Lebanon: Renewed Instability Following August Blast

Lebanon: Renewed Instability Following August Blast

INSIGHTi

Lebanon: Renewed Instability Following
August Blast
August 17, 2020
On August 10, Lebanese Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his cabinet resigned in the wake of a massive
explosion at the port of Beirut that killed at least 178 people and injured thousands. The blast displaced an
estimated 300,000 people, and Lebanese President Michel Aoun estimated the damage at the port to be
roughly $15 billion. The explosion triggered widespread outrage among citizens, and has generated
renewed protests—at times violent—against Lebanon’s political leaders. Diab’s resignation leaves
Lebanon’s government in caretaker status with reduced authorities. Observers speculate that the country
could become mired in months of government formation at a time of economic and humanitarian crisis,
leaving it vulnerable to paralysis and greater social unrest. Policymakers may review U.S. assistance to
Lebanon in the wake of growing humanitarian and economic needs, and in the context of potential shifts
in the country’s political leadership.
Renewed Protest Movement
The August 4 blast renewed the momentum of the protest movement that began in October 2019 and led
to the resignation that month of Saad Hariri, the previous prime minister. Following the explosion,
thousands of protesters returned to the streets, expressing rage with the country’s political leadership,
which reportedly knew of the risks posed by ammonium nitrate stored at the port but took no action. Over
700 civilians were wounded in clashes with security forces, according to the Lebanese Red Cross, and
some reports have accused security forces of using excessive force. Protesters called for international aid
to be channeled directly to local organizations, bypassing Lebanese state institutions that Lebanese
describe as corrupt. On August 13, Lebanon’s parliament voted to declare a state of emergency, granting
the Lebanese Armed Forces and other security services enhanced powers to restore and maintain order.
Some have expressed concern that the release of a verdict by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on August
18 for the 2005 assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri could escalate protests.
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Government Formation: Next Steps
Government formation in Lebanon is shaped by the Taif Accords, which ended Lebanon’s 15-year civil
war, and is designed to forge consensus among Lebanon’s three largest sectarian communities. Lebanon’s
president (must be a Christian) must nominate a prime minister (must be a Sunni Muslim), following
binding consultations with the speaker of parliament (must be a Shi’a Muslim) and after gaining support
for the nomination from a majority of members of parliament. Following nomination, the prime minister-
designate must consult with parliamentary blocs to form a government, taking into account sectarian
quotas. Some reports suggest that the United States may back Lebanon’s former representative to the
United Nations, Nawaf Salam, to head a new government. Hezbollah—a U.S.-designated Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) that operates in Lebanon as a militia force, a political party, and a provider
of social services—played a significant role in selecting outgoing prime minister Diab, and reportedly
supports Hariri’s return to the premiership.
Issues for Congress
U.S. economic assistance to Lebanon has sought to bolster vulnerable populations and reduce their
dependence on public services provided by groups such as Hezbollah. The United States does not provide
its economic aid and humanitarian assistance to Lebanon’s government, but rather to local implementing
partners and international organizations. U.S. security assistance has bolstered the Lebanese Armed
Forces and other elements of the Lebanese security apparatus for counterterrorism and border security
purposes.
As of August 12, the United States, through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and
Department of Defense (DOD), had provided $18 million in emergency humanitarian assistance to
Lebanon since the blast, including food aid and medical supplies. On August 7, a USAID-led Disaster
Assistance Response Team (DART) deployed to Beirut to lead and coordinate the U.S. humanitarian
response.
Food assistance. In May 2020, then-Prime Minister Diab warned of an imminent food crisis. Lebanon
imports approximately 80% of its food, and the destruction of the port of Beirut—responsible for at least
70% of the country’s import and export activities—also reportedly destroyed significant quantities of
food stocks. Recent USAID emergency programming includes emergency food assistance administered
by its Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (which includes the former Office of Food for Peace) and
implemented by the U.N. World Food Program (WFP).
Medical assistance. Six major hospitals and 20 clinics sustained partial or heavy structural damage as a
result of the blast. The United States does not provide aid to Lebanon’s Health Ministry, which U.S.
officials have described as “run by Hezbollah.” (Hezbollah held the Health Ministry in both the outgoing
Diab government and in the Hariri government that preceded it). However, USAID has funded some
U.S.-affiliated medical institutions in Lebanon; following the blast, U.S. officials announced that these
institutions would receive an additional $4 million in U.S. funding.
Security Assistance. The empowerment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as a result of the
parliament’s state of emergency declaration may increase the likelihood of confrontations between the
U.S.-supported LAF and civilian protesters. U.S. law requires that security forces comply with human
rights standards to be eligible for U.S. security assistance; how the protests are met could shape future
U.S. security assistance considerations.

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Outlook
Some reports have suggested that the Administration may be preparing new anticorruption sanctions on
Lebanese officials as part of an effort to shape Lebanon’s new government and reduce Hezbollah’s
influence (these discussions predate the August blast and subsequent government resignation). Such
sanctions would be imposed potentially under either the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability
Act (implemented by E.O. 13818) or section 7031(c) of the State/Foreign Operations annual
appropriations act. Members of Congress have expressed concern about the role of Hezbollah in
Lebanon’s government, and Congress places certification requirements on U.S. assistance funds for
Lebanon annually in an effort to prevent their misuse or the transfer of U.S. equipment to Hezbollah.
Hezbollah, which currently holds 13 seats in parliament, has been granted one to three seats in each
Lebanese cabinet since 2005. Protesters have argued that politicians across the political spectrum have
engaged in corruption, including some with whom the United States has friendly ties.

Author Information

Carla E. Humud

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

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