Patent Owners May Recover Foreign-Based Damages in Certain Infringement Cases

Patent Owners May Recover Foreign-Based Damages in Certain Infringement Cases

Legal Sidebar

Patent Owners May Recover Foreign-Based
Damages in Certain Infringement Cases
Updated July 20, 2018
In WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that patent owners
prevailing in infringement suits involving unauthorized foreign uses of their patented inventions may be
entitled to damages based on lost foreign profits. This decision opens the possibility that infringers may
be required to pay increased damages in patent cases involving international supply chains. Moreover, the
decision could prompt foreign courts to adopt a similar approach in determining the extraterritorial force
of their patent laws. However, it remains to be seen whether the Court’s holding is limited to damages
associated with the type of infringement in this case (arising under § 271(f)(2) of the Patent Act, which
prohibits the unauthorized exportation of a patented invention’s components with the intent that the parts
be assembled abroad), or whether the reasoning of the opinion could potentially be applied in calculating
damages flowing from other types of patent infringement. This Sidebar discusses the case’s background,
the Court’s decision, and its implications for patent litigation and for Congress.
Extraterritoriality of U.S. Patent Law
Extraterritorial application of U.S. law refers to the extension of federal law to activity outside the
territorial confines of the United States. The question of the extent to which a particular statute applies to
foreign activities has generally been considered a matter of statutory construction. In interpreting statutory
provisions to determine their extraterritorial effect, courts often apply a “canon of statutory construction”
known as the “presumption against extraterritoriality,” under which courts presume that, “absent a clear
statement from Congress . . . federal statutes do not apply outside the United States.” In the context of
patent law, the Supreme Court has recognized that the “traditional understanding” of U.S. patent rights is
that they apply only within the nation’s borders. As the Court proclaimed in its 2007 opinion in Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T, “[t]he presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the
world applies with particular force in patent law.”
The Patent Act provides patent holders with an exclusive right to exclude others from (1) making,
(2) using, (3) offering for sale, or (4) selling their invention throughout the United States, or (5) importing
the invention into the United States, for a limited period of time, during which they may try to recoup
their investments through use of the invention, sale of licenses, and collection of royalty payments.
Whoever performs any of these five acts during the term of a patent, without the patent holder’s
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authorization, is liable for infringement under § 271 of the Patent Act. A patent holder may file a civil
action to prevent an alleged infringer from committing further infringing acts (by securing an injunction).
Section 284 of the Patent Act also provides that a federal court shall award a prevailing patent holder
damages that are “adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.” (In practice, a patent holder often seeks to
obtain damages based on its lost profits by showing a “reasonable probability” that “but for” the
infringement, the patent holder “would have made the infringer’s sales.”) Section 284 is silent as to its
territorial scope, although it does refer to “damages . . . for the infringement,” which appears to
incorporate by reference the forms of infringement defined in § 271. Section 271(a) is the general
provision that includes territorial limitation language: infringing acts occurring “within the United States”
or in connection with importation “into the United States.”
In 1972, the Supreme Court in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. held that, under the Patent Act as
it was written at that time, it was not an act of patent infringement to manufacture the components of a
patented invention in the United States and then ship them abroad for assembly into an end product. In
reaching this conclusion, the Deepsouth Court observed that “[o]ur patent system makes no claim to
extraterritorial effect; ‘these acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits
of the United States.’” In response to the opinion’s identification of a “gap in the enforceability of patent
rights,” Congress broadened the territorial scope of infringement defined in § 271 by amending the statute
in 1984 to address certain domestic conduct that enables activities occurring abroad. Specifically, §
271(f)(1) establishes infringement liability for the circumstances at issue in the Deepsouth case,
prohibiting the unauthorized exportation of substantial portions of the components of a patented invention
in a manner that actively induces their combination outside of the United States. Section 271(f)(2)
prohibits the unauthorized shipment of uncombined components that are especially adapted to work in a
patented invention, “knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such
component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if
such combination occurred within the United States.” This latter statutory provision was at issue in the
WesternGeco case.
Background on WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.
WesternGeco LLC owns four patents pertaining to technology it developed for searching for oil and gas
beneath the ocean floor. The company does not sell or license its invention, but rather employs the
technology itself in performing surveys on behalf of oil companies. ION Geophysical Corporation makes
component parts in the United States for a competing survey system and ships those parts abroad for
companies to build a system virtually identical to WesternGeco’s. WesternGeco sued ION for
infringement under § 271(f)(1) and (f)(2). The jury found infringement liability and awarded
WesternGeco a “reasonable royalty” of $12.5 million. The jury also awarded WesternGeco $93.4 million
in lost profits associated with ten survey contracts the jury determined WesternGeco had lost due to ION’s
infringement. ION appealed the award of lost-profits damages to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit)—the court with exclusive, nationwide jurisdiction over most patent
appeals—arguing that § 271(f) does not apply extraterritorially. A divided panel of the Federal Circuit
reversed the award after concluding that § 271(f) does not allow patent owners to recover for lost profits
arising from the overseas combination of domestically made components of a patented invention. The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari to review the Federal Circuit’s holding regarding the
extraterritorial force of § 271(f).
The Supreme Court’s Opinion
In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit erred in
concluding that lost foreign profits are categorically unavailable in cases where the patent owner proves

