Ecuador’s April 2024 Plebiscite on Security Measures: Implications for Congress

Ecuador’s April 2024 Plebiscite on Security Measures: Implications for Congress

INSIGHTi

Ecuador’s April 2024 Plebiscite on Security
Measures: Implications for Congress
Updated April 24, 2024
On April 21, 2024, Ecuador held a plebiscite on 11 proposed reforms that seek to address the country’s
ongoing security crisis. According to preliminary results released by Ecuador’s electoral body, voters
voted in favor of 9 of the 11 questions, approving all of the reforms aimed at increasing the government’s
ability to fight organized crime and corruption. Some measures require legislative action to take effect,
but several reforms—including those that formalize the armed forces’ role in public security functions and
enable the extradition of Ecuadorian citizens—are set to take effect as soon as the official results are
published. Voters rejected two economic proposals related to recognizing international arbitration and
permitting hourly work contracts. Many analysts interpret the plebiscite’s results as a political victory for
President Daniel Noboa, who took office for a 17-month term in November 2023 following a snap
election, although voter turnout was lower than in past electoral processes.
Congress has acted to strengthen security cooperation and broader bilateral ties with Ecuador, including
through the United States-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-263, Division E, Subtitle B). Some
Members of Congress also have expressed concern about the deteriorating security climate in Ecuador
and offered statements of support to the Ecuadorian government. As Congress continues to monitor the
U.S.-Ecuador partnership, it may assess the plebiscite results and their implications for bilateral security
cooperation.
Ecuador’s Security Situation
Since 2020, Ecuador has experienced a surge in organized-crime-related violence as local gangs affiliated
with Mexican, Colombian, and Balkan transnational criminal organizations have competed for control of
drug trafficking routes to ship cocaine to markets outside South America. The homicide rate in Ecuador
reportedly increased by over 500% from 2019 to 2023, reaching 44.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants,
amid a historic increase in cocaine seizures. Some political figures and government officials have been
assassinated, including a 2023 presidential candidate, an anti-crime prosecutor, and local politicians.
In January 2024, President Noboa declared a state of emergency and “internal armed conflict,” limiting
some constitutional rights, designating 22 criminal groups as terrorist organizations, and enabling the
armed forces to carry out law enforcement operations, among other actions. The state of emergency
expired on April 8, ending some extraordinary measures, but a court order determined the armed forces
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may continue to perform public security functions indefinitely. During the state of emergency, security
forces conducted over 272,000 operations, resulting in over 18,700 arrests. Some analysts assess these
efforts have had mixed results, as homicide rates have declined while other crimes, such as kidnapping
and extortion, have increased; some local human rights groups have accused security personnel of using
excessive force.
Through the plebiscite, the Noboa administration received the Ecuadorian electorate’s support for several
policy changes intended to increase the government’s ability to counter organized crime. Among other
changes, the nine approved constitutional and legal reforms will formalize the armed forces’ role in public
security functions; enable the extradition of Ecuadorian citizens; increase sentencing for crimes including
terrorism and drug-trafficking; and designate special judges to oversee due process measures, such as
habeas corpus petitions, which the Ecuadorian government asserts some judges have used improperly to
benefit criminals.
Implications for U.S. Policy and Congress
The results of the plebiscite could have several implications for U.S. policy goals and bilateral relations.
For example, the approved measure to allow the extradition of Ecuadorian nationals wanted for crimes in
other countries could enhance U.S.-Ecuadorian law enforcement cooperation. The United States and
Ecuador agreed to bilateral extradition treaties in 1872 and 1939, but Ecuador’s constitution had
prohibited the extradition of its nationals. Enabling extradition could increase the likelihood that criminals
wanted in the United States are brought to justice, given that Ecuador’s security forces have struggled to
control the country’s prisons, resulting in several high-profile prisoner escapes. Congress could monitor
how the Biden Administration approaches extradition activities with Ecuador and assess whether the
U.S.-Ecuador extradition treaty framework should be updated.
Other approved measures could lead U.S. agencies to reexamine how they engage with their Ecuadorian
counterparts. For example, one approved reform formalizes the Ecuadorian armed forces’ role in
supporting the national police to counter organized crime, terrorism, and other crimes. In some cases,
similar policy changes elsewhere in Latin America have been followed by alleged human rights abuses.
Congress could monitor implementation of the reform and consider policy options to enhance the capacity
of Ecuador’s security forces while safeguarding human rights.
Congress could evaluate how the plebiscite results might affect the objectives of the U.S.-Ecuador
Partnership Act. Among other actions, the act directed the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of the Treasury, to develop and implement a strategy and related programs “to increase the
capacity of Ecuador’s justice system and law enforcement authorities to combat illicit economies,
corruption, transnational criminal organizations, and the harmful influence of malign foreign and
domestic actors.” The act directed the agencies to report to selected congressional committees on
implementation progress “not later than 2 years and 4 years after submitting” the strategy.
Congress also could take into account the results of the plebiscite and the broader security situation in
Ecuador when making funding decisions. Consecutive U.S. presidential Administrations have sought to
increase U.S. support to strengthen Ecuador’s security forces and counter organized crime in the country.
According to a joint statement following the U.S.-Ecuador High-Level Dialogue in March 2024, the
United States has provided Ecuador with over $42 million in “capacity building, training, and equipment”
since 2019 and plans to provide an additional $10 million in “counternarcotics, civilian security, and rule
of law programming, subject to completion of congressional notification procedures.” In addition to
evaluating potential executive branch obligations, Congress may assess the Biden Administration’s
FY2025 budget request for Ecuador, which would provide $49.2 million in bilateral assistance, including
$15 million of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding to build Ecuador’s capacity

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to fight transnational organized crime. Some experts have called for a more robust U.S. assistance plan
for Ecuador.

Author Information

Joshua Klein

Analyst in Foreign Affairs

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