Possible Withdrawal of U.S. Peacekeepers from the Sinai Peninsula

Possible Withdrawal of U.S. Peacekeepers from the Sinai Peninsula

INSIGHTi
Possible Withdrawal of U.S. Peacekeepers
from the Sinai Peninsula
May 25, 2020
Overview
U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper reportedly is considering withdrawing the roughly 450 person U.S.
military contingent from the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), an international peacekeeping
mission formed in 1981 to monitor the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula and supervise the
implementation of the historic 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Explanations for the
withdrawal proposal have centered on repositioning U.S. forces global y to better prepare for
contingencies related to China and Russia, improved Israeli-Egyptian ties, and concern for the safety of
U.S. peacekeepers. In recent years, U.S. forces in the Sinai have faced a heightened risk of terrorist
attacks by groups such as the Islamic State’s Sinai Province (SP).
Israeli officials and the leaders of American Jewish organizations have voiced concern over a possible
U.S. withdrawal, asserting that the mission remains important and that U.S. participation and leadership
in the MFO is vital for its ongoing success. On May 13, a bipartisan group of congressional committee
leaders wrote a letter to the Secretaries of Defense and State arguing against a U.S. withdrawal, stating
that a U.S. force contribution to the MFO is critical to encouraging other countries to participate.
Background
For decades, the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt has been widely hailed as a successful
example of how the United States can facilitate Middle East peace, and U.S. leadership of and
participation in the MFO has been important in maintaining confidence in the treaty and dialogue between
Israel and Egypt. When the MFO was established in a separate protocol between Israel and Egypt in
1981, then U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig sent identical letters to his Israeli and Egyptian
counterparts pledging U.S. troops and funds for the MFO’s startup costs and annual maintenance, subject
to Congressional authorization. Congress then authorized U.S. participation in the MFO in P.L. 97-132, in
which lawmakers considered “the establishment of the Multinational Force and Observers to be an
essential stage in the development of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.” The resolution also
capped the number of U.S. military personnel who could be assigned to the MFO at 1,200. In his 1982
war powers letter to Congress, President Reagan wrote that “The duration of this involvement of U.S.
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forces in the Sinai wil depend, of course, on the strengthening of mutual confidence between Egypt and
Israel. The U.S. contribution to the MFO is not limited to any specific period; how ever, each country
which contributes military forces to the MFO retains a right of withdrawal upon adequate prior
notification to the MFO Director-General. U.S. participation in future years wil , of course, be subject to
the Congressional authorization and appropriations process.”
For almost the first 20 years of the MFO’s history,
Israeli-Egyptian relations remained steady and
Figure 1. The Sinai Peninsula
gradual y matured, and the Sinai Peninsula was
stable. During the Clinton Administration, U.S.
policymakers began to openly question the necessity
of a continued U.S. military presence in the MFO.
During the George H.W. Bush Administration, then-
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld publicly questioned
the need to contribute U.S. forces to the MFO
indefinitely and announced that he would reduce the
U.S. presence in the MFO from 865 troops to 26.
Israel and Egypt objected, and the U.S. force
presence was ultimately reduced by 20% instead.
Over the last nearly 20 years of the MFO’s history,
the operating environment in the Sinai has been
quite different. Between 2001 and 2011, Egyptian
government neglect of the local population, coupled
with regional events such as the 2007 Hamas
takeover of Gaza and the 2011 Arab Spring,
gradual y radicalized some indigenous Bedouin
Arabs. These radicalized elements were then joined
by foreign fighters and Palestinian militants from
neighboring Gaza to form terrorist cel s that targeted

Egypt, Israel, and occasional y the MFO itself. In
Source: http://www.mfo.org
2012, Sinai tribesmen kidnapped MFO soldiers and besieged an MFO base.
By 2014/2015, the Islamic State affiliate Sinai Province (SP) began openly threatening MFO personnel,
cal ing them “Crusader Forces.” Near-constant SP attacks in the Sinai, including against Americans
serving in the MFO, led to discussions between the United States, Israel, and Egypt over how to increase
force protection and possibly reduce the U.S. troop presence. Israeli officials again objected to any
possible decrease of U.S. participation in the MFO. In April 2016, the Defense Department formal y
notified Israel and Egypt that it was analyzing how to rebalance and reconfigure its force posture within
the MFO by partial y replacing U.S. troops in the MFO with remote sensors and cameras. Over the next
several years, MFO personnel moved from northern to southern Sinai and instal ed unmanned camera-
fitted checkpoints to continue its monitoring mission. Between 2017 and 2018, the Defense Department
ultimately reduced the U.S. contingent in the MFO by 36%.
Current Debate
In a February 2020 House Armed Services Committee hearing, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Mark Mil ey questioned whether the MFO was stil a “valid mission for military forces.” Since
then, some observers also have questioned whether the MFO is stil relevant given that much of its
monitoring and verification activities are now being conducted remotely. Other arguments include that
strong Israeli-Egyptian military ties render the MFO “largely a vestigial entity that carries on, in spite of
the fact that the problem it was created to solve no longer exists.” Final y, after years of insurgent warfare

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in the Sinai, concern remains that MFO personnel could be targets without adequate force protection from
the Egyptian government, which is responsible for their safety.
On the other hand, some experts caution that while Israeli-Egyptian military-to-military ties are strong
now, the political situation could change rapidly; in such an occurrence, some argue, the MFO would be
vital for keeping open lines of communication open between both parties. The MFO Director General
must be a U.S. citizen and usual y plays the role of intermediary between the Israeli and Egyptian
governments. Some Israeli commentators have suggested that even if the MFO is less functional y
relevant from a treaty-monitoring standpoint, it is a symbol of the peace treaty, and U.S. leadership in the
MFO is emblematic of decades-long U.S. support for the treaty’s endurance.

Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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