Google Fined for Violation of EU Data Protection Law

Google Fined for Violation of EU Data Protection Law

Legal Sidebari

Google Fined for Violation of EU Data
Protection Law
February 22, 2019
In a decision testing what it means to give informed consent to online data collection, a French regulatory
body recently fined Google LLC (Google) 50 million euro (approximately 56 million U.S. dollars)— the
largest fine issued to date for violating the European Union’s (EU’s) General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). Discussed in this CRS In Focus, the GDPR is an EU law that provides rules for protection of
personal data throughout the 28-member European Union. The French data protection authority—the
Commission Nationale de l’informatique et des Libertés (CNIL)—concluded that Google’s lack of
transparency and failure to obtain valid consent from Android phone users violated the GDPR. Although
the fine arose under EU law (and Google has announced plans to appeal it), the decision could offer
lessons for recent congressional efforts to craft more comprehensive federal data privacy policy.
What is the GDPR?
In effect since May 2019, the GDPR provides data protection rules in several interrelated areas: data
privacy (i.e., how companies and organizations collect, use, and disseminate personal data), data security
(i.e., how companies guard against and respond to data breaches), and cross-border data flows (i.e., when
companies are permitted to transfer personal data within and outside of the EU). In terms of data privacy,
which Google’s fine concerned, the GDPR is more comprehensive than U.S. federal law. Whereas federal
data privacy law involves a “patchwork” of separate laws covering different issues and sectors of the
economy (discussed in this Legal Sidebar), the GDPR creates a single, unified data privacy regime.
Unless an exception applies, the GDPR applies to all processing of personal data, which is broadly
defined to include collection, use, storage, disclosure or any other “set of operations” performed on
personal data. From a territorial perspective, the GDPR applies to organizations that have an
“establishment” in the EU and to non-EU-established entities that offer goods or services to individuals in
the EU. Because many businesses with an online presence offer goods and services to EU individuals, the
GDPR applies to many businesses outside the EU, including many American businesses.
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What Does the GDPR Require?
A central pillar of the GDPR’s privacy provisions is the requirement that entities rely on one of six legal
bases for processing personal data. Individual consent can be a lawful basis, but only if it is “freely given,
specific, informed and unambiguous,” among other conditions. The GDRP further states that consent is
not considered “freely given” if users have “no genuine or free choice” about whether to provide it or are
unable to withdraw their consent without detriment.
A second pillar of the GDPR’s privacy provisions is its enumeration of eight data protection rights
afforded to individuals (unless an exception applies).
1. Individuals have a right to be informed about the collection and use of their personal data.
2. Individuals have a right to access and obtain copies of their personal data.
3. The right to rectification requires entities to correct inaccurate or incomplete data.
4. The right to erasure (also known as the “right to be forgotten”) allows individuals to demand that their personal data be
erased in certain cases.
5. Individuals have right to restrict processing of their data in some circumstances.
6. The right to data portability allows individuals to obtain the personal data that they provided to an entity in a format that
can be transmitted to another entity.
7. Individuals have a right to object to the data processing in some circumstances.
8. The GDPR provides a separately defined objections rights for data processing that involve automated decision-making
(i.e., decision-making without human involvement), including profiling (defined in Article 4).
Why Was Google Fined?
After two digital rights advocacy groups filed complaints in May 2018 concerning Google’s data privacy
practices on its Android mobile operating system, the CNIL deemed Google’s practices deficient in two
ways.
First, the CNIL found that Google did not comply with its obligations to provide Android users with
information about its data processing activities. A complement to the right to be informed, the GDPR
requires data controllers (defined in Article 4) to disclose certain information about their activities, such
as data retention periods, the purposes for which data is collected, and with whom the data will be shared.
According to the CNIL, Google’s disclosures lacked key information and were too generic for users to
understand. The CNIL also found that Google improperly spread its disclosures across several documents.
For example, an individual seeking information about Google’s targeted advertising or location tracking
practices was required to click through five or more pages to obtain a complete picture of the activities.
Second, the CNIL determined that Google did not obtain valid consent from its Android users. Requiring
that users opt-out of targeted advertising by selecting a “more options” feature and then unchecking a pre-
ticked box did not comport with the requirement that consent be unambiguous, according to the CNIL.
Nor was consent specific, the CNIL concluded. Before creating an account, Google required users to
agree to its terms of service in full rather than allowing users to provide consent for each distinct way
Google processed user data. Lastly, the CNIL reasoned that user consent was insufficiently informed
because Google’s disclosures were incomplete and “diluted” across several documents.
The Fine in Context
Although the CNIL’s 50 million euro fine is the largest penalty for violation of the GDPR to date, the
advocacy groups that brought the action sought a much larger fine. Article 83 of the GDPR allows fines

