DARPA’s Pandemic-Related Programs

DARPA’s Pandemic-Related Programs

INSIGHTi

DARPA’s Pandemic-Related Programs
June 30, 2020
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has contributed to the development of
important military and commercial technologies, including stealth and personal electronics. DARPA’s
role and investments in defense-related research and development (R&D), including biological defense,
has potential significance for the science and technology available to address the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and any future biological threats. Advances in genome sequencing and
editing, along with the application of engineering principles and computing and information sciences to
the field of biology, have created opportunities to accelerate and expand the development of
biotechnology products and processes. Although DARPA has invested in biological research since its
establishment in 1958, in 2014 the agency created the Biological Technologies Office, which focuses
specifically on the biological sciences and biotechnology.
The Biological Technologies Office currently supports a number of programs that address pandemics.
Since the emergence of COVID-19, DARPA has shifted the efforts of many of these programs to focus
specifically on the coronavirus pandemic. According to DARPA,
There is currently a mismatch between the rapidity at which biological threats can emerge and
proliferate and the response time for developing and deploying effective medical
countermeasures.… Cognizant of the need for speed, DARPA began aggressively pursuing medical
countermeasures research more than a decade ago with a focus on developing generalizable, virus-
agnostic technologies that can address whatever threat emerges, rather than building a collection of
one-off solutions.
Examples of current DARPA investments include the Pandemic Prevention Platform (P3) program, whose
goal is to develop methods “capable of producing relevant numbers of doses against any known or
previously unknown infectious threat within 60 days of identification of such a threat.” Awardees of the
P3 program have been applying the results of their work to COVID-19. For example, a COVID-19
antibody treatment developed with support from DARPA by AbCellera Biologics, in partnership with Eli
Lilly and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Vaccine Research Center, began human clinical trials in
June 2020.
Additionally, an awardee from DARPA’s Epigenetic Characterization and Observation (ECHO) program,
Fluidigm, in collaboration with a consortium of medical schools, is developing an early detection test for
SARS-CoV-2, the novel virus that causes COVID-19.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11446
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

Congressional Research Service
2
Previous DARPA investments are also showing promise in combating COVID-19. For example, in 2013,
the Autonomous Diagnostics to Enable Prevention and Therapeutics (ADEPT) program awarded grant
funding to Moderna Therapeutics for the development of a new type of vaccine based on messenger
RNA. The company used that technology to develop its COVID-19 vaccine, currently undergoing Phase I
clinical trials in conjunction with NIH.
These DARPA programs are part of a broader biodefense effort to address threats that include naturally
occurring epidemics, as well as accidental biological exposures, biowarfare, and bioterrorism. The
nation’s biodefense enterprise is distributed, spanning multiple departments and agencies with different
missions, making preparing for and responding to a diverse and evolving set of biological threats
challenging. In 2016, Congress directed the Secretaries of Health and Human Services (HHS), Defense,
Homeland Security, and Agriculture to jointly develop a national biodefense strategy and associated
implementation plan (P.L. 114-328, Section 1086). Issued in September 2018, the National Biodefense
Strategy (with an implementation plan in Annex I) calls for the integration of biodefense R&D into
federal planning, emphasizing the development of procedures and policies for interagency coordination of
R&D efforts associated with responding to a biological incident. While the plan also calls for the
sustainment of a robust national science and technology base to support biodefense, it does not articulate
a need for interagency R&D planning and coordination. In 2015, the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on
Biodefense, now the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, highlighted military-civilian collaboration in
biological R&D as one of many issues that “deserve more congressional oversight.”
As directed by Congress in 2016, GAO reviewed the National Biodefense Strategy. In February 2020,
GAO found that the interagency governance and budgeting mechanisms established by the strategy
represented a “promising new approach.” GAO also indicated a need to “change management practices to
help bridge agency cultures and missions, such as efforts to reinforce collaborative behaviors and
enterprise-wide approaches.” Additionally, GAO recommended the development of processes and
responsibilities for joint decisionmaking.
The potential impact of DARPA-funded research in addressing the coronavirus pandemic, in addition to
future biological threats, raises a number of questions:
 How does DARPA coordinate its pandemic-related programs with other federal agencies,
such as NIH?
 Is DARPA effective at transitioning the results of its pandemic-related research to other
federal agencies and the private sector? According to GAO, there are four factors that
contribute to the successful transition of DARPA-funded research and technology:
military or commercial demand for the technology; linkage to a research area where
DARPA has had a sustained interest; active collaboration with the potential transition
partner; and achievement of clearly defined technical goals.
 How could the commercialization of the results of DARPA’s pandemic-related research
be accelerated and expanded?
As it relates to biodefense R&D—especially R&D associated with preparedness,
 What changes, if any, are needed to the National Biodefense Strategy to improve the
research, development, and commercialization of innovative biodefense technologies,
including technologies that are adaptable to a range of infectious diseases, by DARPA
and other federal agencies?
In its role as advisor to the Secretary of HHS, the National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB), stated that
R&D for technologies, platforms, and systems to develop new MCM [medical countermeasures]
against Disease X in 28 days from the recognition of the outbreak, which NBSB recommends as [a]

Congressional Research Service
3
target timeline, requires new incentives, specific goals, and advanced planning within HHS
(involving many stakeholders) to achieve effective capabilities.
The need for advanced planning, specific goals, and new incentives may need to go beyond HHS specific
efforts requiring additional interagency planning and coordination. Congress may consider establishing a
formal R&D coordination mechanism through the National Science and Technology Council similar to
those associated with nanotechnology or quantum science. However, it could be considered duplicative of
the roles of the existing Biodefense Steering Committee and Biodefense Coordination Team established
by National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-14.

Author Information

Marcy E. Gallo

Analyst in Science and Technology Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

IN11446 · VERSION 1 · NEW