Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. F-16 Sale

Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. F-16 Sale

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INSIGHTi

Turkey (Türkiye): Possible U.S. F-16 Sale
Updated September 5, 2023
In February 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly confirmed that the Biden Administration
supports a possible sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Turkey (Türkiye)—a member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)—and has engaged Congress on the issue. According to January 2023 media
reports citing unnamed U.S. officials, the Biden Administration has provided informal notification to
Congress about the possible sale. Issues potentially factoring into congressional review of a proposed sale
include Turkey’s role regarding the Russia-Ukraine war, Sweden’s NATO membership application,
regional rivalry with Greece, and Turkish domestic matters.
The January informal notification is reportedly for 40 new F-16s of the advanced Block 70/72 Viper
configuration and Block 70/72 upgrade packages for 79 existing fighters (see Figure 1), along with 900
air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, at an estimated total value of $20 billion. The transaction could
modernize and extend the service life of much of Turkey’s fleet while Turkey tries to acquire or design a
more advanced fighter. However, delivery of new F-16s might face a production backlog.
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Figure 1. F-16 Block 70/72 Viper Configuration

Source: Lockheed Martin.
Some Members of Congress from both parties have expressed reservations. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee (SFRC) Chairman Bob Menendez was quoted in January as saying, “Until [Turkish President
Recep Tayyip] Erdogan (pronounced air-doe-wan) ceases his threats [against neighboring NATO allies],
improves his human rights record at home ... and begins to act like a trusted ally should, I will not
approve this sale.” Several other Senators, including SFRC Ranking Member Jim Risch and the 29 who
wrote a February letter to President Biden, have indicated they might only consider supporting the F-16
sale to Turkey if its parliament agrees to both Sweden and Finland joining NATO. Turkey’s parliament
approved Finland’s membership in March, and it joined the alliance in April.
As Turkey’s May 2023 election cycle has ended with President Erdogan’s reelection, congressional
committee leaders’ concerns regarding a possible F-16 sale may have softened somewhat. A few days
before the presidential run-off election, House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Chairman Michael
McCaul was cited as saying that he believes he, Menendez, Risch, and HFAC Ranking Member Gregory
Meeks “will approve the transfer once Turkey ratifies Sweden’s membership in NATO.” In late May,
Menendez said that Sweden might be the “whole equation” for some Members of Congress, but is only
“part of the equation” for him. He also suggested that if Turkey approves Sweden’s NATO membership
and ends “belligerence” toward Greece and perhaps other neighbors such as Armenia, “there’s a path
forward—at least for me.” President Erdogan pledged in July to take steps—perhaps contingent on
additional promises or actions from Sweden—toward Turkish parliamentary ratification of Sweden’s
NATO accession protocol. Also in July, Erdogan said that Turkish F-16s have never been used against
Greece and “we do not plan on using them.”
For most possible major arms sales requiring congressional review, the State Department first provides
informal notification to SFRC and HFAC, allowing for a confidential process in which the committees
can raise and discuss concerns with the executive branch. This process usually lasts 20 to 40 days,
followed by formal notification of the possible sale. However, if a committee chair or ranking member

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places a “hold” on the proposed transaction, formal notification usually does not proceed, even though
holds are not legally binding. Under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320),
the Administration can proceed with a sale—if not blocked by legislation—15 days (for NATO allies like
Turkey) after formal notification.
Congress and U.S.-Turkey Arms Transactions
Congressional legislation and oversight has helped shape U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation for decades.
Congress placed an arms embargo on Turkey from 1975 to 1978, following the 1974 Cyprus conflict.
Since then, Turkey has focused more on developing its defense industry (see Figure 2), and as part of that
goal, one objective of Turkish arms purchases from the United States and other foreign suppliers has been
to acquire technology for future indigenous defense production.
Figure 2. Arms Imports as a Share of Turkish Military Spending

