{ "id": "IN10553", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "IN", "number": "IN10553", "active": true, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov, EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "summary": null, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=IN10553", "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "type": "CRS Insight", "formats": [ { "sha1": "de9bbb7d262a146693a495fe0bf7c18b7fccd723", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN10553/10", "filename": "files/2022-03-29_IN10553_de9bbb7d262a146693a495fe0bf7c18b7fccd723.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2022-03-29_IN10553_de9bbb7d262a146693a495fe0bf7c18b7fccd723.html" } ], "title": "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Considering \u201cNo First Use\u201d", "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "retrieved": "2022-05-07T04:04:29.063320", "date": "2022-03-29", "typeId": "IN", "id": "IN10553_10_2022-03-29", "active": true }, { "summary": null, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=IN10553", "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "type": "CRS Insight", "formats": [ { "sha1": "1a26183ed5298e18075d6ddfc5418b955909c82f", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN10553/5", "filename": "files/2021-10-13_IN10553_1a26183ed5298e18075d6ddfc5418b955909c82f.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2021-10-13_IN10553_1a26183ed5298e18075d6ddfc5418b955909c82f.html" } ], "title": "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Considering \u201cNo First Use\u201d", "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "retrieved": "2022-05-07T04:04:29.061799", "date": "2021-10-13", "typeId": "IN", "id": "IN10553_5_2021-10-13", "active": true }, { "summary": null, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=IN10553", "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "type": "CRS Insight", "formats": [ { "sha1": "eadf767ae3917f9197fee8d7b69896a2b7cf1863", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN10553/4", "filename": "files/2021-04-16_IN10553_eadf767ae3917f9197fee8d7b69896a2b7cf1863.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2021-04-16_IN10553_eadf767ae3917f9197fee8d7b69896a2b7cf1863.html" } ], "title": "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Considering \u201cNo First Use\u201d", "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "retrieved": "2022-05-07T04:04:29.060983", "date": "2021-04-16", "typeId": "IN", "id": "IN10553_4_2021-04-16", "active": true }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 592477, "date": "2019-03-01", "retrieved": "2019-12-20T19:51:21.198673", "title": "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Considering \u201cNo First Use\u201d", "summary": "On January 30, 2019, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Adam Smith introduced legislation (S. 272/H.R. 921) that declared, \u201cIt is the policy of the United States to not use nuclear weapons first.\u201d Other Members of Congress are divided on this issue. Senator Dianne Feinstein has argued that the only moral use for U.S. nuclear weapons is as a deterrent to their use. Senator Deb Fischer, on the other hand, has said that the proposal \u201cbetrays a na\u00efve and disturbed world view.\u201d\nA \u201cno first use\u201d policy would represent a change from current policy, where the United States has pledged to refrain from using nuclear weapons against most non-nuclear weapon states, but has neither ruled out their first use in all cases nor specified the circumstances under which it would use them. This policy of \u201ccalculated ambiguity\u201d addressed U.S. concerns during the Cold War, when the United States and NATO faced numerically superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe. At the time, the United States not only developed plans to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield to disrupt or defeat attacking tanks and troops, but it also hoped that the risk of a nuclear response would deter the Soviet Union from initiating a conventional attack. This is not because the United States believed it could defeat the Soviet Union in a nuclear war, but because it hoped the Soviet Union would know that the use of these weapons would likely escalate to all-out nuclear war, with both sides suffering massive destruction. \nSince the end of the Cold War, the United States has modified its declaratory policy to reduce the apparent role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security, but it still has not declared that it would not use them first. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the Obama Administration stated that the United States \u201cwould only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances\u201d and would not threaten or use nuclear weapons, under any circumstances, \u201cagainst non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.