Pipeline Physical Security: Federal Efforts

Pipeline Physical Security: Federal Efforts

INSIGHTi

Pipeline Physical Security: Federal Efforts
May 11, 2023
Securing the nation’s energy pipelines from malicious attacks has long been a priority for Congress and
federal agencies. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) 2020 Biennial National Strategy for
Transportation Security identifies pipelines as vulnerable to cyberattacks and physically “vulnerable to
terrorist attacks largely due to their stationary nature, the volatility of transported products, and [their]
dispersed nature.” After a 2021 ransomware attack against the Colonial Pipeline, Congress focused its
attention on pipeline cybersecurity. However, more recent developments, including the 2022 bombing of
the Nord Stream pipelines in Europe, physical attacks on the U.S. electricity grid, and a new feature film
fictionalizing domestic pipeline terrorism have drawn renewed attention to pipeline physical security.
Evolving Physical Threats to Pipelines
After the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal pipeline security program focused on physical
threats from transnational terrorist groups, especially Al Qaeda. This transnational focus has since
broadened to include threats from criminal groups and nation-states. Most recently, on May 3, 2023, a
NATO intelligence official reportedly warned that Russia was “actively mapping allied critical
infrastructure,” including pipelines, “on land and on the seabed,” and there was a “significant risk” Russia
could target this infrastructure in Europe and North America in response to allied support for Ukraine.
A 2011 federal threat assessment (marked Unclassified/For Official Use Only) stated that “domestic
extremists” including “environmental activists” were responsible for pipeline “tampering and vandalism”
and “likely also pose threats to pipeline networks.” Such an incident occurred in 2016 when climate
activists temporarily disrupted five pipelines transporting oil from Canada to the United States by closing
manual safety valves. In 2017, activists damaged the Dakota Access Pipeline, then under construction. A
subsequent Government Accountability Office report stated, “threats to the nation’s pipeline systems have
evolved to include sabotage by environmental activists.” An April 4, 2023, Kansas City Regional Fusion
Center security bulletin states that the film, How to Blow Up a Pipeline, which depicts domestic climate
activists plotting to bomb an oil pipeline, “could potentially inspire similar attacks.”
The Department of Homeland Security also has warned about threats to critical energy infrastructure from
other violent extremists, including threats to the electricity grid from white nationalists with societal
goals. Threats to the grid and threats to pipelines may be linked. In a 2021 report, the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) stated that, due to growing electric and natural gas system
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN12161
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

Congressional Research Service
2
interdependency, industry “should evaluate the need for additional assessments of the risks of ... attacks
on midstream or interstate natural gas pipelines.”
TSA’s Pipeline Security Program
Pipelines are part of the surface transportation critical infrastructure sector, for which TSA is the sector
risk management agency and administers the federal program for pipeline security. The Aviation and
Transportation Security Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-71), which established TSA, authorizes the agency “to
issue, rescind, and revise such regulations as are necessary” to carry out its functions (§101). The
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) directs TSA to
promulgate pipeline security regulations and carry out necessary inspection and enforcement if the agency
determines that regulations are appropriate (§1557(d)). TSA also cooperates with the Department of
Transportation, which also has certain pipeline security authorities, under the terms of a 2006 agreement
delineating their respective roles.
Prior to the Colonial Pipeline cyberattack, TSA relied upon industry’s voluntary compliance with the
agency’s guidelines for pipeline physical security and cybersecurity. In 2003, TSA initiated its ongoing
pipeline Corporate Security Review Program, wherein the agency conducts voluntary visits with the
pipeline operators “to assess the current security practices ... with a focus on the physical and cyber
security of pipelines.” The agency’s reliance on voluntary compliance with recommended security
standards had long been questioned by some stakeholders. In 2021, following the Colonial Pipeline
incident, TSA issued its first mandatory cybersecurity requirements in the form of a Security Directive
applicable to owners and operators of critical pipeline facilities. The agency subsequently issued a second
cybersecurity directive and has subsequently revised and replaced both. However, TSA has not similarly
imposed mandatory requirements for physical security. Some pipeline companies have publicly reported
physical security investments, but such measures remain voluntary.
Congressional Action
In recent years, Congress has acted to strengthen federal efforts to protect pipelines from physical attacks.
In the 118th Congress, the Pipeline Sabotage and Accident Prevention Act (H.R. 1484) would mandate
fines or imprisonment for causing, or threatening to cause, a defect in equipment to be used in a pipeline
facility or for disrupting the operation of a pipeline facility. The Lower Energy Costs Act (H.R. 1), which
passed in the House, and the proposed SPUR Act would require the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to consult TSA on the compliance of natural gas pipeline permit applicants with the
agency’s best practice recommendations regarding pipeline infrastructure security, cybersecurity, and
other security measures. In the 117th Congress, the Pipeline Security Act (H.R. 3243) would have
recodified TSA’s responsibility relating to “securing pipelines against cybersecurity threats, acts of
terrorism, and other nefarious acts that jeopardize the physical security or cybersecurity of pipelines.” The
Energy Product Reliability Act (H.R. 6084) would have required FERC to certify an Energy Product
Reliability Organization for pipelines that would establish and enforce pipeline “physical security”
standards, among other standards.
As congressional oversight of the federal pipeline security program continues, issues may arise regarding
the relative level of TSA and private sector resources dedicated to physical security versus cybersecurity,
and whether those resources reflect relative risk. Congress also may consider whether TSA’s continued
reliance on voluntary guidelines for physical security is appropriate, or whether the agency should impose
mandatory physical security requirements as it has for cybersecurity. The quality, quantity, and timeliness
of physical threat information originating with the government and being shared with the private sector
may also be an area of focus.

Congressional Research Service
3
Author Information

Paul W. Parfomak

Specialist in Energy Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

IN12161 · VERSION 1 · NEW