Iran’s Transfer of Weaponry to Russia for Use in Ukraine

Iran’s Transfer of Weaponry to Russia for Use in Ukraine

INSIGHTi

Iran’s Transfer of Weaponry to Russia for Use
in Ukraine
November 4, 2022
Since August 2022, according to the Biden Administration, Iran has transferred armed unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs, or drones) to Russia, which has used them against a range of targets in Ukraine. U.S.
officials express concern that Russia may seek to procure missiles from Iran. These transfers (and
potential transfers of ballistic missiles) have implications for the trajectory of the conflict in Ukraine as
well as for U.S. efforts to support Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion. Other policy
considerations for the Administration and for Congress include sanctions on entities involved in the arms
transfers and potential action at the United Nations (U.N.).
Background
In July 2022, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated, “our information indicates that the Iranian
government is preparing to provide Russia with up to several hundred UAVs.” In late August, the
Washington Post reported that Russia had picked up “scores” of Iranian drones. Ukrainian officials
estimated in October 2022 that Russia had ordered around 2,000 UAVs from Iran, of which “hundreds”
had been delivered; the U.S. Department of Defense assesses that “Iranians have been on the ground in
Ukraine to assist Russia with the drone operations there.” Russian and Iranian officials deny the use of
Iranian UAVs in Ukraine.
These drones (the Shahed-131 and 136) have a range of 900 and 1,500 kilometers, respectively. They
have a slow speed, making them vulnerable to man-portable air defense and even small arms. Ukraine
appears to have been successful at downing a “significant percentage of the Iranian drones,” but some
continue to evade defenses. It is unclear how many of Ukraine’s medium- and long-range air defense
systems remain operational.
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Figure 1. Shahed-136 Drone in Kyiv

Source: Getty Images, via New York Times, October 17, 2022
October 2022 media reports suggest that Iran is considering transferring short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs) to Russia. The Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar SRBMs have a warhead of approximately 500
kilograms, in contrast to the 40-kilogram warhead of the drones. While it is difficult to predict the impact
of the use of Iranian drones and potential SRBMs on the ground conflict, the presence of these weapons
highlights Ukraine’s lack of adequate air defense systems. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has
called for more air defense assistance. The United States and European allies have committed to
delivering advanced air defense systems, but production bottlenecks complicate more immediate
deliveries. In addition, the systems are not designed to counter ballistic missiles, and cost imbalances raise
questions about long-term viability. For more, see CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to
Ukraine.
Russian and Iranian Motivations
Russia has responded to battlefield setbacks by conducting long-range missile strikes against Ukrainian
cities and infrastructure targets. Some observers say Russia is likely running low on its stockpile of long-
range precision missiles, and press articles claim that U.S. and other western officials question Russia’s
ability to replace stocks due to Western sanctions and export controls. In contrast to cruise missiles, which
cost several million dollars each, Iranian drones cost far less (estimates range from $20,000 to $50,000).
Their relatively low cost and ease of replacement provide Russia with the capability to use swarms of
drones to attack targets and overwhelm air defenses. Iranian drones also cost less than Ukraine’s air
defense missiles.

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From Iran’s perspective, the UAV transfers appear to represent a strengthening of its ties with Russia, a
relationship reinforced by their economic isolation from and opposition to the United States. Additionally,
Commented [AA1]:
the deployment of Iranian UAVs in Ukraine may be, in the words of one observer, “an important
propaganda opportunity” for Iran to demonstrate its drone capabilities for “potential future clients.” Iran
reportedly has transferred UAVs to proxies in Iraq and Yemen (which have used them against U.S. forces
in Syria and targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, respectively), as well as to states such
as Ethiopia, Venezuela, and Sudan. The U.S. government attributes the 2019 UAV attack on Saudi oil
infrastructure to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Aerospace Force.
Issues for Congress
U.S. Sanctions
On September 8, 2022, the Administration designated for sanctions four entities and one individual
(pursuant to Executive Orders 13382 and 14024) for their involvement in the “research, development,
production, and procurement” of Iranian UAVs and their shipment to Russia. These follow previous
designations (announced October 29, 2021, pursuant to Executive Orders 13224 and 13382) of
individuals and entities that “provided critical support” to Iran’s UAV programs.
Relatedly, Congress is considering legislation that would authorize sanctions under Section 107 of the
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (P.L. 115-44) on individuals who support
Iran’s UAV activities. That legislation, the Stop Iranian Drones Act (H.R. 6089), was passed by the House
in April 2022 and reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June. Some Senators have
proposed incorporating H.R. 6089 into Senate consideration of a FY2023 National Defense Authorization
Act (as amendment SA 5826 to SA 5499), though procedural and other issues reportedly may complicate
its inclusion.
U.N. Action
Adopted in July 2015 to endorse the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Annex B of U.N.
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 restricts until October 2023 the import to or export from Iran
of certain arms, including UAVs and ballistic missile systems. U.S. officials have said Iran’s supply of
UAVs to Russia violates UNSCR 2231. The United States, along with Ukraine and other countries, has
requested the Secretary-General investigate and report on the alleged violation.
Separately, some commentators have called for the United States to work with partners to reimpose U.N.
sanctions on Iran through the “snapback” mechanism of UNSCR 2231, though that mechanism is related
only to “significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA,” not UNSCR 2231
commitments. In any case, some observers suggest the practical impact of reimposing U.N. sanctions
could be minimal, given the extensive U.S. secondary sanctions already in place. Congress may consider
directing the Administration to provide reports or briefings on its views of and strategy related to UNSCR
2231.

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Author Information

Andrew S. Bowen
Clayton Thomas
Analyst in Russian and European Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Carla E. Humud

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
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