\u201d But the Administration was not prepared to state that the \u201csole purpose\u201d of U.S. nuclear weapons was to deter nuclear attack because it could envision \u201ca narrow range of contingencies\u201d where nuclear weapons might play a role in deterring conventional, chemical, or biological attacks. \nThe Trump Administration, in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, also rejected the idea that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack, and, therefore, also did not adopt a \u201cno first use\u201d policy. It noted that \u201cthe United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners\u201d but stated that nuclear weapons contribute to \u201cdeterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assurance of allies and partners; achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails; and the capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.\u201d\n\u201cNo First Use\u201d or Not?\nAlthough the United States does not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons, the absence of a \u201cno first use\u201d pledge is less about the perceived need to employ these weapons first in a conflict than it is about the view that the threat of nuclear escalation continues to serve as a deterrent to large-scale conventional war or the use of chemical and biological weapons. Supporters of the current policy argue that removing the threat of nuclear escalation could embolden countries like North Korea, China, or Russia, who might believe that they could overwhelm U.S. allies in their regions and take advantage of local or regional conventional advantages before the United States or its allies could respond. In such a scenario, some argue, the \u201cno first use\u201d pledge would not only undermine deterrence, but could also increase the risk that a conventional war could escalate and involve nuclear weapons use. Moreover, because the United States has pledged to use all means necessary, including nuclear weapons, to defend allies in Europe and Asia, this change in U.S. declaratory policy could undermine allies\u2019 confidence in the U.S. commitment to their defense and possibly spur them to acquire their own nuclear weapons. As a result, in this view, a \u201cno first use\u201d policy could undermine U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals.\nSome analysts outside government dispute these conclusions. Some assert a lack of evidence that the threat of nuclear escalation can deter conventional war, while others note that U.S. nuclear first-use might spark a nuclear response and an all-out nuclear exchange. Moreover, some contend that a \u201cno first use\u201d policy would not undermine the U.S. commitment to its allies because those states have faith in U.S. conventional forces for their defense, as well as knowledge of the U.S. willingness to retaliate with nuclear weapons in response to nuclear attacks. Others, including Senator Warren and Representative Smith, note that a \u201cno first use\u201d pledge could reduce the chances of nuclear miscalculation by assuring adversaries that the United States was not about to launch a preemptive nuclear attack. Hence, many conclude that the possible first use of nuclear weapons is not only unnecessary, but also might turn conventional war into a nuclear catastrophe.\nPress reports indicate that the Obama Administration considered adopting a \u201cno first use\u201d policy in 2016. However, these reports indicate that both military and civilian officials opposed this change. Air Force officials argued that a policy of calculated ambiguity provided the President with options in a crisis. Admiral Haney, then the Commander in Chief of Strategic Command, noted that the shift could undermine deterrence and stability in an uncertain security environment. Secretary of State Kerry and Secretary of Defense Carter also raised concerns that a \u201cno first use\u201d policy could undermine the confidence and security of U.S. allies. Secretary of Energy Moniz also expressed opposition. Reports indicate that several allies also weighed in against the change in policy.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10553", "sha1": "6482052e0da5768b4b342a4eb4094f91f042d48b", "filename": "files/20190301_IN10553_6482052e0da5768b4b342a4eb4094f91f042d48b.html", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 455143, "date": "2016-08-16", "retrieved": "2017-04-21T15:16:08.179253", "title": "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Considering \u201cNo First Use\u201d", "summary": "Recent press reports indicate that the Obama Administration might adopt a declaratory policy stating that the United States will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in conflict. These reports have reignited debate about the benefits and risks of this policy, known as a \u201cno first use\u201d pledge. U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that the United States could, under certain circumstances, use nuclear weapons against a state, even if the latter has not already done so. The absence of a \u201cno first use\u201d pledge dates back to the Cold War when the United States sought to deter a Soviet attack on the United States and its allies in Europe. The United States has modified its policy to reduce the apparent role of nuclear weapons, but has still not declared that it would not use them first.