Venezuela: Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2021

Venezuela: Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2021

INSIGHTi
Venezuela: Challenges for U.S. Policymakers
in 2021
Updated March 9, 2021
The crisis in Venezuela is a primary chal enge facing U.S. policymakers in the Western Hemisphere. Two
years after the United States ceased to recognize Nicolás Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela,
Maduro has taken de facto control of the National Assembly, the last independent branch of government.
Maduro has consolidated power despite a dire economic and humanitarian crisis exacerbated by
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), U.S. and international pressure for him to cede power, and an
opposition led by Juan Guaidó, the National Assembly president elected in 2015 once regarded as interim
president by nearly 60 countries. Although the Biden Administration stil recognizes Guaidó as interim
president, many U.S. al ies, including the European Union (EU), do not.
Congress supported the Trump Administration’s efforts to promote a restoration of democracy in
Venezuela without the use of military force and provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans. In
December 2019, Congress enacted the Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and
Development Act of 2019 (VERDAD Act; P.L. 116-94, Division J) to address the crisis in Venezuela.
Congress may examine policy approaches by the Biden Administration and further legislative options,
such as additional sanctions against the Maduro government and its foreign enablers or humanitarian
assistance to Venezuelans.
U.S. Policy on Venezuela
In January 2019, the Trump Administration implemented a campaign to compel Maduro to leave office
while providing aid to the opposition and humanitarian assistance to the Venezuelan people and countries
sheltering them. Some Trump officials reportedly discussed using military force in Venezuela, a policy
option that neighboring countries and Congress opposed. Ultimately, the Trump Administration sought to
achieve its objectives through diplomacy, sanctions, and legal pressure. U.S. actions included
 The United States encouraged other countries to recognize the Guaidó government,
sanction Maduro officials (as Canada, the EU, and some Latin American and Caribbean
countries have done), and provide shelter or humanitarian aid to Venezuelans.
 The State Department revoked more than 1,000 visas, including those of Venezuelan
officials and their families.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11607
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

Congressional Research Service
2
 The Treasury Department expanded individual, financial, and sectoral sanctions to
prohibit unlicensed transactions with the state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela
(PdVSA), Venezuela’s central bank, and the Maduro government. In 2020, Treasury
sanctioned two Russian energy companies shipping Venezuelan oil and a Chinese
technology company that helped Maduro conduct digital surveil ance.
 The Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Maduro and 14 top officials for narco-
terrorism, drug trafficking, and other crimes.
Although U.S. efforts under the Trump Administration failed to dislodge Maduro, they created an array of
tools that the Biden Administration could use. Biden Administration officials have stated that the
Administration’s approach focuses on supporting the Venezuelan people and engaging in multilateral
diplomacy to press for a return to democracy and to hold corrupt and abusive Maduro officials
accountable for their actions.
Sanctions, Indictments, and Responding to the Maduro Government’s Foreign
Enablers
Nicolás Maduro has continued to use security forces to quash political dissent and to evade U.S. sanctions
with support from Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, and others. As of February 15, 2021, the government held
some 329 political prisoners, according to Foro Penal, a Venezuelan human rights organization. The U.N.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has documented thousands of extrajudicial kil ings
and other abuses committed by security forces that amounted to crimes against humanity.
The Biden Administration has stated that it wil pursue individuals involved in corruption and human
rights abuses but may also need to address foreign powers that have supported Maduro political y,
economical y, and militarily. Analysts have urged more coordination on sanctions with the EU, a region
where Maduro government officials’ resources and families reside.
In addition to sanctions, U.S. criminal investigations have targeted il icit revenue earned and crimes
committed by the Maduro government and its enablers. According to one indictment, Maduro and other
top officials al egedly participated in the Cartel of the Suns drug cartel in conspiracy with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to produce and traffic il icit drugs to the United States.
DOJ is seeking the extradition of Alex Saab, a money launderer al egedly involved in smuggling il icit
gold for Maduro whose indictment also cites his ties to Hezbollah.
Congress may consider new ways to support efforts to seize il icit revenue tied to the Maduro
government, prosecute corrupt Venezuelan officials and their associates, and respond to foreign influences
in Venezuela.
Supporting the Venezuelan People and Addressing the Humanitarian Crisis
Six years into an economic crisis in which Venezuela’s real gross domestic product (GDP adjusted for
inflation) has shrunk by about 75% and the poverty rate as measured by income has risen to 96%,
Venezuela is experiencing a dire humanitarian crisis. Conditions have worsened over the past year due to
the COVID-19 pandemic. In December 2020, U.N. agencies estimated 5.4 mil ion Venezuelans had left
the country. Some 4.6 mil ion of those migrants went to other Latin American and Caribbean countries,
especial y Colombia.
The United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to address the Venezuela regional crisis.
From FY2017 to FY2020, it provided $1 bil ion to Venezuela and countries sheltering Venezuelans. U.S.
agencies separately have provided $43.7 mil ion for pandemic-related aid efforts in Venezuela.

Congressional Research Service
3
In addition to providing assistance, some Members of Congress have cal ed for humanitarian relief for
Venezuelans living in the United States. The Trump Administration ended removals of Venezuelans
eligible for Deferred Enforced Departure in January 2021. On March 8, 2021, the Biden Administration
designated Venezuela as a beneficiary country for Temporary Protected Status for a period of 18 months.
Some Members of Congress also have expressed concerns about the humanitarian impact of sanctions, as
described in a February 2021 Government Accountability Office report. The Biden Administration is
reviewing U.S. sanctions to ensure they do not exacerbate humanitarian conditions in Venezuela. Some
analysts have suggested using the potential for sanctions relief to influence Maduro’s action.
See CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela:
Overview of U.S. Sanctions; and CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Humanitarian Crisis
and COVID-19.

Author Information

Clare Ribando Seelke

Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

IN11607 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED