{ "id": "IN10987", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "number": "IN10987", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 587002, "date": "2018-10-25", "retrieved": "2018-10-31T14:19:11.249514", "title": "North Korea Diplomacy: October 2018 Status Report ", "summary": "Summary of Developments During 2018\nSince North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in early 2018 dropped the belligerent posture that Pyongyang had displayed the past several years and embarked on a \u201ccharm offensive,\u201d he has held three summits with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, three with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and one with President Donald Trump, in Singapore in June 2018. The United States and North Korea are considering a second Trump-Kim summit in the coming months. \nTo date, these summits and other events have produced the following results:\nNorth Korea\u2019s Nuclear and Missile Programs\nKim publicly agreed to \u201cwork toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.\u201d To that end, he has agreed to the \u201cpermanent dismantlement\u201d of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, \u201cas the United States takes corresponding measures,\u201d and pledged to dismantle North Korea\u2019s Sohae missile and satellite launch site in the presence of international inspectors. Kim also agreed to allow experts to visit the Pyunggye-ri nuclear test site, where in May North Korea collapsed testing tunnels, to verify the site is no longer functional.\nNorth Korea pledged not to conduct nuclear or long-range missile tests while dialogue continues. No such tests have occurred since November 2017. \nDiplomatic and Economic Developments\nKim\u2019s international image has been boosted substantially.\nNorth Korea and China have reset their relationship, which had been strained since Kim became leader in 2011. \nSeveral countries appear to be enforcing international sanctions against the DPRK less aggressively than before the rapprochement period began. China, Russia, and South Korea have called for an easing of sanctions. \nInter-Korean relations have blossomed. Kim agreed to visit Seoul by the end of 2018 \u201cif possible,\u201d potentially the first trip to Seoul by a DPRK leader since the end of the Korean War. The two Koreas opened their first-ever permanent liaison office, agreed to begin reconnecting road and rail links, and restarted family reunions and civil society and sports exchanges.\nThe DPRK, ROK, and the United States agreed to build a \u201cpeace regime,\u201d the first step of which appears to be a declaration formally ending the Korean War.\nMilitary Developments\nThe two Koreas agreed to a number of military confidence-building measures, including creating a no-fly zone along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and withdrawing guard posts within the DMZ. Many of these changes appear to have been made without the full support of U.S. military commanders.\nTrump suspended major annual U.S.-South Korea military exercises, which he called \u201cprovocative,\u201d during nuclear negotiations. \nHumanitarian Developments\nNorth Korea released three U.S. detainees.\nThe U.S. and DPRK opened talks on restarting efforts to recover the remains of U.S. troops unaccounted for during the Korean War. North Korea repatriated the remains of possible U.S. servicemembers. \nThe Trump Administration renewed restrictions on using U.S. passports to travel to North Korea, and reportedly stopped granting special permission to groups seeking to administer humanitarian assistance programs in North Korea.\nQuestions\nSeveral questions remain unanswered.\nHow significant are Kim\u2019s nuclear and missile pledges? Trump has tweeted that \u201cthere is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea,\u201d and Moon has said that if North Korea follows through on Kim\u2019s existing promises, it essentially will be unable to advance its nuclear and missile programs. However, many U.S. and ROK experts are skeptical because North Korea has yet to disclose the composition or size of its nuclear material or warhead stocks and facilities, including those not at Yongbyon. North Korea and the United States also have not publicly agreed on what constitutes \u201cdenuclearization\u201d or the meaning of the phrase \u201cdenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.\u201d Nor have they agreed on a timeline or verification measures for dismantlement. North Korea \u201ccontinue[s] to produce fissile material,\u201d Secretary of State Mike Pompeo testified in July, shortly after U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly gathered evidence of DPRK efforts to conceal parts of its nuclear programs. Pyongyang also reportedly has continued working on more advanced long-range missiles.\nWhat are the \u201ccorresponding measures\u201d the United States must take for North Korea to dismantle Yongbyon? Moon has stated that concessions by the United States and DPRK should be made in a \u201cbalanced manner,\u201d and that the United States should \u201cput an end to hostile relations\u201d and \u201cprovide security assurances to the North,\u201d as Trump promised in Singapore. However, U.S.-DPRK talks are stymied by disagreements over which party needs to move first and on what measures. Without such an agreement, the policy logjam could continue. \nDo the inter-Korean military agreements limit the U.S.-ROK alliance\u2019s capabilities? Some defense analysts claim that the dramatic expansion of existing no-fly zones could curtail the alliance\u2019s ability to conduct surveillance on North Korean military activities north of the DMZ. Together with the removal of guard posts in the DMZ, North Korea may be better positioned to launch a surprise attack. \nWould a peace declaration weaken arguments for keeping U.S. troops in the ROK? Moon said that he and Kim wish to issue by the end of 2018 a \u201cpolitical statement\u201d declaring an end to the Korean War and launch negotiations for a peace treaty, which would be signed \u201cwhen the North achieves complete denuclearization\u201d and when U.S.-DPRK relations are normalized. It is unclear whether the declaration also would include the other two principal combatants, the United States and China. Moon said the declaration would \u201cin no way affect the status\u201d of U.S. forces in South Korea, which \u201cdepends entirely on a decision made between South Korea and the United States\u201d and that \u201cKim agreed on this issue.\u201d Nevertheless, some analysts worry that issuing a peace declaration is premature before North Korea takes further steps to reduce the threat it poses, and that such a document could undermine the rationale for the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea.\nHow much strain is being put on U.S.-South Korea relations by disagreements over the best mix and timing of concessions to offer and pressure to place on Pyongyang? The two governments\u2019 tendencies of making policy decisions without significant, or at times any, prior consultation or coordination with each other has added to the strain.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10987", "sha1": "0d26c5dba395320edb74a09b86505711f6dcb3ac", "filename": "files/20181025_IN10987_0d26c5dba395320edb74a09b86505711f6dcb3ac.html", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "CRS Insights" ] }