Azerbaijan’s Retaking of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Displacement of Karabakh Armenians

Azerbaijan’s Retaking of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Displacement of Karabakh Armenians

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INSIGHTi

Azerbaijan’s Retaking of Nagorno-Karabakh
and the Displacement of Karabakh Armenians
October 18, 2023
On September 20, 2023, Azerbaijan reasserted control over Nagorno-Karabakh (also known in Armenian
as Artsakh), a predominantly Armenian-populated region at the center of a dispute between Azerbaijan
and Armenia for more than 30 years (Figure 1). Since December 2022, Azerbaijan had taken measures to
restrict movement of people, goods, and services between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to
what some observers called a blockade of the region. Following an Azerbaijani offensive on September
19-20, regional authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh consented to a cease-fire that included the disarmament
of Nagorno-Karabakh’s self-defense forces and the region’s reintegration with Azerbaijan. Within 10 days
of the offensive, more than 100,000 people—most of Nagorno-Karabakh’s then-estimated population of
120,000—departed for Armenia (population 2.8 million). Azerbaijani authorities subsequently detained
several regional officials or ex-officials.
Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. The region’s ethnic Armenian
population controlled the region and surrounding territories with the support of Armenian forces since
Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in conflict in the early 1990s, after the dissolution of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (of which Armenia and Azerbaijan were part). In 1992, the region’s legislature
issued an internationally unrecognized declaration of independence. About 500,000 Azerbaijanis who
formed a majority in areas surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh (and a minority in Nagorno-Karabakh) were
displaced during the conflict in the early 1990s. In a six-week war in 2020, Azerbaijan restored control
over territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and a portion of the region itself.
Assistance for the Displaced Population
The Armenian government is addressing the needs of Nagorno-Karabakh’s newly displaced population
(others were displaced after the 2020 war). On October 12, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan
stated that the government had allocated $100 million in assistance, including the provision of about $240
to each displaced person and up to $720 per person for six months’ rent and utilities as needed, as well as
schooling and job placement services.
The International Committee of the Red Cross and U.N. agencies are providing humanitarian assistance.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) announced the United States would provide
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more than $11.5 million in regional assistance, including “for those affected by the ongoing crisis in
Nagorno-Karabakh.” The European Union (EU) announced it would provide about $11 million in
humanitarian assistance and another $16 million in budget support to Armenia. EU member states and
others also are providing assistance.
International organizations have made efforts to assist people remaining in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijani authorities reported providing food and water, medical supplies, and fuel. A U.N. mission that
traveled to the region on October 1 reported seeing “very few local population” and “heard from
interlocutors that between 50 and 1,000 ethnic Armenians” remained.
Future Prospects
Whether displaced persons will seek or be able to return temporarily or on a permanent basis is uncertain.
Without commenting on the displacement or possibility of return, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said
Azerbaijan would protect “the rights and security of the Armenian population of Karabakh,” including
their “religious, educational, cultural, municipal, [and other] rights.” The nongovernmental organization
Human Rights Watch said “such assertions are difficult to accept at face value after the months of severe
hardships, decades of conflict, impunity for alleged crimes … and the Azerbaijani government’s overall
deteriorating human rights record.”
The future of Karabakh Armenians could depend on the prospects for a broader peace agreement between
Azerbaijan and Armenia. According to European Council President Charles Michel, who has offered to
continue mediating EU-led negotiations, a peace agreement might address issues related to recognition of
the two countries’ territorial integrity and border delimitation; detainees, missing persons, and demining;
and the development of transport and economic linkages.
Transport linkages that have been and may continue to be a subject for negotiations are the opening of a
route between mainland Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhichevan, on the other side of Armenia; a
restoration of the Lachin corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh; and the reopening of the land
border between Armenia and Turkey (which closed its border in solidarity with Azerbaijan in the 1990s).
Such linkages, if established peacefully, could boost the role of Armenia and Azerbaijan in a transit
corridor linking China and Central Asia to Europe. Some Armenians and observers have expressed
concerns that Azerbaijan might seek to forcibly establish a corridor across Armenia or seize other
territory.
Changing Geopolitics
Azerbaijan’s assertion of control over Nagorno-Karabakh could further affect regional geopolitics. After
independence, Armenia developed strong security and economic ties to Russia. Since 2018, Armenia has
been led by a democratically elected and reform-minded government, while authoritarian Azerbaijan and
Russia have improved relations, including by issuing a 2022 declaration of “allied interaction.”
Armenians increasingly have questioned Russia’s reliability as a security guarantor and economic partner,
particularly as Moscow did not prevent Azerbaijan from launching its 2020 offensive. Subsequently, the
Russian government and peacekeepers stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh did not protect against Azerbaijani
incursions, including cross-border attacks in September 2022, the transit blockage, or the September 2023
offensive. The Armenian government has taken subsequent steps that Russian officials and some
observers have characterized as efforts to reorient Armenia away from Russia and toward the West.
Russia retains leverage in Armenia, however, due to Armenia’s economic dependency and security needs
vis-à-vis Azerbaijan.

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U.S. Policy and Congressional Action
Since the 2020 war, U.S. officials have mediated directly between Azerbaijan and Armenia on various
issues, including the cessation of new military hostilities, the release of detainees, border delimitation,
transit through the Lachin corridor, and the development of new transportation linkages. In September
2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken called on Azerbaijan to “provide assurances to the residents of
Nagorno-Karabakh that they can live secure in their homes and that their rights will be protected.”
Several Members of Congress have cosponsored legislation or signed letters to the Administration
supporting assistance to Armenia and displaced persons, the rights and security of the Nagorno-Karabakh
population, a prohibition of assistance to Azerbaijan, and/or sanctions on Azerbaijani officials (S.
2900/H.R. 5683, S. 3000, H.R. 5686, H.Res. 735).
Figure 1. Armenia and Azerbaijan

Source: CRS, using data from the U.S. Department of State and ESRI. Internal boundaries are approximate.
Note: The region between Armenia and Iran is Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Region.

Author Information

Cory Welt

Specialist in Russian and European Affairs

Disclaimer

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