North Korea-Russia Relations: Current Developments

North Korea-Russia Relations: Current Developments

INSIGHTi

North Korea-Russia Relations:
Current Developments
May 6, 2024
Since 2023, North Korea (officially known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) and
the Russian Federation (Russia) have upgraded their partnership, a development that could potentially
boost Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and increase North Korea’s military capabilities and its
willingness to engage in provocative actions against the United States and U.S. allies in East Asia.
The Biden Administration in recent months has designated for sanctions North Korean individuals and
entities conducting illicit cyber and crypto activities, weapons procurement and transfers (to Russia), and
fuel trade that violates U.S. and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) restrictions. North Korea’s
contravention of these sanctions, with Russia’s assistance, challenges long-held U.S. policy, shaped and
supported by several acts of Congress, aimed at persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons in
exchange for a potential loosening of sanctions. Strengthened North Korea-Russia bilateral ties
potentially embolden North Korea to expand illicit activities and engage in provocations, and may
improve DPRK military capabilities. The Administration has worked with South Korea and Japan to
increase deterrence and expand allied efforts to counter North Korea’s illicit efforts to evade sanctions,
such as a new U.S.-South Korea task force to disrupt DPRK illicit imports of petroleum. Congress may
consider whether to review Administration policies, examine implementation of unilateral and multilateral
sanctions, and review the breadth and pace of North Korea-Russia cooperation as well as its impact on
U.S. and allied forces.
An Expanding Partnership
In September 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un traveled to Russia’s Far East, where he met with
Russian President Vladimir Putin and visited Russia’s newest spaceport, a factory producing advanced
jets, and Russia’s Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok. It is Kim’s only summit since 2019. High-level Russian
and DPRK officials continue to meet in each other’s capitals to develop the partnership in a broad range
of areas, including economy, science, technology, and culture. In January 2024, the North Korean
government said that Putin may soon travel to Pyongyang for a bilateral summit (the last time he traveled
there was 2000). Some analysts have expressed concern that North Korea’s expanded capabilities and
support from Russia (and China) could give North Korea greater confidence to conduct aggressive
diplomatic, military, or other actions to achieve its objectives in the coming years.
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Benefits for North Korea
According to the U.S. intelligence community’s (IC’s) 2024 annual threat assessment (ATA), Russia has
been providing North Korea with “diplomatic, economic, and military concessions” in exchange for
weaponry. Reportedly, Putin has said Russia is prepared to help North Korea build and perhaps launch
satellites. In addition to increasing exports of food to North Korea, Russia appears to have increased its
exports of items prohibited by UNSC sanctions, such as oil. Russia reportedly has unfrozen $9 million in
North Korean assets, is facilitating the DPRK’s access to the world financial system, and reportedly
continues to violate United Nations sanctions by hosting North Korean workers. U.S. National Security
Council spokesman Kirby said in January that “in return for its support, we assess that Pyongyang is
seeking military assistance from Russia, including fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored
vehicles, ballistic missile production equipment or materials, and other advanced technologies.” In
addition to earning hard currency and/or barter trade from arms sales, North Korea may gain useful
information about how its missile systems perform on the battlefield, potentially accelerating North
Korean gains in improving its ballistic missile capabilities. North Korea also has been advancing its
nuclear weapons programs. Despite an expanding bilateral partnership, North Korea conducted
cyberattacks on Russian missile companies and government agencies in 2023.
Benefits for Russia
According to some estimates, Russia is firing at least 10,000 artillery shells at Ukraine each day. To
sustain this rate of fire while it increases its domestic production capacity, Russia has turned to North
Korea for artillery ammunition. The State Department states that North Korea has sent more than 10,000
shipping containers of ammunition or related materials (potentially containing more than 3 million rounds
of artillery ammunition) to Russia since October 2023. Russia also has “fired more than 40 North Korean
ballistic missiles” since late December 2023 against Ukrainian targets, according to official U.S.
statements. U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby has said that the DPRK weapons have
been used to “to target Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and to kill innocent Ukrainian civilians.” The IC’s
ATA says that by strengthening ties with North Korea (as well as China and Iran), Russia is “offsetting its
decline in relations with the West.”
Evolving Russian Policy
Weapons transfers from North Korea violate at least 10 UNSC sanctions resolutions, which Russia
supported when they were adopted in the 2000s and 2010s following North Korea’s nuclear and missile
tests. UNSC sanctions prohibit the purchase from or sale of arms to North Korea, among other
restrictions. They also prohibit any assistance to North Korea’s ballistic missile programs, including space
or satellite launch activities. From 2006 to 2017, Russia (along with China) supported the adoption of 10
UNSC sanctions resolutions. Russia also participated in past talks meant to persuade North Korea to
denuclearize. Since at least 2022, however, Russia has reversed course. During 2022 and 2023, China and
Russia blocked U.S.-led efforts at the UNSC to adopt stricter sanctions on Pyongyang following DPRK
ballistic missile tests. In March 2024, Russia voted against the renewal of a U.N. expert panel charged
with monitoring sanctions implementation; its representative said that the panel was “losing its relevance”
and sanctions should be reviewed. Since 2006, the panel has documented North Korea’s efforts to evade
sanctions, including ship-to-ship transfers of oil and coal in the waters off China’s and Russia’s coasts.
Forcing the dissolution of the panel may be part of Russia’s move to more openly engage in banned trade
and other activities with North Korea. This change in Russian policy toward North Korea may indicate a
larger departure from Moscow’s historical alignment with the United States on nonproliferation policy,
and may be helping North Korea achieve its military and foreign policy goals.

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Author Information

Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Mark E. Manyin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
Specialist in Asian Affairs

Andrew S. Bowen

Analyst in Russian and European Affairs

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