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of up to 4% of a company’s total worldwide annual revenue, which, in Google’s case, exceeds 100 billion
U.S. dollars. Based on this revenue, the privacy groups urged the CNIL to issue a multi-billion penalty,
but the GDPR does not require that data protection authorities impose the maximum penalty. Instead, the
regulation states that fines must be “effective, proportionate, and dissuasive,” and that data protection
authorities must consider a host of factors, including the nature, gravity, and duration of the offense. In
Google’s case, the CNIL found that the 50 million euro penalty was justified based on the severity of the
infringements, but the CNIL did not explain in detail why it declined to impose a steeper penalty.
In the context of U.S. law, Google’s data processing practices appear unlikely to run afoul of existing
federal data protection laws. Although federal law contains certain sector or data-specific consent
requirements, discussed below, it generally does not dictate the manner in which entities must disclose
their data collection and use, provided their data privacy practices are not unfair or deceptive.
Lessons for Congress
The CNIL’s fine may offer lessons for congressional efforts to craft data privacy policy at the federal
level. In addition to upcoming hearings on the subject, several data privacy bills have been introduced in
the 116th Congress (and previously in the 115th Congress). The National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) also recently sought comments on proposals to “advance consumer
privacy while protecting prosperity and innovation.” Policy options vary widely, and, while some
commentators advocate for the U.S. to adopt a more comprehensive model based on the GDPR, other
observers, including officials in the Trump Administration, have criticized the EU’s approach. Despite the
breadth of approaches, a common thread among many data protection policy proposals in the U.S. (both
legislative and from the NTIA) is the aim to increase the level of transparency and control afforded to
individuals that transmit their data online. The CNIL’s fine of Google implicates both objectives.
With regard to transparency, the CNIL’s decision demonstrates that mandatory disclosure requirements
may present complex issues related to not only what information companies must disclose, but how they
provide that information to Internet-users. In Google’s case, Articles 13 and 14 of the GDRP describe in
detail the information that data controllers must provide to individuals. But the CNIL found that the
manner in which that Google presented the information was too vague and difficult to access. Some
proposed legislation seeks to anticipate this dynamic by placing contours on the “form of disclosure,” but
other proposals are silent on the subject or direct the Federal Trade Commission to prepare more detailed
regulations.
The Google fine also reveals complexities in legislative efforts to give individuals control over
their data through consent requirements. Legal models for obtaining consent differ in legislative
proposals and the patchwork of existing federal law. For example, the Video Privacy Protection
Act prohibits “video tape service providers,” including video streaming services like Hulu and
Netflix, from disclosing protected information unless consumers affirmatively “opt-in” by
electing to provide consent. Financial institutions, by contrast, can disclose protected information
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act if they provide consumers with advance notice and
opportunity to “opt-out.” The GDPR generally uses the opt-in model, and the CNIL fined
Google, in part, because it required users to opt-out by deselecting pre-checked boxes. Some
commentators debate which approach is optimal, while others argue that neither method
effectively gauges user consent due to the inherent complexity in modern data processing and
limits of consumer choice.

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Author Information

Stephen P. Mulligan

Legislative Attorney

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