Agreeing in Advance to Lose? Legal Considerations in Regulating Confessions of Judgment

Agreeing in Advance to Lose? Legal Considerations in Regulating Confessions of Judgment

Legal Sidebari

Agreeing in Advance to Lose? Legal
Considerations in Regulating Confessions of
Judgment
Updated June 13, 2019
UPDATE 6/13/19: Since the initial publication of this Sidebar, multiple governmental entities have
expressed interest in examining confessions of judgment. First, the House Committee on Small Business
has scheduled a hearing to explore “the legalities of the practice, its use, and impact on small business
borrowers.” As of the date of this update, the hearing is scheduled for Wednesday June 26, 2019, at 11:30
AM, in Rayburn 2360.
Secondly, the Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Director of the FTC’s
Bureau of Consumer Protection (Director) indicated last month that the FTC is examining the practice of
creditors utilizing confessions of judgment in small business lending transactions. The Director suggested
that, depending on the results of the FTC’s inquiry, the agency might consider promulgating new
regulations or initiating enforcement actions. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) authorizes the FTC to promulgate
“rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce” for the purposes of the Federal Trade Commission Act, while 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(1)
empowers the FTC to “commence a civil action against” entities that engage in “unfair or deceptive acts
or practices.” The course of action that the FTC ultimately selects could implicate the legal
considerations for Congress discussed in the original post below.
Finally, some policymakers have proposed new laws regulating confessions of judgment at the state level.
The Governor of New York, for instance, has advocated (1) codifying the FTC’s Credit Practices Rule
described below—which prohibits confessions of judgment in consumer credit transactions—in New York
law; (2) prohibiting confessions of judgment in small business loans under $250,000; and (3) “requiring
that any . . . confession of judgment enforced in New York courts have a nexus to business activity in New
York.” Such state-level proposals raise various legal questions, including whether prohibiting a state
court from honoring an out-of-state confessed judgment in the absence of a nexus to business activity in
the enforcing state would comport with the U.S. Constitution’s Full Faith & Credit Clause discussed
herein.
The original post from January 3, 2019 is below.
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Contracts sometimes contain provisions—known as “confession of judgment” or “cognovit” clauses—
pursuant to which one party agrees that if it later breaches the contract, the other party may summarily
obtain a legal judgment that it may enforce against the breaching party’s assets. An entity that enters into
such a contract thereby waives significant procedural rights it would otherwise enjoy, such as the right to
notice and an opportunity to assert legal defenses against the other party’s claim. Creditors laud
confessions of judgment as an efficient means to collect assets from recalcitrant debtors, as they enable
creditors to avoid the “costly and time-consuming” litigation process. Others, however, maintain that
confessions of judgment undesirably permit creditors to collect money and assets that they otherwise
could not collect if the debtor retained the ability to assert meritorious legal defenses against the creditors’
claims. As discussed below, these concerns have previously prompted federal and state policymakers to
restrict the circumstances in which creditors may utilize and enforce confessions of judgment. Some still
contend, however, that existing federal laws do not go far enough to protect debtors from the adverse
consequences of confessions of judgment. Thus, several Members of Congress, spurred in part by an
investigative report on confessions of judgment, have recently introduced legislation to prevent creditors
from utilizing confessions of judgment to collect certain business debts.
This Sidebar discusses the array of legal issues that confessions of judgment implicate. After providing an
overview of confessions of judgment, the Sidebar analyzes existing restrictions on the practice under
federal and state law. It then describes recent legislative proposals to subject confessions of judgment to
heightened federal regulation. The Sidebar concludes by identifying pertinent legal issues for Congress to
consider when developing and evaluating such proposals.
Background
Several states, in the interest of facilitating debt collection, authorize creditors to obtain enforceable
judgments against certain types of debtors without engaging in full-fledged litigation. Such confessions of
judgment operate as follows: first, the creditor includes a provision in its contract with the debtor stating
that the debtor consents to have a court enter a monetary judgment in the creditor’s favor in the event of a
breach. Such a provision might state, for example: “I hereby acknowledge myself to be justly indebted to,
and do hereby confess judgment in favor of [the creditor] in the sum of [a specified dollar amount].” The
debtor then signs the document, thereby waiving its right to notice of the judgment, as well as its right to
assert defenses against the creditor’s claim. If the debtor later breaches the contract, the creditor may then
file the document with the clerk of court to demonstrate that the debtor has agreed in advance to have a
judgment entered against it. The court then enters a judgment in the creditor’s favor, which the creditor
may then invoke to collect the debtor’s assets in satisfaction of the debt.
By authorizing creditors to obtain judgments against debtors “without notice or hearing,” confessions of
judgment raise potential constitutional concerns. As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, “notice [of a
judicial proceeding] and an opportunity to be heard” are “fundamental requisites of the constitutional
guarantee of procedural due process.” Nevertheless, in 1972, the Supreme Court held in D.H. Overmyer
Co. v. Frick that confessions of judgment are “not, per se, violative of Fourteenth Amendment due
process.” According to the Court, because “the due process rights to notice and hearing prior to a civil
judgment are subject to waiver,” a debtor who “voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly” signs a contract
with a confession of judgment clause may validly “waive[] the rights it otherwise possesse[s] to
prejudgment notice and hearing.”
Even though there is no per se constitutional prohibition against confessions of judgment, however, the
D.H. Overmyer Court nonetheless acknowledged the possibility that a confessed judgment may
impermissibly deprive a debtor of due process “where the contract [containing the confession of judgment
clause] is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power” between the debtor and the
creditor, or “where the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision.” Lower courts therefore
conduct a “fact-specific inquiry” to evaluate whether a specific confessed judgment violates due process,

