Responding to State “Fragility” in Coastal West Africa

Responding to State “Fragility” in Coastal West Africa

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INSIGHTi

Responding to State “Fragility” in Coastal
West Africa
May 25, 2022
In April 2022, the Biden Administration identified part of coastal West Africa—Benin, Côte d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Guinea, and Togo—as a priority region pursuant to the 2019 Global Fragility Act (GFA, Title V of
Division J, P.L. 116-94). U.S. military officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concern
over a southward expansion of Islamist insurgent violence from the neighboring Sahel region, centering
on Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (see Figure 1). Benin and Côte d’Ivoire have been hardest hit,
recording at least two dozen attacks since 2020, many targeting military personnel near their northern
borders. Togo has suffered two attacks on northern security outposts since late 2021. Ghana and Guinea
have not recorded attacks to date.
Analysts have attributed most of these attacks to Sahel-based affiliates of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State
that have moved south to procure supplies and seek refuge, including in wildlife preserves in northern
Benin and Côte d’Ivoire. Some warn that armed groups may expand their presence by exploiting local
tensions and grievances, extending approaches pioneered in the Sahel. Disputes between pastoralists and
farmers, along with anger at security force abuses, have reportedly driven extremist recruitment elsewhere
in West Africa.
Governance challenges may heighten coastal states’ vulnerability to conflict. Guinea is under military rule
following a 2021 coup. Togo’s president, in office since 2005, is among Africa’s longest-serving leaders;
his government restricts civic space. Benin, previously viewed as a regional democratic leader, has
experienced rapid backsliding under its current president. Côte d’Ivoire’s president won a constitutionally
dubious third term in a violent 2020 election. Ghana is widely considered one of Africa’s strongest
democracies, though corruption and intercommunal disputes are persistent challenges. In May 2022
congressional testimony, the Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations
emphasized the need to “strengthen democratic and responsive governance” in the region.
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Figure 1. Coastal West African GFA Priority Countries

Source: CRS. Boundaries from State Department and UNEP-WCMC and IUCN, Protected Planet: World Database on
Protected Areas and World Database on Other Effective Area-based Conservation Measures.
Coastal governments have strengthened military deployments along their borders and expanded regional
security cooperation. In 2017, Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo launched the Accra
Initiative, a mechanism to facilitate intelligence sharing, military training, and operational coordination.
In Benin, park rangers have flushed militants out of protected areas amid a “blurring of lines between
conflict and conservation.” Resource constraints, divergent priorities, and a wave of military coups have
undermined regional counterterrorism efforts. West African leaders agreed to mobilize $1 billion for
regional counterterrorism efforts in 2019, but little funding appears to have materialized.
U.S. Assistance
Coastal West Africa’s selection as a GFA priority region follows an increase in U.S. peace and security
assistance for the region. In 2020, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) launched the
Littorals Regional Initiative, which aims to foster resilience to extremism in the five coastal states, with
Benin, Togo, and northern Ghana as initial focus areas. Projects focus on training local leaders to counter
extremism, fostering social cohesion, and reducing farmer-herder tensions. The State Department has
expanded its Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership program, which focuses on North Africa and the
Sahel, to support some coastal states, and has provided assistance to security forces in the region through
other regional and global programs. The Department of Defense has provided assistance to help counter
drug trafficking and enhance maritime security under its global train-and-equip authority (10 U.S.C. 333).
Such assistance comprises a small share of overall U.S. aid for coastal West Africa, most of which focuses
on health and economic development. For FY2023, the Administration has proposed $143 million in
bilateral assistance for Côte d’Ivoire, $132 million for Ghana, $44 million for Guinea, $39 million for
Benin, and $500,000 for Togo. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) also has programs in
Benin, Côte d‘Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo.
Governance challenges have constrained some U.S. assistance. Guinea is subject to coup-related
legislative restrictions on certain U.S. assistance. In 2021, citing democratic backsliding, the MCC stated
that it would “significantly reduce” funding for Benin under a planned joint compact with Niger. Poor
governance may pose dilemmas for GFA engagement even as it fuels the types of problems the GFA aims
to address.

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Congressional Considerations for GFA Engagement
Consideration of the Administration’s FY2023 budget request is ongoing. The GFA authorized the
provision of assistance through two centrally managed funds, the Prevention and Stabilization Fund ($125
million requested for FY2023) and the Complex Crises Fund ($40 million requested); public budget
materials do not disaggregate proposed GFA allocations by country. The request also describes some
proposed bilateral assistance for coastal West African states as supporting GFA priorities. Congress may
consider various questions as it funds and oversees increased U.S. engagement in the region, including the
following:
 Partnerships. The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability outlines a
“compact-style” approach premised on partner governments’ commitment to good
governance. How might the United States approach partnerships with undemocratic
governments? What kinds of U.S. engagement might strengthen democratic governance?
What developments in partner countries might prompt disengagement?
 Prioritization. What is the appropriate balance of U.S. assistance priorities? Insofar as
poor governance and security force abuses appear to have driven extremist recruitment in
the Sahel, what types of assistance might most effectively address such challenges in
coastal states? What role might security assistance conditionality play in U.S.
approaches?
 Oversight. Beyond biennial reporting to Congress as mandated in the GFA, how—and
how frequently—should the executive branch consult with Congress to enable effective
oversight? Inadequate embassy staffing has posed challenges for the management of U.S.
security assistance in coastal West Africa. Does Congress have sufficient information on
personnel and other resource needs to enable appropriate responses?
 Coordination. A 2020 audit of TSCTP assistance identified interagency coordination as a
major challenge, noting “undefined roles and responsibilities, the lack of knowledge
management, and staffing shortfalls.” How might GFA assistance be better administered?
How, if at all, will GFA assistance be coordinated with U.S. stabilization efforts in the
Sahel, and with other donors?

Author Information

Tomás F. Husted
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
Specialist in African Affairs

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