Lebanon: New Mikati Government Faces Challenges

Lebanon: New Mikati Government Faces Challenges

INSIGHTi
Lebanon: New Mikati Government Faces
Challenges
October 18, 2021
After thirteen months of paralysis, and facing economic crisis, Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and
President Michel Aoun agreed on the composition of a new government in September 2021, following
mediation efforts by France and Iran. The new government—dominated by a coalition of Hezbollah and
its political al ies—faces pressure to implement wide-ranging reforms sought by international donors as a
prerequisite for urgently needed economic assistance. The government’s mandate wil expire following
parliamentary elections scheduled for early 2022. The government wil administer these elections amid
concerns that amendments to the electoral law could limit the impact of opposition voters and candidates.
The New Government
What is the political composition of the new government? The new government al ots cabinet seats in
equal thirds to the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament (the country’s most senior
Christian, Sunni, and Shi’a officials, respectively). Although each leader’s “share” within the government
is equal, the March 8 political coalition—which seeks close ties with Syria and Iran—holds a large
majority of seats (see Table 1). This reflects the March 8 majority in Parliament as wel as the decision by
some parties in the rival March 14 coalition—which opposes Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon—
not to participate in the new government. Ministers were nominated by political parties, but many are
technocrats.
Does any party hold the blocking third? A major obstacle in government formation was the reported
insistence by March 8-aligned President Aoun that the Free Patriotic Movement (led by his son-in-law) be
permitted to name one-third plus one of cabinet ministers (known as the “blocking third”) which would
carry de facto veto power. Prime Minister Mikati has stated that there is no blocking third in the new
government. However, ambiguity as to the alignment of two independent Christian ministers appointed as
part of the prime minister’s share “makes it difficult to analyze the balance of power within the
government,” according to one Lebanese analysis.
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Table 1. Lebanon’s New Government
Seats by Share, Coalition, Nominating Party, and Sect
Seats by Political Share
Seats by Coalition and Nominating Party
Prime Minister’s Share (8)
March 8 Coalition (16)

Prime Minister (Sunni)

Free Patriotic Movement (Christian): 6 seats:

Foreign Affairs, Defense, Justice, Social Affairs, Energy,

Interior (Sunni)
Tourism.

Economy (Sunni)

Amal Movement (Shi’a): 3 seats: Finance, Agriculture,

Health (Sunni)
Culture.

Environment (Sunni)

Hezbollah (Shi’a): 2 seats, 3 ministries: Public Works,

Education (Druze)
Transport, Labor.

Administrative Development (Christian minorities)

Marada (Christian): 2 seats: Telecommunications,

Information.

Youth & Sports (Greek Catholic)


Lebanese Democratic Party (Druze): 1 seat:
Displaced.
President’s Share (8)



Tashnag (Armenian Orthodox): 1 seat: Industry.

Defense (Greek Orthodox)



Syrian Social Nationalist Party (secular): 1 seat:

Foreign Affairs (Maronite)
Deputy Prime Minister.

Justice (Maronite)


Energy (Greek Orthodox)
March 14 Coalition (3)

Social Affairs (Greek Catholic)

Future Movement (Sunni): 3 seats: Interior, Health,

Tourism (Maronite)
Environment.

Industry (Armenian Orthodox)


Displaced (Druze)
Other (5)


Azm Movement (Sunni): 2 seats: Prime Minister,
Speaker of Parliament’s Share (8)
Economy.



Progressive Socialist Party (Druze): 1 seat:

Deputy Prime Minister (Greek Orthodox)
Education.

Finance (Shi’a)

Independent: 2 seats: Administrative Development

Public Works & Transportation (Shi’a)
(Christian minorities), Sports and Youth (Greek

Labor (Shi’a)
Catholic).

Culture (Shi’a)


Agriculture (Shi’a)

Telecommunications (Maronite)

Information (Maronite)
Source: “Who’s in Lebanon’s new government?” L’Orient Today, September 10, 2021; “Who is in the new Lebanese
Cabinet?” The National, September 10, 2021.
Notes: Ministers are not necessarily affiliated formal y with the political party that nominated them.
Who is not represented in the new government? The March 14 coalition has minimal representation in
the new government, with the coalition’s two Christian parties—Kataeb and the Lebanese Forces—
choosing not to participate. (Despite the absence of Kataeb and the Lebanese Forces, Christian ministers
comprise half of the cabinet.) The Mikati government is composed of 23 men and one woman; six women
served in the previous government.
Key Actors
What was the role of external actors in government formation? Lebanese press has described French-
Iranian diplomacy as pivotal to breaking the impasse over cabinet formation. In late August, French

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President Emmanuel Macron traveled to Iraq, where he met with Iran’s foreign minister. Macron
reportedly expressed France’s desire to cooperate with Iran in Lebanon, and a wil ingness to invest in
Lebanon and Iraq. French oil and gas company TotalEnergies subsequently signed a $27 bil ion deal with
the Iraqi government. In a cal with Macron, Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi, Raisi reportedly stated that
Iran would facilitate government formation in Lebanon.
What is Hezbollah’s role in the new government? Hezbollah nominated two ministers in the Mikati
government, spanning three portfolios—Public Works, Transport, and Labor. Some analysts maintain that
the Ministry of Public Works, likely to play a key role in administering funds for the reconstruction of the
port of Beirut, had long been sought by Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s share in the Mikati government is
comparable in size to the seats it held in the 2020 Diab government (Health and Industry) and in the 2019
Hariri government (Health, Youth and Sports, and Parliamentary Affairs).
Challenges
Escalating Violence. On October 14, unknown assailants fired on a protest in the Tayyouneh area of
Beirut, kil ing seven and injuring more than 30. The protestors, mostly Shi’a supporters of Hezbollah and
Amal, had cal ed for the removal of Tarek Bitar, the judge assigned to investigate the 2020 Beirut port
explosion. Hezbollah accused the Lebanese Forces (a Christian party aligned with March 14) of
instigating the conflict; the Lebanese Forces have denied involvement. The violence was described as the
worst sectarian clash in Lebanon since 2008.
Economic Crisis. The World Bank has described Lebanon’s economic crisis as possibly among the “top
3 most severe crises episodes global y since the mid-nineteenth century.” In September 2021, Lebanon
received $1.1 bil ion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of its Special Drawing Rights
(SDR). The recent al ocation for Lebanon is separate from the rescue package that Lebanon has sought
from the IMF ($10 bil ion in May 2020). The government has not said how SDR funds wil be used, and
some are concerned that SDR funds could be used to bolster existing patronage networks particularly in
anticipation of upcoming elections. Lebanon has resumed negotiations with the IMF over a rescue
package but a forensic audit of the country’s central bank—reportedly a prerequisite for economic aid
from the IMF and other donors—remains pending.
2022 Elections. Prime Minister Mikati has stated that parliamentary elections wil be held in March 2022,
six weeks early. Some analysts have speculated that the push for early elections seeks to limit the
participation of Lebanese abroad—expected to vote largely for opposition parties—and the ability of
newer opposition parties to mobilize. The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections has warned
early elections would negate “the desired goals and objectives of elections, which are accountability, fair
and proper representation, and equal opportunities in exercising the right to vote and to run for office. ” As
of October, parliament is debating amendments to the electoral law that wil determine whether
expatriates wil vote for a newly created international constituency of six seats (increasing the number of
seats in parliament from 128 to 134), or whether they wil be permitted to vote for candidates in their
home districts—where they potential y could sway key local elections.

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Author Information

Carla E. Humud

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

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