Operation Warp Speed Contracts for COVID-19 Vaccines and Ancillary Vaccination Materials

Operation Warp Speed Contracts for COVID-19 Vaccines and Ancillary Vaccination Materials

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INSIGHTi

Operation Warp Speed Contracts for
COVID-19 Vaccines and Ancillary
Vaccination Materials
Updated March 1, 2021
Operation Warp Speed (OWS) is an interagency partnership between the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) that coordinates federal efforts to
accelerate the development, acquisition, and distribution of COVID-19 medical countermeasures.
Collaborating HHS components include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
(BARDA). OWS is a Trump Administration initiative, and while the Biden Administration has indicated
that the interagency response to COVID-19 will continue, it plans to restructure and rename the effort.
Although the stated goals of OWS include therapeutics and diagnostics, most of the money awarded to
date has focused on vaccines. This Insight summarizes OWS’s vaccine-related contracts, including those
for ancillary vaccination materials (e.g., needles and vials).
BARDA is currently supporting six vaccine candidates through funding research and development,
funding increases in manufacturing capacity, and/or advance purchase contracts. A vaccine candidate
from Merck/IAVI also received funding support from BARDA, but was discontinued in January 2021
because it failed to demonstrate sufficient efficacy against COVID-19. Table 1 provides BARDA contract
awards and additional information about these candidates.
Vaccine development, like drug development, is generally an expensive process that takes 10 or more
years. To accelerate development, OWS implemented a number of measures, including supporting
increased manufacturing capacity for some of the vaccine candidates while they were still in testing,
rather than waiting until testing was complete to scale up production. This investment is considered “at-
risk,” in that the federal government is paying to develop or manufacture vaccine candidates that may not
prove to be safe or effective.
Vaccine candidates that received federal government support for development include Moderna, Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Sanofi/GSK, and Merck/IAVI (see Table 1), whereas the Pfizer/BioNTech, Janssen,
and Novavax candidates participated in OWS through federal purchase of doses only. Three
manufacturers have received Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) from the Food and Drug
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Administration for their vaccine candidates: Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson.
Because OWS has purchased these vaccines, all doses are federally owned and will be provided at no cost
to the American public.
Table 1. Vaccine Candidates Supported by BARDA and Other Federal Agencies
Current Phase
(Preliminary
Effectiveness –
U.S.
Strain)Error!
Doses
Reference
Contract
per
source not
Company
Type
Value
Specifications
Person
found.
Storage
Pfizer/BioNTech
mRNAb
$5.97B
300 mil ion doses
2
Phase II/III (95%)
Ultra cold storage (-70⁰ C)
EUA Issued
Moderna
mRNA
$4.94B
300 mil ion doses
2
Phase III (94.5%)
Cold storage (6 mos, -20⁰ C)
$954M
Development
EUA Issued
Refrigerator (30 days, -2⁰ to -8⁰ C)
AstraZeneca/
Viral
$1.2B
300 mil ion doses
2
Phase II/III (70%)
Refrigerator (-2⁰ to -8⁰ C)
Oxford Univ.
Vectorc
Johnson & Johnson Viral
$1B
100 mil ion doses
1
Phase III (72%)
Refrigerator (3 mos, -2⁰ to -8⁰ C)
(Janssen
Vector
$456M
Development
EUA Issued
Pharmaceuticals)
Novavax
Proteind
$1.6B
100 mil ion doses
2
Phase III (95.6%)
Refrigerator (-2⁰ to -8⁰ C)
Sanofi/GSK
Protein
$2.04B
100 mil ion doses
2
Phase I/II
Refrigerator (-2⁰ to -8⁰ C)
$30.8M
Development
Merck/IAVIe
Viral
$38M
Developmentf
1
DISCONTINUED N/A
Vector
Sources: https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/app/barda/coronavirus/COVID19.aspx?filter=vaccine;
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Operation-Warp-Speed/.
Note: Current as of March 1, 2021.
a. This data reflect vaccine effectiveness against only the predominant strain of COVID-19 in the United States.
Vaccines have different efficacies against the UK and South Africa variants respectively, and vaccine makers are
considering creating booster shots to improve immunity to these strains.
b. Messenger RNA (mRNA) vaccines contain harmless virus genetic material that codes for a protein that is found on
the virus’s surface. The body recognizes this protein as foreign and initiates an immune response.
c. Viral vector vaccines contain a weakened version of the live virus that has most of the harmful parts of the COVID-19
genetic code removed.
d. Protein subunit vaccines contain harmless pieces of the COVID-19 virus (protein), which the body recognizes as
foreign and mounts an immune response against.
e. The Merck/IAVI vaccine candidate was discontinued due to lack of demonstrated efficacy. It was supported by
BARDA, not by OWS.
f.
Only Moderna, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Sanofi/GSK, and Merck/IAVI received funding from the federal government
to support vaccine development. The remaining candidates participated in federal purchase of vaccine doses only.
The Government Accountability Office has noted difficulties in assessing supply chain transparency for
vaccines and ancillary supplies. Shortages of ancillary supplies in particular have been a concern before
and throughout the vaccination campaign.
Although the Biden Administration has announced efforts to increase the production and acquisition of
ancillary supplies—including entering into new contracts and invoking the Defense Production Act—

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monitoring and addressing potential supply issues may still be of interest to Congress. Table 2 provides
OWS contract awards for ancillary vaccination supplies.
Table 2. Federal Government Contracts for Ancillary COVID-19 Vaccine Supplies
Needles, Syringes, Glass Vials, and Vial Alternatives
Company
Contract Value
Specifications
ApiJect Systems America
$138 mil ion
100 mil ion prefil ed syringes by the end of 2020
Expansion of manufacturing capacity to produce 500
mil ion prefil ed syringes in 2021
Corning Pharmaceutical
$204 mil ion
Expansion of manufacturing capacity to produce an
Technologies
additional 164 mil ion Valor Glass vials per year if
needed
SiO2 Materials Science
$143 mil ion
Expansion of manufacturing capacity to produce 120
mil ion glass-coated plastic containers per year if
needed
Becton, Dickinson and Co.
$42.3 mil ion
Expansion of manufacturing capacity to produce
needles and syringes
Smiths Medical, Inc.
$20.6 mil ion
Expansion of manufacturing capacity to produce
needles and syringes
Goldbelt Security, LLC
$125 mil ion
530 mil ion needles and syringes
Retractable Technologies, Inc.
$53.6 mil ion
Expansion of manufacturing capacity to produce safety
needles and syringes
Retractable Technologies, Inc.
$93.8 mil ion
320 mil ion needles and syringes
Marathon Medical Corp.
$27.5 mil ion
Duopross Meditech Corporation
$48 mil ion
134 mil ion safety syringes by the end of 2020
500 mil ion safety syringes over a 12-month period
Cardinal Health Inc.
$15 mil ion
(August 2020–August 2021)
Gold Coast Medical Supply, LP
$14 mil ion
HTL STREFA Inc.
$12 mil ion
Quality Impact, Inc.
$9 mil ion
Medline Industries, Inc.
$6 mil ion
Sources: https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/barda/influenza-and-emerging-infectious-diseases/coronavirus/
pharmaceutical-manufacturing-in-america/?filter=all; https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Operation-
Warp-Speed/
Notes: Current as of March 1, 2021.

Author Information

Simi V. Siddalingaiah

Analyst in Health Economics

Congressional Research Service
4

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IN11560 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED