Department of Justice Efforts to Counter Ransomware

Department of Justice Efforts to Counter Ransomware

INSIGHTi
Department of Justice Efforts to Counter
Ransomware
July 2, 2021
Ransomware attacks, such as the one carried out by DarkSide against Colonial Pipeline in May 2021 that
disrupted pipeline operations, have highlighted federal law enforcement efforts to counter cybercriminals
and their use of malicious technology.
Ransomware
Ransomware is malware that targets systems and data for the purpose of extortion. It is used against individuals, businesses,
and government networks, locking users out of their systems or data and demanding a ransom payment to supposedly
regain access to or prevent exposure of systems or data. There is no guarantee users wil get their data back, even if they
pay, or that their data or systems wil not have been otherwise compromised. Reportedly, cybercriminals have increasingly
used a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model wherein certain criminals develop the malware and then sel or lease the tool
to others to carry out ransomware campaigns. Both the developer and attacker then receive portions of the criminal
proceeds. RaaS was involved in the attack on Colonial Pipeline.
DOJ’s Role in Cyber Incident Response
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and National Cyber
Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF), leads the nation’s threat response to significant cyber incidents.
Specifical y, this threat response includes
conducting appropriate law enforcement and national security investigative activity at the affected
entity’s site; collecting evidence and gathering intelligence; providing attribution; linking related
incidents; identifying additional affected entities; identifying threat pursuit and disruption
opportunities; developing and executing courses of action to mitigate the immediate threat; and
facilitating information sharing and operational coordination with asset response.
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In April 2021, DOJ announced it was launching a four-month strategic cyber review to evaluate how it
responds to cyber threats, in part because of growing ransomware concerns.
Evolving DOJ Actions on Ransomware
As the threats posed by cybercriminals using ransomware develop (the FBI is investigating about 100
types of ransomware) and the amount of money paid by victims increases (one study estimates the
average payment is over $170,000, and average recovery costs increased from $761,106 in 2020 to $1.85
mil ion in 2021), DOJ has acknowledged that the consequences extend beyond ransomware payments and
remediation costs and include the associated “mayhem” (e.g., ensuring patient care during attacks against
hospitals’ systems). DOJ has taken a number of actions intended to bolster investigations, enhance law
enforcement information sharing, and increase public awareness.
Investigations. Augmenting cyber investigations is among DOJ’s top priorities, as cyber threats,
including ransomware attacks, pose risks to national security. For instance, DOJ created a Ransomware
and Digital Extortion Task Force comprised of the FBI, Executive Office for United States Attorneys
(EOUSA), and representatives from their Criminal, Civil, and National Security Divisions. The task
force’s intended efforts include increasing training and resources; enhancing intel igence and information
sharing; using al investigative leads, including human intel igence and links between criminals and
nation states; and improving DOJ coordination on cases—al to disrupt, investigate, and prosecute
ransomware cases.
Information Sharing. In June 2021, Deputy Attorney General Monaco issued a memorandum to federal
prosecutors requiring that they notify the Computer Crime and Intel ectual Property Section (CCIPS) and
the National Security and Cyber Crime Coordinator for the EOUSA of any significant developments in
existing ransomware or digital extortion cases. They must also notify CCIPS and the EOUSA of al new
instances of ransomware or digital extortion attacks in their districts and must file an Urgent Report in the
instance of new attacks or those affecting ongoing cases. Essential y, federal prosecutors are now to report
ransomware incidents in the same way they report critical national security threats. The memorandum
also reinforced CCIPS as the coordinating entity for ransomware and digital extortion cases. In this role,
CCIPS coordinates with EOUSA and relevant DOJ components and identifies instances where potential
ransomware cases are related to other open investigations.
Awareness. DOJ leads several public awareness activities on ransomware. For instance, the NCIJTF
“convened an interagency group of subject matter experts to [among other things] educate the public on
ways to prevent ransomware attacks.” In addition, NCIJTF and the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint
Center (IC3), among others, have published materials on the threats posed by ransomware, where to
report it, and how to respond. Victims are encouraged to report ransomware incidents to their local FBI
field office, NCIJTF, IC3, or the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Notably,
federal law enforcement discourages the payment of ransom, noting that doing so “may embolden
adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution
of ransomware and/or fund il icit activities.”
Congressional Considerations
As Congress conducts oversight and debates legislation on DOJ’s efforts to respond to cyber incidents,
and specifical y threats posed by ransomware, policymakers may consider how these efforts may be
affected by resource constraints, evolving technology, and the often transnational nature of cybercrime.

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 In its FY2022 budget justification requesting resources to bolster cybersecurity and
counter cybercrime, DOJ specifical y identified ransomware as a threat. Policymakers
may debate whether law enforcement’s manpower and monetary resources as wel as
DOJ’s new initiatives to investigate ransomware are commensurate with the threat.
 As technology evolves, some contend that law enforcement’s investigative capabilities
may not be able to keep pace; some specifical y cite strong, end-to-end (or what law
enforcement has sometimes cal ed “warrant-proof”) encryption, which can prevent access
to certain communications and information. Congress may continue to examine this
tension between the privacy of electronic communications and law enforcement’s ability
to investigate cybercrime in the context of ransomware investigations.
 Because cybercriminals, including those engaging in ransomware, can operate anywhere
in the world, networks of these criminals—and digital evidence of their activity—may
exist in various countries. There may be investigative chal enges in gathering evidence,
working with international law enforcement, and holding perpetrators accountable in the
United States. Policymakers may examine how these chal enges could affect DOJ
investigations of criminals engaging in ransomware and RaaS.

Author Information

Kristin Finklea

Specialist in Domestic Security

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