{ "id": "IN11023", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "number": "IN11023", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 594149, "date": "2019-01-23", "retrieved": "2019-04-17T14:31:05.863273", "title": "A Possible Second U.S.-North Korea Summit: What Diplomacy Has and Hasn\u2019t Achieved", "summary": "Summary of January 2018-January 2019 Developments \nIn late January 2019, President Donald Trump said he would meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un \u201cprobably at the end of February.\u201d The summit would be the second between the two leaders, following their summit in Singapore in June 2018. As of January 22, the White House has not detailed the substance of the planned meeting. Washington and Pyongyang appeared to reach few substantive agreements ahead of the last summit, which Trump described as a \u201cgetting to know you\u201d occasion.\nIf the Trump-Kim summit occurs, it would continue the high-level diplomacy that Pyongyang has orchestrated since early 2018. Over the past year, Kim has held three summits with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, four with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and one with President Trump. \nTo date, these diplomatic efforts have produced the following results:\nNorth Korea\u2019s Nuclear and Missile Programs\nKim publicly agreed to \u201cwork toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,\u201d pledging the \u201cpermanent dismantlement\u201d of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, \u201cas the United States takes corresponding measures.\u201d He promised to dismantle North Korea\u2019s Sohae missile and satellite launch site in the presence of international inspectors. Kim also agreed to allow experts to visit the Pyunggye-ri nuclear test site, where in May North Korea collapsed testing tunnels, to verify the site is no longer functional.\nKim pledged to suspend nuclear or long-range missile tests while dialogue continues. No such tests have occurred since November 2017. \nDiplomatic and Economic Developments\nKim\u2019s international image has been boosted substantially.\nNorth Korea and China have restored close diplomatic relations. The relationship had been strained since Kim became leader in 2011. \nSeveral countries appear to be enforcing international sanctions against the DPRK less aggressively than before the rapprochement period began, possibly weakening the Trump Administration\u2019s \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d approach. China and Russia have called for an easing of sanctions.\nInter-Korean relations have blossomed. Kim agreed to visit Seoul, potentially the first trip to Seoul by a DPRK leader since the end of the Korean War. The two Koreas opened their first-ever permanent liaison office in North Korea, agreed to begin reconnecting road and rail links, and restarted family reunions and civil society exchanges.\nThe DPRK, ROK, and the United States agreed to build a \u201cpeace regime,\u201d which could start with a declaration formally ending the Korean War.\nMilitary Developments\nThe two Koreas agreed to several military confidence-building measures, including creating a no-fly zone along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Many of the military changes appear to have been made without the full support of U.S. military commanders.\nTrump unilaterally suspended major annual U.S.-South Korea military exercises following the Singapore summit, and expressed his preference to withdraw U.S. troops in the future. Subsequently, Congress inserted into defense authorization legislation (P.L. 115-232) a provision imposing conditions on the president\u2019s ability to reduce U.S. troops in South Korea. \nOther Developments\nNorth Korea released three American detainees.\nThe United States and DPRK opened talks on restarting efforts to recover the remains of U.S. troops unaccounted for during the Korean War. North Korea repatriated the remains of possible U.S. service members. \nQuestions\nSeveral questions remain unanswered.\nHow significant are Kim\u2019s nuclear and missile pledges? In 2018, Trump tweeted that \u201cthere is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea,\u201d and Moon said that Kim\u2019s pledges, if fulfilled, would halt advances in its nuclear and missile programs. However, many U.S. and ROK experts are skeptical because North Korea has not agreed to disclose its nuclear stocks and facilities, including those not at Yongbyon, or to accept international verification of denuclearization. North Korea and the United States also have not publicly agreed on the meaning of \u201cdenuclearization\u201d or the phrase \u201cdenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.\u201d North Korea \u201ccontinue[s] to produce fissile material,\u201d Secretary of State Mike Pompeo testified in July, shortly after U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly gathered evidence of DPRK efforts to conceal parts of its nuclear programs. Pyongyang also reportedly has continued working on more advanced long-range missiles.\nWhat \u201ccorresponding measures\u201d does Pyongyang expect Washington to take if it dismantles Yongbyon? Moon has stated that concessions by the United States and DPRK should be made in a \u201cbalanced manner,\u201d and that the United States should \u201cput an end to hostile relations\u201d and \u201cprovide security assurances to the North,\u201d as Trump promised in Singapore. However, disagreements over which side moves first and on what measures created a stalemate after the Singapore summit. In his annual New Year\u2019s speech, Kim said that U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises and U.S. military equipment \u201cshould no longer be permitted\u201d on the Korean Peninsula. \nDo the inter-Korean military agreements limit the U.S.-ROK alliance\u2019s capabilities? Some defense analysts claim the dramatic expansion of existing no-fly zones and maritime buffer zones could curtail the alliance\u2019s ability to surveil on North Korean military activities. \nWould a peace declaration weaken arguments for keeping U.S. troops in the ROK? Moon said that he and Kim sought to issue a \u201cpolitical statement\u201d declaring an end to the Korean War and launch negotiations for a peace treaty, which would be signed \u201cwhen the North achieves complete denuclearization\u201d and when U.S.-DPRK relations are normalized. Moon said the initial declaration would \u201cin no way affect the status\u201d of U.S. forces in South Korea, which \u201cdepends entirely on a decision made between South Korea and the United States.\u201d Nevertheless, some analysts worry that that issuing a preliminary peace declaration is premature before North Korea takes further steps to reduce the threat it poses, and that such a document could undermine the rationale for the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea. The United States and South Korea also have failed to reach a new host nation support agreement, under which Seoul helps defray the costs of U.S. troops in South Korea, to replace a deal that expired at the end of 2018. Washington reportedly has demanded Seoul increase its contribution by at least 50%.\nShould negotiations include North Korea\u2019s other objectionable practices and programs, like the DPRK\u2019s human rights record, cyberattacks, chemical and biological weapons, and/or conventional forces?", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN11023", "sha1": "10ffc8ab2db587245c3959169cf4839a1cde0482", "filename": "files/20190123_IN11023_10ffc8ab2db587245c3959169cf4839a1cde0482.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN11023", "sha1": "0aa8ffd26751c74e984d540e7283e486de8d0ae4", "filename": "files/20190123_IN11023_0aa8ffd26751c74e984d540e7283e486de8d0ae4.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "CRS Insights" ] }