Israel-UAE Normalization and Suspension of West Bank Annexation

Israel-UAE Normalization and Suspension of West Bank Annexation

INSIGHTi

Israel-UAE Normalization and Suspension of
West Bank Annexation
August 19, 2020
President Trump issued a joint statement on August 13, 2020, with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahu and United Arab Emirates (UAE) Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayid, announcing that Israel
and the UAE have agreed to fully normalize their relations, and that Israel is suspending plans to annex
parts of the West Bank. In the coming weeks, Israeli and UAE officials are expected to begin talks aimed
at reaching bilateral agreement on Coronavirus Disease 2019 research, direct airline flights, establishing
reciprocal embassies, and other matters. These agreements could significantly boost both countries’ trade
and investment in high-tech and other sectors, and have implications for the region and U.S. policy.
Background
Israel-UAE normalization, if implemented, would officially acknowledge contacts that have existed for
years. Egypt and Jordan had been the only Arab states with formal diplomatic relations with Israel. Israel
established informal ties with a number of Arab states, including the UAE, in the 1990s. Discreet Israel-
UAE links on intelligence, security, and trade have become closer and more public in the past decade as
Israel has worked with various Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states aligned with the United States,
including Saudi Arabia, in efforts to counter Iran’s regional influence and military capabilities.
A June 2020 article addressed to the Israeli people from the UAE’s ambassador to the United States
reportedly sparked the talks leading to the U.S.-Israel-UAE joint statement. The article implied that closer
ties between Israel and Arab states would be possible if Israel refrained from annexing West Bank areas.
Other Arab states—notably Bahrain, Oman, and Sudan—may follow the UAE’s lead. Saudi Arabia’s
leadership role in the Arab and Muslim world and complicated domestic politics may lead it to approach
normalization more cautiously.
Israeli-Palestinian Issues
Some view the Israel-UAE deal as vindicating Prime Minister Netanyahu’s long-standing claim that he
could normalize Israel’s relations with Arab countries before reaching a peace agreement with the
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Palestinians. It also appears to signal a change to Arab states’ previous insistence—in the 2002 Arab
Peace Initiative—that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.
It is unclear how long plans for West Bank annexation—endorsed in principle by President Trump’s
January 2020 Vision for Peace—might be postponed. Netanyahu has sought to reassure Israeli pro-
annexation constituencies that declaring Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank remains on his agenda
pending U.S. approval. White House Senior Adviser Jared Kushner said that “we do not plan to give our
consent for some time.” Even before the deal, Israeli annexation may not have been likely given
international opposition and other domestic priorities.
Palestinian leaders have denounced the deal and withdrew their ambassador from the UAE, arguing that
the UAE legitimized Israel’s annexation threats by bargaining over them, and thus acquiesced to a West
Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto annexation.” UAE officials contend that by
significantly delaying Israeli declarations of sovereignty over West Bank areas, they have preserved
prospects for future negotiations toward a Palestinian state. Regional and international reactions to the
deal have been mixed, with some criticism from civil society groups opposed to normalization in GCC
states.
UAE Considerations
UAE leaders faced several considerations in deciding to commit to normalizing relations with Israel.
They may have judged the domestic political risks of normalization to be relatively low given the lack of
discernible unrest amid the decade-long evolution of discreet Israel-UAE ties. In 2015, the UAE public
did not obstruct Israel’s opening of an office in Abu Dhabi to facilitate Israel’s participation in the
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). Israeli ministers, including the Foreign Minister, and
security officials have reportedly since exchanged multiple visits with their UAE counterparts, and
Israelis have often visited the UAE to attend professional conferences. The UAE and Israel had no
territorial disputes to resolve and—unlike Egypt and Jordan—Emirati forces had not participated in any
war against Israel.
The UAE decision to normalize relations with Israel likely reflects a perception that Iran represents a
significant threat to both countries and to the region. Iran’s allies and proxies in Syria, Lebanon, and the
Gaza Strip directly threaten Israeli territory, and Iran’s attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf in 2019,
including some UAE-owned tankers, led the UAE to join a U.S.-led naval coalition that was formed to
deter such attacks. Israel has played a role in that operation, and a normalization of relations with the
UAE could lead Israel to expand that role. Iran’s President Rouhani said that, in agreeing to the
normalization, “the UAE has turned itself into a legitimate target for the resistance.”
By committing to normalizing relations with Israel, the UAE leadership is arguably hoping to extract
benefits from the U.S. Administration, no matter the outcome of the upcoming U.S. election, as well as
advantages in the Gulf and broader region. While some reports have speculated about possible sales of F-
35 aircraft and armed drones to the UAE proceeding under U.S. laws protecting Israel’s qualitative
military edge, Netanyahu has responded that Israel remains opposed to sales to the UAE—including of F-
35s—that could tip the military balance. The UAE also might expect that normalization with Israel will
reduce some congressional and other criticism of its actions in the conflict in Yemen and efforts with
other GCC states to isolate neighboring Qatar.
Congressional Considerations
Some Members of Congress have voiced support for the Israel-UAE deal. Congress could consider action
on the deal or issues related to it, including support or opposition for the following:

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 Israeli-Arab normalization. For example, S. 4482 would require State Department
reporting about anti-normalization measures in Arab states.
 U.S. arms sales to Arab states that normalize relations with Israel.
Possible Israeli annexation. For example, H.R. 8050 seeks to prohibit U.S. recognition of and funding
related to potential Israeli sovereignty claims in the West Bank.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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