NATO’s 2023 Vilnius Summit

NATO’s 2023 Vilnius Summit

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INSIGHTi

NATO’s 2023 Vilnius Summit
Updated July 20, 2023
Leaders from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) 31 member states (see Figure 1) met in
Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11-12, 2023. The allies addressed numerous issues of interest to Congress,
including efforts to deter and respond to a possible Russian attack, NATO’s relations with Ukraine, allied
defense spending, security threats posed by China, and Sweden’s pending accession to the alliance.
Enhanced Deterrence and Defense
Since Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine, NATO has bolstered its force posture in the eastern
part of the alliance, including by deploying eight multinational battlegroups in the region. Since early
2022, the number of allied soldiers deployed to Central and Eastern Europe more than tripled, bringing
approximately 40,000 allied troops in the region under direct NATO command. The United States has
been a leading proponent of these efforts and has deployed about 20,000 additional military personnel in
Europe since February 2022, including some under NATO command; as of mid-2022, U.S. forces in
Europe totaled approximately 100,000 personnel.
In Vilnius, the allies adopted new regional defense plans and force structure requirements, which NATO
leaders characterize as the most comprehensive since the end of the Cold War. NATO officials stress that
implementation will require increased defense investments from NATO members.
NATO-Ukraine Relations
In Vilnius, NATO leaders declared that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO”; called on allies to continue
providing Ukraine with robust security assistance; and announced enhanced partnership programs with
Ukraine, including the creation of a new NATO-Ukraine Council. Underscoring its role as a defensive
alliance, NATO has declared it will not deploy forces to Ukraine. Allied governments have collectively
provided an estimated $79 billion in security assistance to Ukraine (including about $47 billion from the
United States), and NATO has provided about $82 million in nonlethal support, including medical
supplies and fuel.
Since 2008, NATO has reiterated a broad pledge that Ukraine will one day become a member but has not
outlined a timetable or specific benchmarks for a formal invitation. The Biden Administration and some
other allied governments have said Ukraine will not join NATO while the war is ongoing. Other allies,
including Poland and the Baltic states, have called for a more defined pathway to membership and have
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cautioned that postponing membership decisions could incentivize Russia to prolong the war. In Vilnius,
allies pledged to work closely with Ukraine to enact the reforms necessary for NATO membership. They
also announced that Ukraine had “moved beyond” the need for a Membership Action Plan, typically
required for aspiring members.
Some allies have argued that NATO members should offer Ukraine explicit, long-term security
guarantees. In Vilnius, the Group of Seven (G7) industrialized economies—including NATO members
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States—announced commitments to
provide Ukraine with long-term assistance.
Defense Spending
Russia’s war in Ukraine has added urgency to efforts to increase allied defense spending. At the summit,
allies strengthened NATO’s defense spending guidelines, which called on NATO members to aim to
spend at least 2% of GDP on annual defense spending by 2024 (as agreed in 2014). The allies stressed
that 2% of GDP be viewed as a minimal spending requirement and that “in many cases, expenditure
beyond 2% of GDP will be needed.” NATO reports that defense spending within the alliance has
increased for eight consecutive years and estimates that 11 allies will meet the 2% of GDP benchmark in
2023. A total of 17 allies reportedly have plans in place to meet or exceed the 2% target by 2024.
Addressing Security Threats from China
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept is the first NATO strategic blueprint in which the allies identify security
challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In Vilnius, the allies reiterated that the PRC’s
“stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge [NATO’s] interests, security and values.” A key NATO
response has been to enhance cooperation with governments in the Indo-Pacific region, including
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, each of which attended the Vilnius Summit. At the same
time, some European governments remain reluctant to antagonize a major economic partner and
concerned about the broader implications of a more confrontational relationship with the PRC.
Finland and Sweden
The Vilnius Summit was the first NATO summit attended by NATO’s newest member, Finland, which
formally joined the alliance on April 4, 2023. On the eve of the summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan announced his government would lift its objections to Sweden becoming NATO’s 32nd member
and move to ratify accession in October. Sweden’s accession has been delayed due to concerns raised by
Turkey and Hungary (see CRS Insight IN11949, NATO: Finland Joins as Sweden’s Accession Faces
Delay).
Considerations for Congress
In Vilnius, allied leaders addressed numerous policy issues that have been of sustained interest to
Congress, including the following:
• NATO and U.S. Force Posture in Europe. NATO has reoriented its collective defense
posture in Europe to respond to the threat from Russia. Key questions remain, however,
about the longer-term sustainability of these efforts, whether the alliance’s current force
posture would be adequate to deter or defend against a possible Russian military attack,
and the U.S. role in such a response.
• NATO Support for Ukraine. While some in Congress have voiced support for Ukraine’s
NATO membership aspirations and a majority have voted in favor of U.S. bilateral

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assistance to Ukraine, others have expressed opposition. Ukraine’s membership prospects
and possible security guarantees for Ukraine could factor into congressional
consideration of potential longer-term support for Ukraine.
• Allied Defense Spending. Throughout NATO’s history, Congress has urged European
allies and Canada to increase defense spending. Some Members have suggested that
allied defense spending levels could influence congressional deliberations over potential
future U.S. security commitments in Europe.
• Possible Accession of Sweden. Congressional majorities have voiced support for NATO
enlargement to Sweden. In 2022, the Senate passed a resolution of ratification approving
Sweden’s (and Finland’s) accession by a vote of 95-1; the House passed H.Res. 1130 in
support of accession by a vote of 394-18.
Figure 1.NATO Members and Aspirants

Source: CRS Graphics. Map updated April 2023.

Author Information

Paul Belkin

Analyst in European Affairs

Congressional Research Service
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