Cross-Cutting Issues in Cybersecurity: Financial Institutions

Cross-Cutting Issues in Cybersecurity: Financial Institutions

INSIGHTi

Cross-Cutting Issues in Cybersecurity:
Financial Institutions
March 1, 2021
Financial institutions remain a prime target for many types of malicious actors in cyberspace. The types of
data these institutions hold make them a target, in addition to their role in managing money. As a result,
government and industry have security requirements for these institutions. Because many financial
institutions make significant investments in cybersecurity, the financial sector as a whole may provide
insights into novel attacks and potentially cost-effective mitigation strategies.
This Insight outlines the cybersecurity risk to the financial services industry and efforts by government
and industry to address those risks.
Financial Institutions’ Realms of Cybersecurity Risk
Financial institutions face three broad types of cybersecurity risk: operational, reputational, and systemic.
Definitions
Cybersecurity
Financial Institutions
A process involving the prevention of damage to, protection
Financial institutions comprise the financial series sector.
of, and restoration of computers, computer networks,
These institutions include depository institutions (e.g., banks
information and communications technology, virtual
and credit unions), broker-dealers, investment funds and
systems, cyber-physical systems, digital services and software companies, insurance companies, payment processors, and
(including the information and data contained in those
other credit and financing organizations.
systems), and users.
Source: CRS Analysis.
Operational Risk
Like any organization, financial institutions face operational risk from cyber threats. They engage in
activities to protect their business information technology (IT) networks and their operational networks.
Business networks (e.g., email systems and web portals), can be the initial point of entry for malicious
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actors. Other attacks may target operational networks of the financial institution. Once in an operational
network, adversaries may seek access to critical and sensitive data stores in order to gain an advantage in
market transactions, or to disrupt business activities.
Reputational Risk
The financial system depends on trust. For example, if a breach at a bank results in the release of personal
data, customers may be reluctant to continue their relationship with the bank. They may choose to pull
their deposits out from the bank and close their account. Without trust that customers’ money and
personal data are safe, the financial system cannot operate smoothly. The Equifax breach illustrates an
example where 145 million customers’ data was exposed. As a result, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) advised agencies to not use knowledge-based questions (a service which Equifax provided
in addition to credit reporting) to authenticate users. Additionally, while customers may not be able to
withhold information from Equifax and other credit bureaus, they may become reticent about using
financial services if they know their information will be shared with institutions susceptible to similar
breaches.
Systemic Risk
Financial institutions are highly interconnected, and many institutions depend on a few widely-accepted
systems. Because an attack on one of these IT systems could result in significant losses across the entire
industry, financial regulators must also consider the systemic risks to the entire industry. In doing so, they
seek to ensure the safety and soundness of not only individual organizations, but also their partners.
Systemic risk may have increased in 2020, as the pandemic has increased reliance on technology (e.g.,
remote payment systems). The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has identified three
channels through which a cybersecurity event could threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system:
 An incident could disrupt a key financial service or a financial market utility for which
there are few substitutes (e.g., the central bank, exchanges, and payment clearing and
settlement institutions);
 An incident could cause a loss of confidence among a broad set of customers or market
participants; and
 An incident could compromise the integrity of critical data (e.g., altering balance sheets),
rendering information critical to financial firms either inaccurate or unusable.
Security Approaches
Laws, regulations, agency authorities, and private sector actions combine to mitigate cybersecurity risks.
Key Laws
Four primary laws make up the statutory framework upon which financial institutions’ cybersecurity is
based. Although these laws rarely mention cybersecurity specifically, their requirements broadly apply,
regardless of the medium on which the information is stored (e.g., on paper or a hard drive), or how it is
processed (e.g., by hand or by a computer).
 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

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 The Bank Protection Act
Key Agencies
The Federal Reserve System (the Fed), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), along with representatives from state supervising organizations,
comprise the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
The FFIEC IT Handbook provides the standards that financial institutions must abide by for the safety
and soundness of the financial system.
Other federal agencies provide guidance or rules to improve cybersecurity, such as the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
With so many agencies involved with the cybersecurity of financial institutions, GAO has raised concerns
over interagency cooperation and tracking the success of agency efforts.
Key Private Sector Entities
The financial institutions have also organized to bolster the financial system’s cybersecurity. Some of
these organizations include the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council (FSSCC), Payment Card
Industry Security Standard Council, and the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(FS ISAC).
Self-regulatory organizations (SROs), such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) for
brokers and dealers of securities, provide information security practices and operational controls for their
member organizations.
Cross-Cutting Issues in Cybersecurity
This CRS Insight is one of a series on cross-cutting issues in cybersecurity. For others in the series please visit our website.
As with others in this series, a podcast accompanies this product. You may access this podcast and others online.
Further Reading
Cybersecurity: An Introduction, by Chris Jaikaran
Fintech: Overview of Innovative Financial Technology and Selected Policy Issues, coordinated by David
Perkins
Consumer Data Security and the Credit Bureaus, by Chris Jaikaran
Financial Services and Cybersecurity: The Federal Role, by Maureen Murphy and Andrew Scott

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Author Information

Chris Jaikaran
Andrew P. Scott
Analyst in Cybersecurity Policy
Analyst in Financial Economics

Disclaimer
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Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
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