Russia: Poisoning of Alexei Navalny and U.S. Policy

Russia: Poisoning of Alexei Navalny and U.S. Policy

INSIGHTi
Russia: Poisoning of Alexei Navalny
and U.S. Policy
Updated March 4, 2021
On March 2, 2021, the Biden Administration said Russian government agents were responsible for an
August 2020 nerve agent attack on anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny. The Department of State
cal ed the attack an “attempted assassination” and determined Russia had used a chemical weapon in
violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The White House stated the intel igence community (IC)
“assesses with ‘high confidence’ that officers of Russia’s Federal Security Service,” or FSB, were
responsible for the attack. The Administration announced sanctions in response, as wel as for Navalny’s
subsequent arrest and imprisonment.
Navalny Poisoning and Opposition Crackdown
Russian authorities appear to have launched a campaign last year to silence Navalny, a one-time Moscow
mayoral candidate. Navalny has demonstrated acumen in exposing government corruption and organizing
anti-government actions, despite being barred from competing in elections since 2013. In August 2020,
Navalny was poisoned and fel il on a flight to Moscow. After public outcry, authorities al owed him to
be evacuated to Germany for medical care. German officials later cited “unequivocal” evidence Navalny
had been poisoned with an il icit nerve agent known as a Novichok. An investigation by independent
researchers implicated several individuals linked to the FSB, Russia’s leading domestic security agency.
Navalny, posing as a government official, later spoof-cal ed an al eged operative who appeared to provide
details of the attack.
Rather than seek asylum after recovering, Navalny and his wife, Yulia Navalnaya, returned to Moscow,
where Navalny was detained at the airport in January 2021. Authorities ostensibly arrested Navalny for
having missed parole check-ins, including during his hospitalization abroad. Navalny’s parole was related
to a 3½-year suspended sentence he received in 2014 on embezzlement charges, which the European
Court of Human Rights found to be “arbitrary and manifestly unreasonable.” A Russian court ordered
Navalny to be imprisoned for 32 months of his suspended sentence (the court subtracted time served
during house arrest). Navalny reportedly has been transferred to a penal colony outside Moscow. He
previously received several short prison sentences for participating in unsanctioned protests.
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After his latest arrest, Navalny continued efforts to expose corruption and undermine Putin’s leadership.
Navalny’s team released a film purporting to present evidence of corruption under Putin, which has
received over 110 mil ion views online. In court, Navalny said Putin was a “thieving little man” who
would go down in history as “Vladimir the Poisoner of Underpants.” Navalny’s imprisonment sparked
mass demonstrations across Russia. Authorities forcibly dispersed protesters and detained thousands of
participants.
U.S. Policy
The United States, the European Union (EU), the Group of Seven (G7), and others have condemned the
attack on Navalny and subsequent crackdown and have cal ed for Navalny’s release. In October 2020, the
EU imposed sanctions on six Russian officials and a research institute in response to the attack on
Navalny. On March 2, 2021, the EU imposed sanctions on four more officials in response to Navalny’s
imprisonment and other human rights abuses.
Also on March 2, in coordination with the EU, the Biden Administration imposed sanctions on seven of
the officials subject to EU sanctions: Russia’s prosecutor general, FSB and Federal Penitentiary Service
directors, two deputy presidential chiefs of staff, and two deputy defense ministers. The Administration
also imposed sanctions on the FSB (already subject to sanctions for election interference and malicious
cyber activities) and on three research institutes for engaging “in activities to develop Russia’s chemical
weapons capabilities.” Three other officials subject to EU sanctions are already subject to U.S. sanctions
for other malign activities.
In addition, the Administration imposed sanctions on Russia’s military intel igence agency (known as the
GRU) and on two GRU officers in response to the 2018 nerve agent attack on former Russian intel igence
agent Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom. The two officers are already subject to related sanctions, and
the GRU is already subject to sanctions for election interference and malicious cyber activities. The
Administration also expanded sanctions original y imposed after the 2018 nerve agent attack, pursuant to
the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. §§5601 et
seq.), and other export restrictions.
President Biden addressed Navalny’s poisoning in a January 2021 telephone cal with President Putin and
included the issue in a tasking to the IC for a “full assessment” of key issues in U.S.-Russia relations
(together with the SolarWinds cyber breach, interference in U.S. elections, and al eged bounties for
attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan). Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the United States, together
with the EU and others, seeks “to send a clear signal that Russia’s use of chemical weapons and abuse of
human rights have severe consequences.”
Many observers expect the Biden Administration to maintain a firm response to various Russian malign
activities. In addition to responding to Navalny’s imprisonment, the Administration has broached the
plight of U.S. citizens imprisoned in Russia. On February 3, 2021, the White House cal ed on Russia to
“swiftly release” U.S. citizens Paul Whelan and Trevor Reed.
On February 22, 2021, the Administration identified a Russian vessel and its owner, both previously
subject to sanctions related to the construction of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany, as also
subject to sanctions under the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019, as amended (22 U.S.C.
§9526 note). The State Department indicated an evaluation of other potential sanctions designations is
ongoing.
On February 3, Secretary Blinken announced a five-year extension of the New START nuclear arms
treaty with Russia. He noted, “Even as we work with Russia to advance U.S. interests, so too wil we
work to hold Russia to account for adversarial actions as wel as its human rights abuses, in close

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coordination with our al ies and partners.” Members of Congress likely wil consider additional measures
in response to the Russian crackdown and assess the Administration’s review of policy toward Russia.
On related issues, see CRS Report R46518, Russia: Domestic Politics and Economy; CRS Report
R46616, Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress; CRS In Focus IF10962,
Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions; and CRS Insight IN10936, Resurgence of Chemical
Weapons Use: Issues for Congress.

Author Information

Cory Welt

Specialist in Russian and European Affairs

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