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infringement under § 271(f)(2). Instead, the Court concluded that damages awards for § 271(f)(2)
infringements are not confined to domestic sales, but can also include lost foreign profits as long as the
relevant infringing conduct occurred in the United States (i.e., shipping components of a patented
invention from the United States for overseas assembly). In other words, patent owners could be entitled
to damages associated with an infringer’s foreign activities if the infringer had also committed a domestic
infringement—by introducing an infringing product into foreign commerce through exportation. In
reaching this determination, the Court applied the analytical framework it articulated in RJR Nabisco, Inc.
v. European Community to interpret the extraterritorial reach of the Patent Act’s general damages
provision, § 284, and the infringement provision at issue in the case, § 271(f)(2). The Court exercised its
discretion to skip step one of the RJR Nabisco framework, which asks if the statutory text provides a
clear, affirmative indication of congressional intent for the statute to apply abroad, thereby rebutting the
presumption against extraterritoriality. The Court justified declining to address WesternGeco’s argument
that the presumption should never apply to a general damages provision such as § 284 because
“[r]esolving that question could implicate many other statutes besides the Patent Act,” and, in any event,
would not change the case’s outcome.
The Court instead moved to the second step of the extraterritoriality framework—identifying the “focus”
of a statute, which includes the conduct, parties, or interests that the statute seeks to regulate or protect.
Under RJR Nabisco, “[i]f the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States, then
the case involves a permissible domestic application” of the statute, “even if other conduct occurred
abroad.” On the other hand, if the relevant conduct occurred abroad, “then the case involves an
impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.”
The Court first determined that the focus of § 284 is on “the infringement,” and cited previous Court
precedent recognizing that the “overriding purpose” of the damages statute is to give patent owners
“complete compensation” for infringements. Then the Court examined the statutory text of § 271(f)(2)
and found that the statute focuses on domestic conduct: specifically, the domestic act of supplying
components of a patented invention from the United States with the intent that they be assembled
overseas. The Court concluded “that the conduct relevant to the statutory focus in this case is domestic”
because ION’s act of supplying the components that infringed WesternGeco’s patents occurred in the
United States. Therefore, the lost-profits damages awarded to the patent owner were a permissible
domestic application of § 284. Because of this finding, the Court found it did not need to consider
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality was rebutted in this case.
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented, asserting that the Court’s holding “allows U.S.
patent owners to extend their patent monopolies far beyond anything Congress has authorized and shields
them from foreign competition U.S. patents were never meant to reach.” The dissenting opinion argued
that because the Patent Act provides patent owners with “a lawful monopoly over the manufacture, use,
and sale of an invention within this country only,” the foreign conduct at issue in the case—the use of
WesternGeco’s invention outside of the United States—is not an infringement of a U.S. patent right and
thus should not be considered by a court in awarding compensation for infringement under § 284. Finally,
the dissenters observed that, in their view, nothing in § 271(f)(2) “suggest[s] that U.S. patents protect
against—much less guarantee compensation for—uses abroad.” In response, the Court disputed the
dissenting justices’ reading of the plain text of the Patent Act and stated that “[t]heir position wrongly
conflates legal injury with the damages arising from that injury.”
Implications for Patent Litigation and for Congress
WesternGeco expands the scope of available remedies for certain types of patent infringement to include
damages attributable to foreign sales, though it also leaves several questions unanswered. Thus, the
decision’s potential impact on future patent litigation depends on how courts interpret and apply the case.
On the one hand, the Court expressly stated in a footnote that its analysis and holding are limited to

