Intra-Afghan Talks Commence in Doha, Qatar

Intra-Afghan Talks Commence in Doha, Qatar

INSIGHTi

Intra-Afghan Talks Commence in Doha, Qatar
September 16, 2020
On September 12, 2020, Afghan government and Taliban representatives officially met to begin inaugural
direct peace negotiations in Doha, Qatar, a significant moment with potentially dramatic implications for
the course of the Afghan conflict. The United States, whose military involvement in Afghanistan is
approaching its twentieth year, helped facilitate the talks while withdrawing U.S. military forces from the
country. As negotiators begin their work, U.S. officials, including Members of Congress, are expected to
closely follow the negotiations, given the impact that a settlement could have on U.S. interests such as
human rights and counterterrorism.
Background
After eighteen months of negotiations, the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement on February
29, 2020, laying out a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. and international troops in return for
counterterrorism assurances by the Taliban. The pact also outlined plans for talks between the Taliban and
the Afghan government (which was not a party to the agreement) by March 2020. Intra-Afghan talks
remained unscheduled for months amid complications that included gridlock in Kabul due to the disputed
September 2019 presidential election, delays to a prisoner exchange between Taliban and the Afghan
government, and ongoing violence. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, Ghani’s
electoral opponent and former partner in a unity government, agreed in May 2020 to end the impasse and
appoint Abdullah as chairman of the newly created High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR) to
oversee talks with the Taliban. The prisoner exchange was completed in early September 2020.
Participants
The Afghan government’s 21-member negotiating team, led by former Afghan intelligence agency head
and Ghani ally Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, includes four women and represents Afghanistan’s major
ethnic groups. The Abdullah-chaired HCNR is to oversee the team’s work, though the full membership of
that body is unclear in light of Abdullah’s rejection of Ghani’s August 2020 appointment of HCNR
members.
The Taliban negotiating team also comprises 21 members (all men), though the Taliban have not made the
list public. On September 5, the Taliban announced as lead negotiator Mawlawi Abdul Hakim Haqqani, a
senior hard-line cleric who is head of the Taliban’s judiciary body and reportedly close to Taliban leader
Hibatullah Akhundzada. Some analysts have speculated that the move represents an attempt by Taliban
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11502
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

link to page 2
Congressional Research Service
2
senior leadership (likely based in Pakistan) to exert more control over negotiations, which are ostensibly
overseen by Doha-based Taliban deputy political head Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (who met with
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo in Doha, Figure 1), whom analysts view as more moderate.
U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad negotiated the February
2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement and said on September 11 that the United States will “be engaging each
side,” but that it would not be a direct participant in talks, with its role limited to aiding the negotiations if
asked.
Figure 1. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Taliban Deputy Political Leader Mullah
Baradar in Doha, Qatar, September 12, 2020

Source: Secretary of State Pompeo (@SecPompeo), Twitter, September 12, 2020. Available at
https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/1304766751251595264.
Major Negotiating Issues
Experts and officials expect the talks to last months and that at least two key substantive issues will be
dominant—reducing violence and future governance.
Reducing Violence
The U.S.-Taliban agreement commits the Taliban to refrain from attacking U.S. and international forces–a
commitment the Taliban has reportedly observed. It does not, however, address Taliban operations against
Afghan government forces, which have continued and even increased in some areas in 2020, with
hundreds killed on both sides. The Afghan Ministry of Defense reported Taliban attacks in 18 of the
country’s 34 provinces on September 12 as talks began in Doha.
Violence has directly affected those involved in talks: female negotiator Fawzia Koofi and Vice President
and HCNR member Amrullah Saleh were injured in separate assassination attempts in August and

Congressional Research Service
3
September 2020, respectively. The Taliban denied responsibility for both attacks, which Khalilzad blamed
on “spoilers” seeking to undermine talks.
The Afghan government has prioritized a permanent ceasefire, which the Taliban have rejected despite
two limited truces in recent years. Many observers doubt the Taliban would agree to abandon violence,
arguably their main source of leverage, before a settlement, though targeted reductions in violence could
pave the way for a more comprehensive ceasefire.
Afghan Governance
Major differences remain in the sides’ visions for the future of Afghanistan, including both the structure of
the Afghan state and what rights the state recognizes for Afghan citizens, especially women.
The Taliban, whose main priority has been the withdrawal of foreign forces, have not described their
specific proposals on these issues in detail. In his opening remarks, Mullah Baradar said, “We seek an
Afghanistan that is independent, sovereign, united, developed and free — an Afghanistan with an Islamic
system in which all people of the nation can participate without discrimination.” Some analysts posit that
the Taliban are likely to push for clerical oversight of executive and legislative decision-making.
Afghan leaders express a determination to preserve Afghanistan’s constitution, which establishes Islam as
the state religion, and its democratic institutions. In an interview in Doha, HCNR Chairman Abdullah
said, “For me, one person, one vote — I don’t call anything a red line — but that’s critical . . . and
compromises on these things will not get us to peace.” The Afghan government has rejected speculation
about a possible power-sharing arrangement.
U.S. Policy
Speaking at the opening of talks, Secretary of State Pompeo encouraged Afghans to preserve democratic
gains while highlighting the limits of U.S. influence, saying, “the choice of your political system is of
course yours to make. … the United States doesn’t seek to impose its system on others.” He added that
the U.S. government believes “firmly that protecting the rights of all Afghans is indeed the best way for
you to break the cycle of violence.”
The United States is currently withdrawing forces from Afghanistan in line with its February 2020
agreement with the Taliban. Some Members of Congress and others question the credibility of the
Taliban’s counterterrorism assurances on which the U.S. withdrawal is conditioned. Administration
officials reject claims that withdrawal decisions are motivated by domestic political concerns and that
U.S. military withdrawal reduces the Taliban’s incentives to remain in, and conclude, negotiations. It is
unclear whether the United States would halt or reverse that withdrawal if intra-Afghan talks collapse.
Some Members of Congress have proposed limiting funding for U.S. military withdrawals unless the
Administration certifies that they will not compromise U.S. national security or Afghan social and
political gains made since 2001.
Beyond military forces, the main U.S. leverage in Afghanistan arguably is financial assistance
(which has totaled about $137 billion since 2001). Secretary Pompeo cautioned intra-Afghan
negotiators that their “choices and conduct will affect both the size and scope of United States
future assistance.” As Congress considers authorizing and appropriating that assistance, it could
alter the amounts, types, and conditions set for U.S. aid based on the course and outcome of
intra-Afghan negotiations.

Congressional Research Service
4
Author Information

Clayton Thomas

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

IN11502 · VERSION 1 · NEW