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examining factors such as the debtor’s sophistication and whether counsel represented the debtor. As a
practical matter, however, courts have often rejected debtors’ claims that they did not voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently consent to a confessed judgment.
Federal Regulation of Confessions of Judgment
In the absence of a categorical constitutional prohibition on confessions of judgment, federal
policymakers have opted to regulate confession of judgment clauses in certain respects. In particular, a
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulation known as the “Credit Practices Rule” declares it a violation
of Section 5 the Federal Trade Commission Act—which empowers the government to police and penalize
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”—“for a lender or retail installment seller
directly or indirectly to take or receive from a consumer an obligation that . . . [c]onstitutes or contains a
cognovit or confession of judgment.” By its plain terms, however, the Credit Practices Rule only applies
“in connection with the extension of credit to consumers in or affecting commerce.” The Rule defines
“consumer” as “a natural person who seeks or acquires goods, services, or money for personal, family, or
household use.” Thus, by its terms, the Rule does not protect corporations, limited liability companies, or
other business entities from the adverse consequences of confessions of judgment.
State Regulation of Confessions of Judgment
Because the Credit Practices Rule only applies to consumer lending contracts, the legality of confession
of judgment clauses in business contracts depends on state law. Many states have enacted statutes
rendering confession of judgment clauses void. A few states even declare it a misdemeanor to induce
another person to sign a document containing a confession of judgment provision. Other states, by
contrast, authorize their courts to enter confessed judgments so long as the creditor complies with certain
substantive and procedural requirements. Under Ohio law, for example, a confession of judgment in a
business contract is potentially enforceable if it informs the debtor, “in such type size or distinctive
marking that it appears more clearly and conspicuously than anything else on the document,” that:
By signing this paper you give up your right to notice and court trial. If you do not pay on time a
court judgment may be taken against you without your prior knowledge and the powers of a court
can be used to collect from you regardless of any claims you may have against the creditor.
States that authorize confessed judgments generally grant debtors a window of time during which they
may ask the court to vacate the judgment. A debtor’s challenge to a confessed judgment will generally
fail, however, if the debtor does not promptly seek relief from the court that originally entered the
judgment.
Critically, however, states cannot necessarily shield their residents from confessed judgments entered in
other states. Because the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires states to honor
judgments that are validly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction in another state, a confessed
judgment issued by a court of a state that authorizes confessed judgments may be enforceable against a
debtor that resides in a different state that restricts or prohibits confessions of judgment. Thus, to
illustrate, the Supreme Court of Florida has ruled that Florida courts must honor confessed judgments
validly issued by courts in other states, even though Florida law prohibits Florida courts from entering
confessed judgments themselves.
Legal Considerations for Congress
Members of recent Congresses have introduced a variety of bills to regulate confessions of judgment in
several different respects. For example, the Small Business Fair Lending Act from the 115th Congress (S.
3717/H.R. 7354) would have amended the Truth in Lending Act to prohibit any creditor from “directly or
indirectly tak[ing] or receiv[ing] from a borrower an obligation that constitutes or contains a cognovit or

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confession of judgment” “[i]n connection with the extension of credit in or affecting commerce.” That bill
would have therefore codified the Credit Practices Rule’s prohibitions on confessions of judgment in the
consumer lending context while expanding the Rule’s protections to business contracts.
There are several legal issues for Congress to consider if it chooses to impose greater regulations on
confessions of judgment. The first question is how broadly the legislation will sweep: Congress could
restrict or prohibit confession of judgment clauses in a wide swath of contracts, or it could instead enact
legislation that applies only to a limited subset of contracts, creditors, or debtors. For instance, whereas
several legislative proposals introduced in past Congresses would have only restricted the use of
confession of judgment clauses in specific types of contracts (such as franchise agreements), bills like the
Small Business Fair Lending Act would have applied more broadly to prohibit confession of judgment
clauses in any contract “in connection with the extension of credit in or affecting commerce.”
Significantly, drafting the legislation more broadly could potentially result in federal law preempting a
wider array of state statutes that currently authorize confessions of judgment in certain contexts.
Another issue is whether the legislation would apply retroactively to render confession of judgment
clauses in existing contracts unenforceable. The Supreme Court, opining that “elementary considerations
of fairness dictate that . . . settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted,” has generally declined to
afford statutes retroactive effect “absent a clear indication from Congress that it intended such a result.” In
the present context, invalidating confession of judgment clauses in existing contracts could potentially
disrupt the settled expectations of creditors, who could lose a valuable contractual right. Perhaps for that
reason, the Credit Practices Rule only purports to constrain creditors from including confession of
judgment clauses in new contracts formed after the Rule’s effective date—the FTC has taken the position
that contracts signed before the Rule’s effective date remain “enforceable and not in violation of the Rule”
even if they contain confession of judgment provisions.
In addition to the aforementioned issues, regulating confessions of judgment at the federal level raises
other legal questions, including:
 Whether the responsibility for enforcing the new law will be entrusted to a federal
agency, individual debtors, or both;
 Whether creditors who enter into contracts containing unlawful confession of judgment
provisions will be subject to penalties—and, if so, what those penalties will be and to
whom they will be paid;
 Whether (and to what extent) the existence of a confession of judgment clause in a
contract will render that contract partially or entirely unenforceable; and
 Whether (and under what circumstances) debtors will be allowed to collaterally attack the
validity of confessed judgments entered by state courts in a subsequent judicial
proceeding in the same court or a different court.
If the 116th Congress chooses to continue the 115th Congress’s work on regulating confessions of
judgment, it may need to consider these varied legal issues implicated by confession of judgment clauses.

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Author Information

Kevin M. Lewis

Legislative Attorney

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