Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Issues and Aspects

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Issues and Aspects

INSIGHTi

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Military and
Intelligence Issues and Aspects
Updated March 7, 2022
On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would recognize the
independence of two Russia-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine (the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk
People’s Republics, or DNR/LNR). Russian recognition appeared to include the entire regions of Donetsk
and Luhansk, most of which had remained under Ukrainian control since Russia’s first invasion of
Ukraine in 2014. Shortly after February 21, Putin announced Russia would send “peacekeepers” into the
DNR/LNR to defend against fabricated Russian charges of Ukrainian plans for invasion and sabotage
attempts. Despite denials from Russian officials, Russia had spent months amassing a significant portion
of its military capabilities around Ukraine. The attack began after Russia had mobilized between 150,000
and 190,000 personnel on the Ukrainian border, in Belarus, and in Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region,
according to U.S. government estimates. Russia’s invasion follows months of warning and concern from
the Biden Administration, European allies, NATO, and some Members of Congress.
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
On February 24, Putin announced in a televised address a “special military operation” to protect the
civilian population and to “demilitarize” and “de-Nazify” Ukraine (the latter term understood by many
observers as a false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected Ukrainian government).
Hours after Putin’s speech, the invasion began with a massed air and missile attack against key targets,
including logistics centers, naval installations, command and control centers, air defenses, and critical
infrastructure. Russia initiated large-scale precision guided missile (PGM) and rocket artillery attacks
across Ukraine. In the initial attack, the Pentagon stated that Russia launched over 100 short-range
ballistic missiles (SRBM), including Iskander-M SRBMs, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. Some
observers believe Russia’s initial strategy was to achieve air superiority, degrade Ukrainian air defenses,
and undermine the Ukrainian military’s ability to coordinate defenses and counterattacks. This initial
bombardment, however, was more limited in duration and scale than some analysts expected and did not
establish full air superiority.
After the air and missile assault, Russian ground forces attacked from multiple directions: north from
occupied Crimea in the direction of Kherson; limited incursions west from DNR/LNR; from Russia’s
Belgorod and Kursk toward Ukraine’s cities of Kharkiv and Sumy; and a strong thrust toward Kyiv.
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Initially, Russia made the most progress in the south, driving north from Crimea toward Kherson and
eventually turning toward Mariupol (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Ukraine

Source: Congressional Research Service.
Russia’s key target was seemingly Kyiv. Led by elite, but more lightly equipped, airborne and special
forces, Russia reportedly made advances along the western side of Kyiv and quickly reached the outskirts
of Kyiv. U.S. officials and some analysts believe Russia’s initial operation was to “decapitate” the
Ukrainian government and rely on fast-moving, elite units to quickly seize key junctures, similar to
Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014.
The Ukrainian military hindered, deflected, and imposed costs, in personnel and equipment, on Russian
forces. The Ukrainian military was seemingly able to draw in, and in many cases overextend, Russian
forces, allowing the Ukrainian military to conduct ambushes and counterattacks. Russia also failed to
completely achieve air dominance, leaving at least some of Ukraine’s air defenses and aircraft
operational; Ukrainian air defenses shot down multiple Russian fighters and helicopters.
Reports indicate that Russia’s military and political leadership appeared surprised by the lack of progress
and level of resistance from Ukrainian forces. After failing to meet initial objectives, suffering casualties,
and appearing to outrun logistics support (leaving many units stranded), Russian forces were forced to
regroup and resupply. Analysts also noted that Russian units were often not operating as combined arms
formations (joint armor, infantry, and artillery), which left infantry (such as airborne, special operations,
reconnaissance, and spetsnaz forces) exposed and armor vulnerable to ambushes. Some observers were
surprised at the poor tactical and operational discipline of Russian units.

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Latest Developments
Reports indicate Russian forces continue to make advances along all sectors and by March 6, the
Pentagon estimated that 95% of available Russian units had been committed into Ukraine. Russia has
seen its biggest advances in the south, capturing Kherson on March 2 and continuing to advance toward
Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia (including shelling and capturing the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant) and to
encircle Mariupol. In the east, Russian forces have encircled Kharkiv and appear to be making slow but
steady progress—although, reportedly, they are suffering heavy casualties. Some observers believe these
forces are preparing for a possible advance toward the Dnieper River. Additionally, Russian forces
continue to advance from Sumy toward Kyiv to encircle it from the east.
Most analysts believe Kyiv continues to be the primary Russian objective. Russia has been resupplying
and reinforcing units outside of Kyiv, and reports indicate Russia is trying to surround the western
approaches to the city. Heavy fighting has been reported in Kyiv’s northwest suburbs of Bucha,
Hostomel, and Irpin.
In recent days, Russian forces have increased the use of artillery and air support, including targeting
civilian and residential areas as well as infrastructure targets (such as airfields) in western Ukraine after
initially refraining from using large-scale artillery attacks. Many of these strikes appear to be SRBMs
launched from Belarus or Russia, as well as some cruise missiles from Russian Black Sea Fleet vessels in
recent days. Russian air forces also have increased activity but continue to suffer losses due to active
Ukrainian air defenses.
In addition to defending key urban areas, Ukrainian forces continue to attack exposed Russian units and
supply convoys, further straining the Russian military’s ability to resupply and sustain offensive
momentum. Over March 5-6, Russian forces appeared to pause most operations, leading some observers
to speculate that they are resupplying in preparation for renewed offensives.
Despite significant Ukrainian resistance, Russia retains significant quantitative and qualitative advantages
over the Ukrainian military, including significant air and helicopter forces, electronic warfare, and
artillery.

Author Information

Andrew S. Bowen

Analyst in Russian and European Affairs

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