\nCurrent Nuclear Declaratory Policy\nThe United States has pledged to refrain from using nuclear weapons against most non-nuclear weapon states, but has neither ruled out their first use in all cases nor specified the circumstances under which it would use them. This approach, known as \u201ccalculated ambiguity,\u201d addressed U.S. concerns during the Cold War, when the United States and NATO faced numerically superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe. At the time, the United States not only developed plans to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield to disrupt or defeat attacking tanks and troops, but it also hoped that the risk of a nuclear response would deter the Soviet Union from initiating a conventional attack. This is not because the United States believed it could defeat the Soviet Union in a nuclear war, but because it hoped the Soviet Union would know that the use of these weapons would likely escalate to all-out nuclear war, with both sides suffering massive destruction. \nU.S. officials have occasionally considered adopting a \u201cno first use\u201d pledge, but the policy has remained largely unchanged since the end of the Cold War. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the Obama Administration stated, \u201cThe fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons ... is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.\u201d According to the report, the United States \u201cwould only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances\u201d and would not threaten or use nuclear weapons, under any circumstances, \u201cagainst non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.\u201d For states not covered by this assurance, the Administration was not prepared to state that the \u201csole purpose\u201d of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack because it could envision \u201ca narrow range of contingencies\u201d where nuclear weapons might play a role in deterring conventional, chemical, or biological attacks.\n\u201cNo First Use\u201d or Not?\nAlthough the United States does not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons, the absence of a \u201cno first use\u201d pledge is less about the perceived need to employ these weapons first in a conflict than it is about the view that the threat of nuclear escalation continues to serve as a deterrent to large-scale conventional war or the use of chemical and biological weapons. Supporters of the current policy argue that removing the threat of nuclear escalation could embolden countries like North Korea, China, or Russia, who might believe that they could overwhelm U.S. allies in their regions and take advantage of local or regional conventional advantages before the United States or its allies could respond. In such a scenario, some argue, the \u201cno first use\u201d pledge would not only undermine deterrence, but could also increase the risk that a conventional war could escalate and involve nuclear weapons use. Moreover, because the United States has pledged to use all means necessary, including nuclear weapons, to defend allies in Europe and Asia, this change in U.S. declaratory policy could undermine allies\u2019 confidence in the U.S. commitment to their defense and possibly spur them to acquire their own nuclear weapons. As a result, in this view, a \u201cno first use\u201d policy could undermine U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals.\nSome analysts outside government dispute these conclusions. Some assert a lack of evidence that the threat of nuclear escalation can deter conventional war, while others note that U.S. nuclear first-use might spark a nuclear response and an all-out nuclear exchange. Moreover, some contend that a \u201cno first use\u201d policy would not undermine the U.S. commitment to its allies because those states have faith in U.S. conventional forces for their defense, as well as knowledge of the U.S. willingness to retaliate with nuclear weapons in response to nuclear attacks. As a result, they conclude that the possible first use of nuclear weapons is not only unnecessary, but also might turn conventional war into a nuclear catastrophe. Moreover, they argue that \u201cno first use\u201d would support U.S. nonproliferation goals by demonstrating that the United States accepted a limited role for its nuclear force.\nPress reports indicate that both military and civilian officials in the Obama Administration oppose a \u201cno first use\u201d pledge. Air Force officials have argued that current ambiguity provides the President with options in a crisis. Admiral Haney, the Commander in Chief of Strategic Command, has noted that the shift could undermine deterrence and stability in an uncertain security environment. Secretary of State Kerry and Secretary of Defense Carter have raised concerns that a \u201cno first use\u201d policy could undermine the confidence and security of U.S. allies. Secretary of Energy Moniz also expressed opposition. Reports indicate that several allies have also weighed in against the change in policy. Congress remains divided, with some, like Senator Dianne Feinstein, arguing that the only moral use for U.S. nuclear weapons is as a deterrent to their use. Others, such as Representative Mac Thornberry, argue that changes in U.S. nuclear policy could lead to a more dangerous world by undermining nuclear deterrence.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10553", "sha1": "e734b53644e46a8dea92736b41c185df25f6cf09", "filename": "files/20160816_IN10553_e734b53644e46a8dea92736b41c185df25f6cf09.html", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "National Defense" ] }