Iraq’s October 2021 Election

Iraq’s October 2021 Election

INSIGHTi
Iraq’s October 2021 Election
Updated October 18, 2021
Iraqis Rebalance Forces in Parliament, Turn to Government Formation
On October 10, 2021, Iraqis voted in an early election to determine the makeup of the unicameral Council
of Representatives (COR), Iraq’s national legislature. The COR elects Iraq’s president and approves the
prime minister’s program and cabinet nominees. The election results wil inform negotiations among
political groups to identify the largest bloc in the COR, which nominates a prime minister and shapes the
selection of cabinet nominees. The largest bloc may or may not include the coalition or party that wins the
most COR seats. Past government formation negotiations have taken months to resolve. Iran-aligned
parties won fewer seats, which may make it less likely that Iraq’s next government wil request a fuller or
earlier U.S. military withdrawal.
Iraqi officials and clerics encouraged voters to participate, but turnout was low, reflecting some boycotts
and Iraqis’ lack of confidence that participation would produce change. Although no party won an
outright majority, the improved performance of some parties relative to the 2018 election, the weaker
showings of others, and the electoral success of new parties and independents associated with the 2019-
2021 protest movement may change some of Iraq’s political dynamics.
Some pro-Iran/anti-U.S. forces fared less wel than they had hoped and, among some others, are
chal enging the results. Pro-Iran groups appear to have lost some support by suppressing protests, but
Iraqi analysts expect they wil use resources and intimidation to maintain their influence. Iraqi analysts
expect a compromise coalition government to emerge from post-election negotiations that includes these
groups alongside their rivals. Such a government could lower the risk of violent confrontation between
armed supporters of competing parties, but also may make less likely some of the systemic reforms
sought by protestors who brought down Iraq’s last government.
Election Framework and Results
Under a new voting law finalized in 2020, Iraq adopted a single nontransferable vote system (one vote,
one candidate, multiple seats per constituency). Voters selected 320 candidates across 83 local
constituencies and nine candidates for seats reserved for minority groups. At least 25% of the COR seats
were reserved for women, with one seat per constituency designated for female candidates. Prior elections
saw voters choose party lists in province-wide constituencies. The provincial list system favored larger
parties and enabled them to seat loyalists who might not have attracted support as individual candidates.
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Election results remain provisional, with certification expected after courts consider chal enges. The
European Union cited the findings of its election observers in saying the election was “largely peaceful
and orderly” and that “the polls were wel managed and competitive.”
As of October 16, results indicate the following outcomes for selected parties, coalitions, and
independents:
 Sadrist Bloc (73 seats). Supporters of Shia religious figure and militia leader Muqtada al
Sadr won the most seats, improving on their 2018 electoral performance through effective
party organizing and voter turnout activities. Sadr, whose movement maintains a militia
of its own, emphasized the importance of state authority and control of armed groups in
his post-election remarks. Sadrists campaigned against corruption, but Sadrists face
related al egations. Sadr appears determined to wield influence over government
formation, but he must navigate rivals’ concerns.
 Taqaddum (Progress, 38 seats). COR Speaker Mohammed Halbusi’s Taqaddum bloc
prevailed in the competition among Sunni Arab coalitions, outperforming its rivals in the
Al Azm bloc (Resolve, 12 seats).
 Independents (37 seats). Unaffiliated candidates attracted support across the country, but
some have quietly aligned with organized coalitions.
 State of Law (35 seats). Former prime minister Nouri al Maliki’s coalition improved on
its 2018 outcome, and other groups may seek its support to form the largest COR bloc.
State of Law includes the Shia Islamist Dawa (Cal ) Party and smal er Shia Arab and
Turkoman parties critical of the U.S.-Iraqi partnership.
 Kurdish Parties. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP, 33 seats) and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK, 16 seats) remain the dominant parties in the federal y
recognized Kurdistan Region. The opposition New Generation movement won 9 seats.
 Fatah Coalition (Conquest, 16 seats). This coalition of Shia, Iran-friendly opponents of
the U.S. military presence in Iraq won two-thirds fewer seats than in 2018, which may
reflect some voters’ discontent and the coalition’s failure to adapt tactical y to the new
electoral system. Fatah leaders al ege “fabricated results” and intend to chal enge some
outcomes legal y. Fatah al ies in the Babilyun movement won four of the seats reserved
for Iraqi minorities.
 Imtidad party (Reach, 9 seats). Imtidad, a new protester-led party has demonstrated the
political potential of parties that have organized to advance the movement’s demands
with various agendas.
 Coalition of the National State Forces (4 seats). This coalition of supporters of former
prime minister Hayder al Abadi’s Nasr (Victory) bloc and Shia leader Ammar al Hakim’s
Hikma movement (Wisdom) attracted some voters’ support, but diluted its result in part
through poor coordination.
 Haquq (Rights) Movement (1 seat). Supporters of U.S.-designated FTO Kata’ib
Hezbollah, which is widely considered a close al y of Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC-QF), lead this party.
Implications for the United States
The Biden Administration congratulated Iraq on holding the election and said the United States hopes
“Iraq wil form a government that reflects the wil of the Iraqi people.” The Administration seeks a
multifaceted partnership with Iraq, and alongside U.S. aid programs, 2,500 U.S. military personnel
support Iraqi operations against tenacious Islamic State remnants. In July, U.S. and Iraqi leaders decided

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that “there wil be no U.S. forces with a combat role in Iraq by December 31, 2021.” Congress is
considering authorization and appropriations legislation to support an advisory mission beyond that date.,
Fatah’s loss of seats may make them more intransigent in government formation negotiations and
insistent on maintaining influence over the Popular Mobilization Forces (militias official y incorporated
in the security sector). Iraqi parties may again choose inclusive power sharing to avoid confrontation, but
a new government seen by Iraqi activists as reinforcing corrupt and unaccountable governance could
drive renewed (and potential y destabilizing) protests.

Author Information

Christopher M. Blanchard

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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