Japan’s Landslide Election: Implications for the United States

Japan’s Landslide Election: Implications for the United States

Japan's Landslide Election: Implications for the United States

February 11, 2026 (IN12656)

Introduction

On February 8, 2026, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and her ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won a landslide victory in elections for the Lower House of the Diet, Japan's legislature. Takaichi now is well-positioned to advance her policy agenda, including issues of interest to the United States, such as increasing defense spending, building Japan's defense industrial base, implementing a 2025 U.S.-Japan trade and investment agreement, and enacting expansionary fiscal policies. Japan's first female premier, Takaichi is scheduled to visit Washington, DC, for a March 19 summit with President Trump, providing Members of Congress with a potential opportunity for meetings.

Takaichi's LDP Makes Resounding Comeback

The election results place Takaichi in a dominant legislative position. The LDP won 316 seats, up from its previous total of 196. Its coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), won 36 seats. (Figure 1.) Takaichi—first elected as prime minister in October 2025—led the LDP to victory after the party's losses in 2024 and 2025 elections reduced it to minority status in both the Lower House and Upper House. The governing coalition now holds more than a two-thirds supermajority, which allows it to override rejections of bills in the Upper House, where the coalition lacks a majority (Figure 2). The elections decimated the largest opposition group, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), which lost over 120 seats, reducing its total to 49. Meanwhile, right-wing party Sanseito (Do-It-Yourself Party) went from 2 to 15 seats, half its pre-election aspirations. Experts attribute the victory to Takaichi's pre-election popularity and the CRA's inability to resonate with the public, particularly younger voters, among whom the LDP made substantial gains.

Takaichi may have an extended political runway. The next scheduled elections (for the Upper House) are not until July 2028. Lower House elections are not required until February 2030.

Figure 1. Lower House Party Strength

Before and After February 2026 Elections

Source: "A Landslide for Takaichi's LDP: House of Representatives Election Results," Nippon.com, February 9, 2026.

Figure 2. Upper House Party Strength

Source: House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan, February 11, 2026.

Implications for the United States

U.S.-Japan Economic Relations

Takaichi has promised a "responsible and proactive" fiscal policy, including potential cuts to consumption taxes aimed in part at addressing rising costs of living. Takaichi also has pledged to promote public-private investments focused on strategic sectors. Some reports suggest that certain pre-election Japanese stimulus measures were partially aimed at mitigating potential effects of U.S. tariff increases on Japan in 2025. Although Japan was granted lowered tariff rates as a result of the 2025 U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement, tariffs remain higher than 2024 rates on key Japanese exports (e.g., vehicles). Additionally, concerns about how Japan will fund Takaichi's government spending plan may have led to recent volatility in bond markets.

Takaichi now may have greater political space to manage trade relations with the United States, including potential challenges of fulfilling Japan's pledge to invest $550 billion in strategic U.S. sectors as part of the 2025 Framework Agreement. Both sides have identified potential investments and projects; in February 2026, some media reports suggested initial investments will be announced soon. Japan reportedly has faced pressure from the Trump Administration to deliver the investments; other countries with similar agreements have faced tariff hike threats.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance

The LDP's victory could bolster Takaichi's ability to implement her defense goals, which may affect U.S.-Japan security relations. Amid perceived threats by China and North Korea, Takaichi has accelerated plans to increase Japan's defense spending to 2% of GDP. With a fresh electoral mandate, the LDP may choose to pursue increasing defense spending beyond the 2% of GDP level, but views among LDP candidates before the election appeared to diverge on whether to do so and how to finance such increased spending. Last year, the Trump Administration reportedly asked Japan to increase its defense spending to 3.5% of GDP. In addition, the current U.S.-Japan agreement for sharing the costs of the roughly 60,000 U.S. troops stationed across Japan expires in March 2027.

Meanwhile, Takaichi has reportedly expressed interest in revising the Japanese constitution, which renounces war and limits the use of the military. Such a revision could significantly alter the role of Japanese forces and how they operate within the alliance. Revising the constitution would require a two-thirds approval in both Diet chambers and a majority vote in a national referendum. Takaichi also intends to draft a new national security strategy by the end of 2026 and to establish a National Intelligence Bureau.

Japan's Regional Strategy

Takaichi has committed to continuing Japan's decade-old Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, aimed at preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon. That strategy aims to boost the U.S.-Japan alliance, build Japan's defense industrial base, and strengthen cooperation with partners such as South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. The latter two policies may reflect Japanese concernsconcerns about U.S. reliability as an alliance partner.

Japan-China relations have sunk to their worst levels in years with Takaichi implying in November 2025 that Japan might respond militarily to Chinese military aggression against Taiwan. China responded with a range of punitive measures, including restricting certain Japanese imports and curbing exports of critical minerals. Takaichi has said she seeks a "constructive and stable relationship" with Beijing but has not retracted her statement. Some observers have criticized the Trump Administration for not doing more to publicly support Japan, which some speculate may reflect the Administration's desire to avoid jeopardizing Trump's planned April 2026 visit to China. Some caution that a softer U.S. approach to China on security or economic issues could impede U.S.-Japan cooperation on countering China's actions. H.Res. 971, S.Res. 547, and H.Con.Res. 71 condemn China's recent coercive actions against Japan and praise Japan's actions related to the Taiwan Strait.

Tensions with China could be further heightened and relations with South Korea strained if Takaichi's pushes to revise the constitution's pacifist clauses, dismantles restrictions on defense industry exports, or visits the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japanese who died for their country during war, and enshrines 14 Class A war criminals from the World War II era, when Imperial Japan colonized Korea and invaded China. She reportedly hopes to create an environment where neighboring countries would understand a Japanese premier visiting the shrine.