Sudan’s Removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List

Sudan’s Removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List

INSIGHTi

Sudan’s Removal from the State Sponsors of
Terrorism List
November 9, 2020
Twenty-seven years after the Clinton Administration designated the government of Sudan a state sponsor
of international terrorism (SST), the White House on October 23 announced President Trump’s intent to
rescind the designation, describing it as a “momentous step forward” in the bilateral relationship and “a
pivotal turning point for Sudan.” This followed a statement from the President on Twitter, referencing an
agreement by Sudan’s transitional government to pay compensation to victims of terrorist attacks in
which the previous government was implicated.
The decision comes amidst a political transition following the April 2019 military ouster of Sudan’s long-
ruling leader, Omar al Bashir, who took power in a 1989 coup. Removal from the SST list has been a top
priority for Sudan’s new prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, who has described Bashir’s Islamist regime as
“one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in human history” in a 2019 U.N. address. “The Sudanese
people have never sponsored, nor were supportive of terrorism,” he asserted, “those were the acts of the
former regime which has been continuously resisted by the Sudanese people until its final ouster,”
referencing nationwide protests that spurred Bashir’s overthrow. Hamdok’s government has sought to end
Sudan’s international isolation and internal conflicts, pursing peace with insurgents and reforms to
improve human rights and religious freedom. The transition is fragile; the government, formed out of a
power-sharing arrangement between a disparate civilian coalition and security chiefs, faces mounting
public frustration over an economic crisis inherited from the former regime. A new peace deal with
insurgents may change the country’s political dynamics, but whether it will empower civilians or security
actors is subject to debate.
Sanctions and Sudan’s Economy
Four main categories of U.S. sanctions result from an SST designation: restrictions on U.S. foreign aid, a
ban on U.S. defense exports and sales, controls over U.S. exports of dual-use items, and other restrictions,
including a prohibition on U.S. support in the international financial institutions. Some other sanctions,
imposed through executive and congressional action, were lifted in 2017.
The Sudanese government views the removal of sanctions as critical to addressing the country’s economic
crisis and worsening humanitarian situation. Once East Africa’s largest economy, Sudan saw its GDP fall
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from over $66 billion in 2011—when South Sudan seceded—to $33 billion in 2019. Per capita income
has plunged to under $800. COVID-19 has exacerbated these crises: Sudan’s GDP is expected to shrink
8.4% in 2020, and over 9.6 million Sudanese are severely food-insecure. Sudan struggles with a heavy
external debt burden, limited foreign reserves, persistent deficits, and soaring inflation. SST rescission
could encourage U.S. and foreign banks to restore correspondent banking relations in Sudan, which could
facilitate remittance, trade, and investment flows. It could also enable U.S. support for Sudan in IMF and
World Bank decisions, including on Sudan’s bid for multilateral debt relief. Sudan has other debt relief
hurdles to clear, including gaining congressional approval to write off Sudan’s $3 billion debt to the
United States, which Treasury officials estimate will cost roughly $300 million. Some experts suggest that
making debt arrears clearance a real possibility would better position Sudan’s government to make the
politically difficult reforms prescribed by the IMF.
The Delisting Process
The White House transmitted a certification of its intent to rescind the SST designation to Congress on
October 26, stating that Sudan had met the statutory requirements—namely that its government had not
provided support for acts of international terrorism during the preceding six months and had provided
assurances that it would not support them in the future. The State Department previously reported the
government’s assertion that Sudan no longer supported terrorist groups; the Obama Administration
described Sudan as a generally cooperative counterterrorism partner.
Congress has 45 days to review the decision before rescission takes effect, and could block delisting with
a joint resolution of disapproval under Section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).
For more detail, see CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative
Parameters: In Brief.
Terrorism Claims and “Legal Peace”
Sudan has deposited $335 million into escrow to provide compensation for victims of Al Qaeda’s 1998
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and 2000 USS Cole attack, and for the killing of
USAID employee John Granville in Khartoum. (Sudan paid over $72 million in early 2020 to settle with
the USS Cole families.) Payments are based on negotiations between Sudan and the State Department, in
consultation with victims’ counsel, which resulted in private settlements. The $335 million is to be
distributed to the victims after Congress enacts “legal peace” legislation to restore Sudan's immunity
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). If Congress does not enact such legislation within
one year of the deposit, Sudan could reclaim the funds. Sudan’s removal from the SST list is not
contingent on passage of legal peace legislation (a CRS memorandum on Sudan's proposed settlement
and its implications for U.S.-Sudan relations is available to congressional clients upon request from the
author).
Compensation for victims of the embassy bombings has been contentious, and concerns raised by some
victims of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks have also complicated discussions on legal peace. The
settlement deal does not address 9/11 claims—U.S. courts have yet to find Sudan liable for 9/11, though
cases remain in litigation. If legal peace legislation passes, cases against Sudan could still be pursued
under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA; P.L. 114-222; see particularly, Section 3 (28
U.S.C. 1605B)). Without legal peace, Sudan would remain liable for outstanding enforceable judgements
related to the embassy bombings.

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Relations with Israel
Following the October 23 announcement on delisting, the White House released details of a call
between President Trump, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, and Sudan’s leaders,
fueling speculation that the Administration had pressed Sudan to normalize relations with Israel
in exchange for delisting. Hamdok’s military counterpart, General Abdel-Fattah Burhan, had
begun talks with Israel in early 2020, but Prime Minister Hamdok had objected to linking of the
Israel issue—controversial among Sudanese—with delisting. Reports suggest Administration
officials offered inducements to secure Khartoum’s commitment on an Israel deal. USAID has
since announced a planned $20 million wheat purchase, part of a broader commitment with
Israel and the United Arab Emirates to Sudan. Some of the reported commitments may require
congressional authorization or appropriations.

Author Information

Lauren Ploch Blanchard

Specialist in African Affairs

Disclaimer
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