Political Reforms in Kazakhstan

Political Reforms in Kazakhstan

INSIGHTi

Political Reforms in Kazakhstan
Updated November 22, 2022
Kazakhstan, a U.S. partner in areas such as counterterrorism and regional security, is implementing
political reforms as it faces a range of domestic and international challenges. Following unprecedented
unrest in January 2022, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has moved to consolidate power while his
country confronts difficult geopolitical dynamics in the wake of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of
Ukraine. Reforms introduced by Tokayev are restructuring Kazakhstan’s political system and annulling
the privileged position of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who held office for nearly three
decades. While authorities tout ongoing reforms as moving the country in a more democratic direction,
skeptics question the degree to which Kazakhstan will implement genuine democratization. On November
20, Tokayev secured a second term in a snap presidential election, winning 81% of the vote. Observers
from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) deemed the electoral contest
“lacking competitiveness.” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized this assessment as
“biased.” The U.S. Department of State concurred with OSCE findings and declared support for
Tokayev’s reform program. Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in expanding U.S.
engagement with Kazakhstan, and in Kazakhstan’s reform process.
January Unrest
On January 2, 2022, peaceful demonstrations broke out in Kazakhstan’s western oil-producing region
over increased fuel prices. The protests quickly spread throughout the country, encompassing grievances
over corruption and economic inequality, with much of the anger directed at Nazarbayev and his family.
By January 6, the protests had become the largest and most violent unrest in Kazakhstan’s history, leaving
over 200 dead. Some Members of Congress condemned the violence, calling on Kazakhstani authorities
to respect human rights. Some scholars assess that in addition to peaceful protestors with genuine
economic and political demands and opportunistic looters, the events involved “organized provocateurs,”
who attacked government facilities and law enforcement. Tokayev referred to the events as an “attempted
coup.” Many analysts contend that figures associated with Nazarbayev and his family took advantage of
genuine popular protests to pursue an intra-elite power struggle.
As Tokayev moved to control the situation, he appealed for assistance from the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), a Russia-led security alliance to which Kazakhstan belongs. In the first deployment
in the organization’s history, a CSTO mission of approximately 2,500 troops from Russia, Armenia,
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Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan arrived on January 6 and remained in Kazakhstan until the following
week.
“De-Nazarbayevification” and Political Reforms
In the aftermath of the January unrest, President Tokayev consolidated power, removing Nazarbayev
associates and family members from positions of authority. What some observers term the “de-
Nazarbayevification” of Kazakhstan is ongoing. In September, Kazakhstan’s capital, which Tokayev had
renamed Nur-Sultan in Nazarbayev’s honor in 2019, reverted to its previous name, Astana.
In a move some analysts see as part of Tokayev’s efforts to reduce Nazarbayev’s influence, Kazakhstan
held a constitutional referendum on June 5, 2022. Voters approved a range of changes curtailing some
presidential powers and removing mentions of Nazarbayev from the constitution. Tokayev said the
constitutional changes would shift Kazakhstan from a “super-presidential form of government to a
presidential republic with a strong parliament.” Following additional legislation passed in September that
extends the presidential term from five years to seven and imposes a one-term limit, a snap presidential
election was held on November 20, two years ahead of schedule.
Analysts assess the vote was intended, as one wrote, to “underline that [Tokayev] is his own man and no
longer reliant on Nazarbayev’s patronage” while he is at the potential “apex” of his popularity. Skeptical
observers termed the election a “one-horse race.” All three parties in parliament backed Tokayev.
Although Tokayev’s vision for a “New Kazakhstan” includes development of a “multipolar party system”
and “fair and free political competition,” some analysts doubt the degree of political pluralism
Kazakhstan’s government will allow, seeing Tokayev’s reform program as one of “authoritarian
modernization.”
Implications of Russia’s War in Ukraine
In January, some analysts posited that the CSTO intervention would undermine Kazakhstan’s multi-
vector foreign policy and increase the country’s dependence on Russia. In the wake of Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine, Kazakhstan has maintained its “diplomatic balancing act,” and Kazakhstan’s foreign policy
has not shifted in Russia’s favor. Astana has repeatedly expressed support for Ukraine’s territorial
integrity and provided humanitarian aid. While polling indicates public opinion on the war is divided,
some analysts see Kazakhstan as increasingly distancing itself from Russia in response to the ongoing
conflict. Some observers see the war in Ukraine as having enabled Tokayev to reinvent himself as a “truly
independent figure,” arguing that the snap election was intended to give Tokayev “a popular mandate to
rule, as distinct from a mandate from either Nazarbayev or Putin.”
Because of close economic ties between Russia and Kazakhstan, the war places Kazakhstan in a difficult
position. The country is facing significant inflation and supply chain disruptions. Following Russia’s
September announcement of “partial mobilization,” more than 200,000 Russian citizens officially entered
Kazakhstan, of whom about 50,000 remain in the country. Some outside observers see this influx as a
“humanitarian crisis in the making.”
Issues for Congress
Congress could consider what opportunities exist for developing U.S.-Kazakhstan relations given shifting
geopolitics, and how the United States might effectively support democratization in Kazakhstan. While
some analysts see Kazakhstan as a potential avenue for sanctions evasion by Russia, Kazakhstani officials
have asserted their intention to abide by U.S. and European sanctions. The State Department has stated
the United States seeks to minimize the impact of those sanctions on Kazakhstan. In light of the war,

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Kazakhstan aims to diversify its trade relationships; sanctions on Russia may also present opportunities
for Kazakhstan as companies consider relocating their operations or redirecting transit routes through
Kazakhstan. Members may wish to consider how U.S. engagement can aid Kazakhstan in reducing its
dependence on Russia, although some observers see China as the potential beneficiary of any such
distancing. Some Members have called for an international investigation into Kazakhstan’s response to
the January unrest, and a State Department review of security assistance to Kazakhstan in order to ensure
accountability for alleged human rights violations.

Author Information

Maria A. Blackwood

Analyst in Asian Policy

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