Congress Considers the IG Independence and Empowerment Act (H.R. 2662)

Congress Considers the IG Independence and Empowerment Act (H.R. 2662)

INSIGHTi
Congress Considers the IG Independence and
Empowerment Act (H.R. 2662)
August 2, 2021
The IG Independence and Empowerment Act (H.R. 2662; H.Rept. 117-66) would amend the Inspector
General Act of 1978 (IG Act, 5 U.S.C. Appx.) and alter the independence and operations of inspectors
general (IGs) in potential y significant ways. The bil includes provisions that would, among other things,
enhance the authority of IGs, institute additional requirements for the appointment and removal of IGs,
and make operational changes to the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
(CIGIE).
On June 29, 2021, the House passed H.R. 2662. The most recent legislative action occurred on July 12,
2021, when the bil was received in the Senate and referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.
This Insight provides a brief introduction to IGs and summarizes select provisions of H.R. 2662. For more
information on the organization of the IG community see CRS Report R45450, Statutory Inspectors
General in the Federal Government: A Primer, by Ben Wilhelm.
IG Community
Congress passed the IG Act in 1978 to establish offices of inspector general as “independent and objective
units” tasked with conducting audits; promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in agencies; and
preventing and detecting fraud and abuse in government. IGs conduct audits, investigations, and other
reviews of agency activities. They decide what issues to review based on their own knowledge and
expertise, as required by statute, and based on tips or requests from Congress, agency employees, and the
public. IGs report their findings and make recommendations to agencies, Congress, and ultimately the
public. Congress frequently uses IG reports and recommendations to support the exercise of its own
legislative and oversight authority.
Since the passage of the IG Act in 1978, Congress has monitored the operations of the IG community,
added IGs to dozens of new and existing agencies, and amended the IG Act. For instance, the Inspector
General Reform Act of 2008 created CIGIE as a permanent organization for the IG community and
required the President to provide Congress with a written notice and explanation 30 days before the
removal or transfer of an IG. Proposals to amend or expand the IG Act are frequently offered by
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11714
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

Congressional Research Service
2
Congress, the IG community, and government oversight stakeholders and experts. While these proposals
reflect a variety of viewpoints and priorities, common themes include promoting IG independence and
accountability, closing potential gaps in IG investigative authority, and further developing the operations
and duties of CIGIE.
Brief Summary of Selected Provisions of the IG Independence and
Empowerment Act
H.R. 2662 passed the House on June 29, 2021 by a vote of 221-182. It includes a number of substantive
changes to the IG Act related to IG authority, independence, and operations. Selected provisions are
briefly summarized below. CRS experts are available to consult with congressional requesters interested
in examining these components in greater detail.
The bil would significantly alter the appointment and removal process for IGs and acting IGs. If enacted,
it would:
 Establish new limits on the removal or transfer of IGs. The President or the head of a
designated federal entity could remove or transfer an IG based only on documented
“permanent incapacity, neglect of duty, malfeasance, conviction of a felony or conduct
involving moral turpitude, knowing violation of a law or regulation, gross
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or inefficiency.” In addition,
the President or another government official would be required to provide Congress a
“substantive rationale, including detailed and case specific reasons,” for the removal or
transfer as wel as information on any ongoing or completed investigations into the
conduct of the IG (Title I).
 Require that written notification be sent to Congress before an IG is placed on non-duty
status in most circumstances (Title II).
 Amend the Vacancies Reform Act (5 U.S.C. §3345 et seq.) by placing additional limits on
whom the President may appoint to serve as an acting IG (Title III).
 Require an acting IG to provide Congress a list of “al audits and investigations” that
were in progress at the time a permanent IG was removed, transferred, or placed on non-
duty status (Title VIII).
If enacted, the bil would also:
 Authorize IGs to issue subpoenas for testimony to individuals other than current federal
employees. The bil would establish a panel of three IGs to review and approve proposed
subpoenas and would al ow the Attorney General to object to a subpoena that would
interfere with an ongoing investigation (Title V).
 Provide the Department of Justice (DOJ) IG with the authority to investigate al egations
that DOJ attorneys have engaged in misconduct related to their authority to investigate,
litigate, and provide legal advice. These matters are currently reviewed by the DOJ’s
Office of Professional Responsibility (Title VI).
 Require IGs to report to the appropriate congressional committees if information or
assistance they request is “unreasonably refused or not provided” by an agency (Title X).
 Make several changes to CIGIE operations and reporting to Congress.
 Expand the duties of Whistleblower Protection Coordinators under Section 3(d)(3) of the
IG Act by specifical y requiring that they educate IG office staff on whistleblower rights
(Title VII).

Congressional Research Service
3

 Ensure that the rate of pay for each IG is greater than or equal to the rate of pay of the
highest compensated employee in that IG’s office (Title XII).
 Direct the Government Accountability Office to prepare a report on the CIGIE Integrity
Committee’s effectiveness (Title XIII).

Author Information

Ben Wilhelm

Analyst in Government Organization and Management

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

IN11714 · VERSION 3 · NEW