“An Epidemic of Coups” in Africa? Issues for Congress

“An Epidemic of Coups” in Africa? Issues for Congress

INSIGHTi

“An Epidemic of Coups” in Africa? Issues for
Congress
February 11, 2022
Military officers have seized power in five African countries since 2020 (Figure 1), part of a trend the
U.N. Secretary-General has termed “an epidemic of coups.” While military coups have long shaped
African politics, their frequency peaked during the Cold War. A more recent wave occurred in Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in 2008-2012, but regional tolerance seemed to
decline. Recent coups challenge U.S. efforts to promote democracy and stability in Africa, complicate
counterterrorism cooperation with several countries, and threaten a fragile post-authoritarian transition in
Sudan that successive U.S. Administrations and Congress have supported. They also raise fears of
“contagion,” especially in West Africa.
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Figure 1. Military Takeovers and Selected Attempts in Africa Since 2020

Source, Notes: CRS graphic. Borders are not necessarily authoritative.
Military interventions both reflect and deepen a trend of democratic backsliding in Africa. In Burkina
Faso, Guinea, and Mali, ousted presidents were once popular figures who themselves ended previous
periods of military rule. In Burkina Faso and Mali, however, they failed to curb insurgent and militia
violence and spiraling humanitarian crises. The coups in Mali and Guinea followed allegations of election
fraud; in Guinea, former President Condé sought a contested third term and cracked down on opposing
voices. Many citizens in these countries openly welcomed the coups, although majorities reject military
rule in principle.
Divided reactions greeted the military’s actions in Chad, following decades of authoritarian rule and rebel
uprisings and the death of the president. In Sudan, protesters cheered a 2019 coup that ousted
authoritarian President Omar al Bashir but opposed security forces’ ensuing attempts to maintain control.
Ongoing protests in Sudan underscore public opposition to the military’s October 2021 power grab from
civilian transition officials.
Several factors are at play across cases and exist elsewhere, including tensions within the armed forces,
allegations of high-level corruption, and economic pressures worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Political instability in West Africa’s Sahel region also coincides with growing diplomatic tensions with
former colonial power France over the scope of its regional counterterrorism operations and other issues.

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Russian military contractors recently arrived in Mali; various actors may see opportunities in military
rule.
Regional Responses
The African Union (AU) rejects “unconstitutional changes of governments” and suspended the
memberships of Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan after recent coups. It did not suspend Chad,
where the military takeover prolonged the Déby family’s control. AU Commission Chairperson Moussa
Faki once served as Chad’s foreign minister.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), often seen as a democratic bulwark,
likewise suspended member states Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali, and imposed sanctions on junta
members in Guinea and Mali after delays in scheduling new elections. ECOWAS recently broadened its
sanctions on Mali to encompass trade, access to the regional central bank, and border crossings. On
February 3, ECOWAS announced it would deploy a stabilization force to Guinea-Bissau.
The Biden Administration praised ECOWAS’s recent actions. Intense popular opposition in Mali has
challenged the bloc’s influence, however, while Guinea’s junta has declined to enforce ECOWAS
decisions on Mali. With events in Burkina Faso, a dwindling number of ECOWAS’ 15 heads of state are
committed to civilian rule. The East African body to which Sudan belongs, known as IGAD, has not taken
punitive action in response to the recent coup there.
Selected Issues for Congress
Oversight of U.S. Security Cooperation. Coups have disrupted some U.S. security cooperation activities
and led observers to question the impact of prior military engagement, including counterterrorism
activities. While prior U.S. training of junta leaders in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali is unlikely to have
directly caused their actions, policymakers may examine whether external support for specialized units
contributed to intra-military and/or civil-military tensions, and whether existing courses emphasizing
civilian control are effective. Country- and unit-level funding allocations under U.S. regional security
programs are not routinely available, presenting a potential oversight challenge.
Coup-Related Aid Restrictions and Implications. Section 7008 of annual foreign aid appropriations
legislation restricts certain aid to the governments of countries in which the military has overthrown a
“duly elected” leader. (See CRS In Focus IF11267, Coup-Related Restrictions in U.S. Foreign Aid
Appropriations.) Section 7008 is in effect for Mali, Guinea, and Sudan (due to a previous coup in 1989),
although Congress has exempted some aid for Sudan. The Biden Administration determined that it did not
apply to Chad. Officials have paused “most” aid to Burkina Faso pending a determination.
U.S. officials may review and suspend some programming under other laws or as a matter of policy. The
Millennium Challenge Corporation suspended activities related to a five-year, $450 million development
aid compact in Burkina Faso, citing its own eligibility requirements. The Administration suspended most
of a $700 million aid allocation for Sudan in October.
U.S. officials have not consistently used the term “coup” to refer to events, due to differing circumstances
and related considerations around the application of Section 7008. Members of Congress may examine
whether perceived inconsistency in U.S. messaging and/or application of aid restrictions are affecting
U.S. credibility, and if so, whether legislative changes are warranted.
Other Potential Deterrence Tools. Policymakers may consider sanctions and other measures to deter
further coups. Whether these alter local calculations is debated. Sanctions programs exist for select
countries, including a Mali program that targets those engaged in “actions or policies that undermine

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democratic processes or institutions,” among other activities. The Biden Administration established a new
country-specific sanctions regime in response to the 2021 coup in Burma, but such action has not
followed coups elsewhere.
No U.S. sanctions program with global scope currently allows designations specifically for military
interventions in politics. The Global Magnitsky program pertains to human rights abuses and corruption,
which are often at issue in coup-affected countries. The executive branch also has broad authority to
restrict travel to the United States, which previous Administrations wielded after previous coups in
Guinea (2008) and Mali (2012). The Biden Administration has not announced such measures in response
to recent coups in Africa, but did suspend Guinea and Mali’s eligibility for trade benefits under the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Burkina Faso and Chad currently are AGOA beneficiaries.
Pressure on coup leaders may be applied multilaterally. In Sudan, international financial institutions have
paused disbursements and progress toward debt relief. The European Union has pledged to back
ECOWAS sanctions against Mali.

Author Information

Alexis Arieff
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
Specialist in African Affairs

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