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patent-infringing exports under § 271(f)(2) because the Federal Circuit did not address the liability of
ION under § 271(f)(1). Furthermore, the Court did not discuss the extraterritorial reach of § 271(a), the
direct infringement provision, under which the vast majority of patent infringement cases arise. Thus,
courts may apply WesternGeco narrowly and confine its application to only § 271(f)(2) cases, which
would not likely be a dramatic change to current patent litigation practices. Similarly, it is also possible
that WesternGeco’s impact may be limited if lower courts construe the decision as narrowly applying to
certain fact-specific situations. Lower courts could potentially apply the decision only to situations that do
not involve foreign patent law or implicate the sovereignty of foreign countries, but, like WesternGeco,
concern foreign sales and contracts for services performed on the high seas (and therefore outside the
territorial reach of any nation’s patent jurisdiction). It would likely be fairly rare for litigation to arise
under these specific factual circumstances, which would have the effect of limiting the reach of the
Court’s decision in WesternGeco.
In addition, though WesternGeco held that lost foreign profits could be recoverable under § 271(f)(2), it is
important to note that patent owners are not automatically entitled to such foreign damages. In a footnote,
the Court expressly stated that “we do not address the extent to which other doctrines, such as proximate
cause, could limit or preclude damages in particular cases.” In light of this footnote, it is possible that, on
remand, WesternGeco may still be denied “lost profits resulting from its failure to win foreign service
contracts” if a court finds such extraterritorial damages were not reasonably foreseeable or the injury was
too remotely related to ION’s domestic acts of infringement. Thus, WesternGeco may not necessarily
cause a spike in damages awards in future patent litigation, as courts would likely still apply traditional
principles of tort causation to determine whether the patent owner’s lost foreign profits damages were
attributable to a defendant’s infringing domestic conduct.
On the other hand, if lower courts view the reasoning of WesternGeco more broadly—particularly
language explaining that the “overriding purpose” of § 284 is to provide patent owners “complete
compensation” for infringements—the opinion may have greater implications. For example, such a court
may agree to allow patent owners to recover for foreign lost-profits damages in cases involving other
types of infringement beyond § 271(f)(2). Patent owners could also rely on WesternGeco’s emphasis on
“complete compensation” for infringement to challenge the validity of judicially created rules that have
guided courts in calculating patent damages awards, such as the principles of “apportionment” or the
“entire market value rule.” It also remains to be seen whether courts will view WesternGeco as calling
into question Federal Circuit case law interpreting § 271(a)—the direct infringement provision—as
precluding recovery for lost foreign profits, although it may be worth noting that § 271(a) is limited to
acts of domestic infringement and does not contain exportation language similar to that found in § 271(f).
Finally, the dissenting opinion raised the concern that the Court’s holding allowing U.S. patent owners to
seek damages for foreign uses of their inventions could “invite other countries to use their own patent
laws and courts to assert control over [the American] economy,” despite the fact that “foreign patent[s]
lack[] any legal force here.” However, at least one observer has downplayed the risk that foreign courts
will respond in this manner, arguing, as noted above, that proximate cause and other legal doctrines will
likely limit the amount of damages for foreign lost profits arising from infringing domestic conduct.
Congress could also play a role in determining WesternGeco’s impact. For example, the Patent
Act’s remedial provision could be amended to permit only domestic damages or limit foreign-
based damages to only § 271(f) cases. Congress could also await further judicial developments
before taking any action.

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Author Information

Brian T. Yeh

Legislative Attorney

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