commentators and Justices have argued that Auer is not premised on a similar presumption about
legislative intent, and, notably, the Chief Justice did not join the portion of Justice Kagan’s opinion that
argued that Auer deference is based on such a presumption.
Justice Kavanaugh also filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Like Justice Gorsuch, he argued that
Auer should be overruled, but he also agreed with the Chief Justice that the Kisor majority and Justice
Gorsuch’s approaches may not be that far apart. Justice Kavanaugh contended that the Kisor majority’s
instruction that courts exhaust the traditional canons of construction before concluding that a regulation is
ambiguous “will almost always [lead a court to] reach a conclusion about the best interpretation of the
regulation at issue.” Justice Kavanaugh also agreed with the Chief Justice that the majority’s refusal to
overturn Auer is not relevant to the issue of Chevron.
While the Court in Kisor upheld the Auer doctrine, the framework it elucidated for assessing
whether deference is appropriate may provide further guidance, and, perhaps, constraints for
lower courts tasked with determining whether to defer to an agency’s regulatory interpretation. It
remains to be seen how courts will apply Kisor’s reframing of Auer deference, including whether
courts will be more hesitant to conclude that deference is warranted. It is also unclear whether
Kisor’s elaborations on the limits of Auer deference will inform agency decision making. For
instance, if an agency believes its interpretation of a regulation is unlikely to receive Auer
deference, some contend the agency might devote more time to ensure regulatory texts are
sufficiently precise to withstand greater judicial scrutiny. In any event, the Court in Kisor made
clear that Auer deference is not constitutionally required, and Congress may opt to memorialize,
abrogate, or modify application of the doctrine by statute. For example, Congress could amend
the judicial review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to explicitly provide
that judicial review of agency interpretations of regulations shall be accorded no deference (i.e.,
“de novo”) or instead be subject to some other standard. Congress could also potentially legislate
on whether Auer deference or some other standard of judicial review should be applied to
regulatory interpretations in particular statutes, instead of the generally applicable APA.

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Author Information

Daniel J. Sheffner

Legislative Attorney

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