Sources: Stratfor, based on information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Traders
Database, with some text modifications by CRS.
Over the past 15 years, a number of proposed U.S. arms transfers to Turkey either have stalled or faced
reported congressional holds. After Turkey acquired an S-400 surface-to-air defense system from Russia,
the Trump Administration removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program (citing concerns
about possible Russian use of the S-400 to collect intelligence on F-35 stealth capabilities), and imposed
congressionally authorized sanctions on Turkey. Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense

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Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits funding the transfer of F-35s to Turkey unless Turkey
no longer possesses the S-400.
Considerations for Congress
Several issues could have implications for congressional approaches to the possible sale, and vice versa.
Congressional committee leaders’ concerns regarding a possible F-16 sale—whether or not tied to NATO
accession for Sweden—could conceivably persist. At some point, the Administration may face decisions
regarding whether, when, and how to address congressional concerns, and/or move forward with a formal
notification of the sale.
Shortly after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, a State Department letter to some Members of
Congress reportedly said that there were “compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability
interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by
appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.” While Turkey has acted more independently of the West
under Erdogan, it has NATO’s second-largest military, hosts allied military assets and personnel, and
partners in other ways with the United States and NATO—including using F-16s in occasional policing
missions.
U.S. officials have voiced appreciation for Turkish actions that appear favorable to Ukraine. Turkey has
denounced Russia’s invasion, closed the Bosphorus (alt. Bosporus) and Dardanelles Straits to belligerent
warships, helped broker efforts to export Ukrainian grain via the Black Sea, served as a transit hub for
natural gas to Europe, and supplied Ukraine with military equipment.
However, Turkey also has boosted various forms of economic and energy cooperation with Russia.
During early 2023, U.S. officials have warned counterparts in Turkey (and some non-NATO countries)
about possible penalties for businesses that continue trade potentially supplying Russia’s defense industry.
Reportedly, Turkey began in March 2023 to enforce curbs on goods that are subject to Western sanctions
from transiting its territory to Russia. In April 2023, the Department of the Treasury placed sanctions on
two Turkey-based companies and associated persons for assisting Russia or Russian entities.
Within a context of strong congressional support for Swedish NATO accession, some Members have
argued that Turkish delays on the issue have threatened alliance unity. Sweden’s application to join NATO
remains pending as of August, with Turkey and Hungary the only alliance members not to have approved
it. After President Erdogan’s reelection, President Biden said in late May that Erdogan “wants to work on
something on the F-16s. I told him we wanted a deal with Sweden, so let’s get that done.”
President Erdogan agreed in July to send the NATO accession protocol for Sweden to Turkey’s parliament
and work closely with it to “ensure ratification,” but later clarified that Turkey’s parliament might not
consider Swedish accession until October (after its summer recess). Erdogan also said that he expected
Sweden to provide a roadmap of steps it will take to implement a June 2022 trilateral memorandum—
aimed at acting against those that Turkey considers terrorists—before sending the accession protocol to
parliament.
Turkey-Greece regional disputes also are a factor for Congress. U.S. arms transfers could affect the
balance of power between Turkey and Greece. U.S.-Greece cooperation has expanded, and reportedly the
Administration informally notified Congress of a possible sale of up to 40 F-35s to Greece at the same
time as the Turkey/F-16 informal notification. Additionally, the joint explanatory statement accompanying
the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) cautioned NATO allies against “unauthorized territorial overflights of
another NATO ally’s airspace.”

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Domestic developments in Turkey are another consideration. Many U.S. lawmakers have alleged that
“gross violation of human rights and democratic backsliding” have occurred under the rule of President
Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party.
Congressional action on a possible F-16 sale could influence whether Turkey continues to use major U.S.
weapons platforms, and other aspects of U.S.-Turkey political-military ties. Turkey is reportedly
exploring Eurofighter Typhoons as a potential alternative to F-16s, but it is unclear if consortium partner
Germany would approve such a sale. Additionally, Turkey’s air force could face difficulties adjusting to a
non-F-16 platform, thus potentially complicating alternatives. Moreover, European arms transfers to
Turkey could be subject to the congressional review process if such weapons were to include U.S.-origin
defense articles meeting the specified notification threshold.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
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