Political Transition in Yemen

Political Transition in Yemen

INSIGHTi

Political Transition in Yemen
April 25, 2022
In April 2022, a truce went into effect between the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and the
Ansar Allah movement (aka the Houthis); the first nationwide truce in six years. Yemen’s president
subsequently resigned, reportedly under pressure from Saudi Arabia, which leads a coalition backing the
ROYG in its fight against the Iran-backed Houthi movement. Congress may review the status of the
Yemen conflict during its consideration of the Biden Administration’s request for $46 million in FY2023
foreign assistance funding for Yemen and through its oversight of the Administration’s regional policies,
including a potential nuclear agreement with Iran and defensive support to U.S. partners.
Military Developments: Nationwide Truce Begins
On April 1, U.N. Envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg announced a truce between the ROYG and Houthi
forces for a two-month period between April 2 and June 2. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) endorsed the truce. In addition to halting all military operations, the agreement establishes several
humanitarian measures:
 18 fuel ships will be permitted entry into the Houthi-controlled ports in Hodeidah.
 Two commercial flights per week in and out of Sana’a airport.
The truce may reflect a military impasse between Houthi and ROYG/Coalition forces as well as
increasing economic stress. In early 2022, the deployment of forces backed by the UAE to Shebwa and
Marib governorates reversed Houthi gains in the north. Subsequently, soaring global commodity prices
following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine worsened economic conditions in both ROYG and Houthi-held
areas, and the Saudi-led coalition’s maritime and air blockade exacerbated severe fuel shortages for the
Houthis. The truce represents a freeze of the present conflict lines but is not a formal ceasefire, and it
lacks external enforcement or monitoring mechanisms.
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Figure 1. Lines of Control in Yemen
As of April 11, 2022

Source: Map prepared by CRS. Areas of influence and control based on original map from Risk Intelligence (April 11,
2022); geography from Esri.
Political Developments: Leadership Transition
On April 6, Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi dismissed his vice president and delegated his
own authority to an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). According to some reports,
Saudi Arabia—where Hadi has been based since 2015—directed his resignation. One analyst stated,
“Hadi was widely recognized as exerting little to no control, or even influence, over most of the major
anti-Huthi groupings now represented on the council.” Similarly, another analysis stated that Hadi’s
removal was “an effort to unite disparate forces opposed to the Houthis ahead of peace talks or a renewed
offensive.” Although Hadi’s presidential term expired in 2015, he had remained as interim president in
the absence of new elections.
Presidential Leadership Council. According to one analyst, the new council “unprecedentedly brings
together prominent leaders of the anti-Huthi military and political factions that control territory and forces
on the ground. It is evenly split between northerners and southerners.” Prominent members of the council

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include Tariq Saleh, nephew of the late President Saleh, and Aydarous al Zubaidi, president of the
Southern Transitional Council (STC).
Regional Response. Following the council’s establishment, Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced that
they would provide $1 billion each to Yemen’s central bank; Saudi Arabia would provide an additional $1
billion to purchase oil products and support development projects. The countries previously had declined
to pledge any funding for Yemen at a U.N. donor conference in March 2022, citing recent Houthi attacks.
The U.N. Security Council also issued a press statement welcoming the creation of the PLC.
Outlook
U.N. Envoy Grundberg has stressed that the parties should use the truce period to negotiate a more lasting
ceasefire, rather than preparing for additional fighting. According to one PLC member, “Our first option
is peace, but we are ready for war. We believe the council is in a position, with the coalition support, to
score a decisive military victory.” Some analysts have noted that newly aligned anti-Houthi forces that
comprise the PLC have the potential to “more aggressively pursue peace and more aggressively pursue
war,” suggesting that the expiration of the truce in June could usher in a period of intensified fighting.
Either worsening economic conditions or renewed fighting could exacerbate needs for humanitarian
assistance and generate requests for U.S. contributions.
U.S. Policy
The Biden Administration welcomed the truce and the formation of the PLC. Successive Administrations
have sought a political settlement to the conflict and have called on both sides to facilitate humanitarian
access. The United States continues to maintain a “small number” of U.S. military personnel in Yemen to
conduct operations against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State. Houthi
ballistic missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2022 prompted the Biden
Administration to authorize additional deployments of U.S. forces and equipment to the region.
New Maritime Task Force. On April 13, the commander of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet announced the
establishment of Task Force 153 under the Combined Maritime Forces Command, based in Bahrain. The
new task force will patrol the waterway between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, through the Bab al-Mandeb
Strait to the waters off the Yemen-Oman border. The announcement did not specifically mention the
Houthis, who have long used the waterway to smuggle weapons from Iran in addition to seizing a UAE-
flagged vessel in early 2022.
Possible Issues for Congress
Chairs of both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee
welcomed the truce and the associated humanitarian measures, expressing hope that negotiators would
use the truce to make progress towards a political settlement. Many Members remain concerned about
Iranian support to Houthi forces—including the provision of weapons such as ballistic and cruise
missiles—with some Members arguing that a U.S. return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) agreement with Iran would provide Tehran with additional resources to finance the Houthis.
Members may continue to debate U.S. support to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the PLC-led ROYG in the
context of consideration of the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act, FY2023 appropriations for
defense and foreign assistance, and any proposed major arms sales.

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Author Information

Carla E. Humud

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

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