Yemen: Recent Terrorism Designations

Yemen: Recent Terrorism Designations

INSIGHTi

Yemen: Recent Terrorism Designations
January 29, 2021
Overview
On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration designated the Yemeni group Ansar Allah (Arabic for
“the Partisans of God”), commonly referred to as the Houthis, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)
and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). In notifying Congress, (per 8 U.S.C. §1189), then
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo identified that the Houthis were closely linked to Iran and that the
designations were intended to hold the Houthis accountable for terrorist acts. The designations reportedly
had been under consideration for months, though aid organizations repeatedly cautioned that designations
would exacerbate what the United Nations presently considers the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. On
January 19, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued general
licenses to allow for the continued provision of humanitarian goods to Yemen, and the Trump
Administration claimed that these exemptions would mitigate any humanitarian impact. Nevertheless, the
United Nations warned that the designations would put more than 5 million people in some northern
governorates at risk of famine and called for them to be lifted. Commercial food imports account for 90%
of Yemen’s food supply and, under U.S. law, private importers are not exempt from criminal liability for
material support to an FTO (18 U.S.C. §2339B). On January 25, OFAC issued a new general license
exempting nearly all sanctions restrictions on transactions with the Houthis until February 26, 2021, while
the policy is reviewed. A day earlier, the Houthis had announced they would participate in U.N.-
sponsored prisoner release negotiations.
Conflict Background
Seven years ago, after a nation-wide attempt at political reconciliation failed, the Houthis seized large
swaths of Yemen. In 2015, Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners intervened at the behest of the Republic
of Yemen government (ROYG), conducting air strikes and ground operations against Houthi-held
territory (See Figure 1). Since then, conflict has continued unabated, leading to estimates of over 130,000
Yemeni casualties. U.N. officials have attempted to broker a nation-wide cease-fire, but the Houthis have
continued to advance militarily while using Iranian knowledge and military aid to attack Saudi Arabian
territory. The war repeatedly results in civilian casualties, leading the United Nations to charge that all
parties have committed violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.
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Figure 1. Lines of Control in Yemen
As of October 2020

Source: Graphic created by CRS using data from Risk Intelligence (2020); Esri (2017 & 2018); NOAA (2018); USGS
(2018); Department of State (2015).
The Possible Humanitarian Impact
As a result of conflict, 80% of Yemen’s population needs some form of humanitarian assistance. Food
insecurity and acute malnutrition are widespread. The COVID-19 pandemic has only exacerbated this
crisis. In 2020, donor governments funded 55.9% of the U.N.’s humanitarian appeal, raising concerns that
any additional strain on Yemen’s economy could lead to further depreciation of the currency, a
concomitant rise in food prices, and greater risk of death for an already vulnerable population.
In northern Yemen, where food insecurity is highest, the Houthis are the de facto authority, as the group
has assumed control of government agencies formerly part of the ROYG in Sana’a. The Houthis also
control all northern ports, where most humanitarian goods enter the country. According to one recent
study, it would be “practically impossible to operate in this area without interacting with the de-facto
authorities.” It is possible that shipping, insurance, and banking companies, among others, may move to
minimize their exposure to Houthi officials in order to comply with U.S. sanctions requirements.

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Material Support and Humanitarian Aid
Under 18 U.S.C. §2339B, enacted in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), persons may face
criminal prosecution of up to 20 years in prison if they knowingly provide “material support or resources” to an FTO.
While the definition of material support excludes medicine and religious materials, it is extensive and includes: currency,
financial services, and training, among other things. The law has extraterritorial application in that it may apply to activities
conducted outside the United States, activities affecting foreign commerce, or support by foreign persons for activities
initiated under U.S. jurisdiction (18 U.S.C. §2339B(d)).
OFAC administers U.S. sanctions programs and may issue general or specific licenses to authorize humanitarian aid when
dealing with designated FTOs or SDGTs (see below). While the Department of Justice (DOJ) has a responsibility to
prosecute violations of material support statute, it has discretion in prioritizing its cases. U.S. officials may choose to
privately offer reassurances to the humanitarian community that they would set an extremely high bar before embarking on
a federal prosecution. According to one source, the DOJ claims that it rarely, if ever, has pursued prosecution for material
support when related to humanitarian activities. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and financial institutions can be
risk-averse without more substantial assurance: the looming threat of sanctions prosecution can have a chil ing effect.
On January 19, in concurrence with the FTO designation of the Houthis, OFAC issued four general
licenses to allow humanitarian assistance and other commodities to reach Yemen even if a transaction
involves the Houthis. The licenses clear the way for continued activities by NGOs to support various
humanitarian projects. Finally, OFAC authorized official activities of the U.S. government and certain
international organizations, such as the United Nations. In its guidance accompanying the general
licenses, OFAC indicated that “foreign financial institutions do not risk exposure” to sanctions under
E.O.13224 in knowingly conducting an exempted transaction with the Houthis.
The Biden Administration and Congress
The terrorist designations of the Houthis have been met with bipartisan congressional concern over their
timing, efficacy, possible harm to any peace process, and possible humanitarian impact. Some Members
wish to see the United States continue its maximum pressure campaign on Iran, while other Members
have called on the Biden Administration to reverse the designations. At his confirmation hearing,
Secretary of State Antony Blinken remarked that he would review the policy to ensure it is not impeding
humanitarian assistance.
With the Biden Administration temporarily allowing “all transactions” with the Houthis (to include
commercial imports), U.S. officials may be trying to reassure private actors that their operations may
continue, while signaling the Houthis that the FTO designation may be lifted if peace negotiations
advance.
8 U.S.C. §1189 authorizes the Secretary of State to revoke an FTO designation, upon completion of an
administrative review, if (1) circumstances underlying the designation have changed, or (2) for national
security reasons. No previous revocations have cited national security grounds for justification.

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Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp, Coordinator
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy

Dianne E. Rennack
John W. Rollins
Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation
Specialist in Terrorism and National Security

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